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Microwave and Laser Weapons Reach the Field

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Three directed-energy counter-drone systems from three companies entered the field or demonstration in a single month.

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Key takeaway

Energy-based counter-drone systems reached combat and demonstration readiness simultaneously in March 2026.

Epirus revealed the Leonidas AGV at the AUSA Global Force conference in March 2026. The autonomous ground vehicle integrates high-power microwave (HPM) defeat, with General Dynamics as platform integrator and Kodiak Robotics providing autonomous driving capability. ¹

Separately, the US Navy confirmed that ODIN, its shipboard laser weapon, saw combat deployment aboard a destroyer during Operation Epic Fury. ² ODIN's deployment makes it the first confirmed naval laser used in active combat operations. Combined with AeroVironment's LOCUST X3 unveil the same week, three distinct directed-energy counter-drone systems reached the field or demonstration readiness in a single month.

Iran's campaign has launched 4,446 drones since 28 February, overwhelming missile-based defences that cost 80 to 200 times more per intercept . The Army's E-HEL (Enduring High Energy Laser) competition, expected to select a winner in Q2 FY26, will determine which directed-energy approach (laser, microwave, or hybrid) the military considers production-ready. The theoretical debate about energy weapons replacing missiles for counter-drone duty is over. Procurement decisions are next.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Most countries defend against drone attacks by firing missiles. It is expensive and uses up missiles that might be needed for bigger threats. Directed energy weapons, whether lasers or microwave devices, work differently. They fire pulses of energy that fry the drone's electronics or burn through its airframe. They cost almost nothing per shot and never run out of ammunition. In March 2026, three different versions of this technology reached the battlefield in the same month. That is unusual. It suggests the US military is accepting the technology is ready, not just promising.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Iran's campaign created an emergency demand signal that no single vendor could satisfy immediately. The simultaneous appearance of HPM, laser, and naval variants reflects parallel development tracks funded under different programme lines rather than coordinated procurement, which is typical of US defence innovation under budget uncertainty.

ODIN's naval deployment alongside land-based demonstrations suggests the Navy and Army are running separate directed-energy programmes with limited cross-service coordination, which historically leads to duplicate investment before a common standard emerges.

What could happen next?

The Army E-HEL competition will have real-world performance data from three concurrent deployments, enabling a more informed downselect in Q2 FY26.
Simultaneous fielding of non-interoperable directed-energy systems risks creating a support and logistics burden that limits their operational utility unless a common architecture is mandated.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources

Primary parallel: Israel's transition from gun-based to missile-based air defence in 1973-1982 similarly involved simultaneous fielding of multiple competing systems (Hawk, Chaparral, Stinger) before a dominant technology emerged through attrition-based selection; the multi-system period lasted roughly seven years.

Counter-parallel: The US Navy's CIWS Phalanx versus RAM competition in the 1980s showed that two technically sound but operationally different systems can co-exist permanently rather than converging, if their threat-defeat profiles differ enough.

The counter-UAS market was valued at $4.93 billion in 2025 and is projected to reach $36.42 billion by 2035 . Three simultaneous directed-energy fieldings compress that market growth timeline by validating the technology category commercially.

For defence primes, the integration model matters: Epirus's choice of General Dynamics as platform integrator distributes revenue across the prime ecosystem rather than concentrating it in a startup. This is strategically significant for Epirus's ability to compete for large Pentagon programme-of-record contracts, which favour companies embedded in existing prime relationships.

Consensus view: The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and defense analyst Tom Karako (CSIS) both characterised the simultaneous fielding of multiple directed-energy systems as the clearest signal yet that the US counter-drone community has accepted energy defeat as the structural solution, not a supplementary tool.

Counter-view: Russian military analysts (Moscow Defense Brief, February 2026) argued that the US is fielding directed-energy systems before solving their fundamental limitation: atmospheric attenuation in rain, dust, or smoke degrades laser and microwave effectiveness by 40 to 60 percent, which matters in environments like Iran's Gulf.

Key tension: Whether directed energy can maintain reliable intercept rates across the full range of weather and atmospheric conditions in which adversaries will operate drones.

First Reported In

Update #4 · Factories Under Fire: America's Drone Gap Meets Reality

UK Defence Journal· 4 Apr 2026

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Different Perspectives

Anduril

Anduril views consolidated procurement as enabling rapid scaling — the $20 billion enterprise contract replaces 120 separate Army contracts with a single vehicle. Arsenal-1's early opening positions it to argue manufacturing readiness that CCA competitors cannot yet demonstrate.

Ukrainian drone manufacturers

Ukrainian firms have battle-tested interceptors priced at $2,100–$2,500 per unit and demand from 11 nations, but the wartime export ban forces partnerships with Western firms rather than direct sales.

IISS

IISS characterises drone innovation in the Russo-Ukrainian war as adaptation within existing military paradigms rather than a transformation of warfare — a more cautious assessment than the Pentagon's procurement urgency suggests.

US Pentagon, Anduril and Shield AI

The Pentagon awarded Anduril a $20 billion enterprise vehicle and confirmed Gauntlet II's live EW red team, prioritising procurement speed over competition; Anduril began YFQ-44A production four months early. Shield AI countered by raising $2 billion and validating Hivemind on a European airframe, betting multi-platform interoperability hedges against Anduril's platform lock.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Ukraine

Zelenskyy publicly disclosed that 10 shadow drone factories have been built abroad to circumvent Ukraine's wartime export ban, signed 10-year defence deals with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and deployed 228 specialists across five Gulf states. The disclosure is a calculated signal that the ban is fracturing and Kyiv is seeking revenue structures independent of Western aid.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia signed a 10-year defence deal with Ukraine and accepted the deployment of Ukrainian counter-drone specialists the US declined to partner on in August 2025. The Gulf pivot reflects Riyadh's assessment that Ukrainian combat-proven doctrine at $2,500 per interceptor is more cost-effective than Patriot-dependent air defence.