22MAY

Murkowski's Iran AUMF still unfiled before recess

3 min read

10:57UTC

Senator Lisa Murkowski confirmed on 9 May her Iran AUMF was still not filed; she will introduce it the week of 11 May absent a White House credible plan. None had arrived.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

An Article I authorisation effort sharpens as the executive's verbal-only Iran posture enters its third month.

Senator Lisa Murkowski confirmed on 9 May that her Iran Authorisation for Use of Military Force (AUMF) had not been filed. The Alaska Republican stated she would introduce it the week of 11 May absent a White House credible plan ¹. No plan was delivered by 9 May. The Senate returns from recess on the same week the Trump-Xi summit opens on 14 May, compressing the legislative timeline to a single working week before the next forcing event.

The last signed Iran-adjacent presidential instrument was the 1 May OFAC General Licence W ; the verbal track running on top of it (the carrier escort announcement, the EPIC FURY conclusion, the MOU claim) has produced no signed counterpart. The Murkowski AUMF acquires argumentative force from that gap. The constitutional argument has shifted from "is this a war the President can wage alone?" to "is this a war the President can run on Truth Social alone?".

Murkowski has voted with the bipartisan War Powers caucus through six prior unsuccessful WPR motions in this Congress; her AUMF route is the inverse approach, granting Article I authority on conditions rather than denying it. The Murkowski conditions, requiring a White House plan with verifiable benchmarks before any vote, would force the executive to sign something rather than say something. Without Susan Collins or Rand Paul signing on as co-sponsors, the bill enters a Senate where the Republican leadership has not yet conceded that 71 days of unsigned Iran posture amount to an Article I deficit. The White House has the working week before the 14 May summit to produce a written counter-text or accept the legislative pressure.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

In the US, only Congress has the power to formally declare war. But the President can deploy troops and conduct military operations using emergency powers for up to 60 days without Congress voting. After 60 days, Congress is supposed to either authorise the action formally or the troops must come home. That is what the War Powers Resolution, passed in 1973, requires. Senator **Lisa Murkowski** of Alaska wants to introduce an **Authorisation for Use of Military Force (AUMF)**, a formal congressional permission slip for the Iran war, but with conditions attached. She says she will file it the week of 11 May unless the White House produces a credible written plan for the conflict first. This matters because it would force the President to either produce signed documents or face a congressional vote. The war has run for 71 days without a single signed presidential legal instrument (no executive order, no formal authorisation). Murkowski's move is an attempt to force written accountability onto a war that has been run entirely through social media posts.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The Murkowski AUMF's structural logic rests on a constitutional asymmetry that the 71-day verbal-only track has exposed.

**Article I** of the US Constitution assigns Congress the power to declare war. The War Powers Resolution operationalises this through the 60-day clock, but the clock has never been successfully enforced because the Supreme Court has avoided ruling on its constitutionality, and every administration has argued that ongoing operations authorise themselves by Congress's failure to cut off funding.

The verbal-only Iran track has produced a new factual basis for the Article I argument: the President is waging a conflict without any signed presidential instrument visible in the Federal Register (no executive order, no published CENTCOM operations order, no Treasury designation with Iran specifically in scope since GL-U lapsed). An AUMF in this context would force the executive to choose between accepting conditions it has refused to commit to, or actively rejecting congressional authorisation, which produces a clean Article I test that courts could rule on.

Murkowski's specific leverage derives from her position as a centrist Republican whose vote is needed for several other White House legislative priorities. Her threat to file the AUMF functions as a negotiating instrument against an administration that needs her vote elsewhere in the same legislative session, separate from any constitutional outcome.

What could happen next?

Consequence
Without Susan Collins or Rand Paul as co-sponsors, the Murkowski AUMF enters a Senate where Republican leadership has not conceded that 71 days of unsigned Iran posture constitute an Article I deficit; the bill may not reach a floor vote.
Short term · 0.72
Precedent
If the White House produces a written plan in response to Murkowski's threat without the AUMF being filed, it would confirm that the threat of legislation is more effective than WPR enforcement mechanisms that have failed six times in this Congress.
Immediate · 0.68
Risk
The Senate returning from recess the same week as the 14 May Trump-Xi summit creates a compressed window: if the summit produces a diplomatic framework, the AUMF loses political oxygen; if the summit fails, the AUMF filing would coincide with a new escalation phase.
Immediate · 0.78

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-leaning sources from United States

United States

LeftRight

Primary parallel: The 2002 Iraq Authorisation for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Public Law 107-243, passed the Senate 77-23 and the House 296-133, but it required the President to first certify to Congress that diplomatic efforts had failed and that military action was consistent with the anti-terrorism resolution.

The Murkowski Iran AUMF inverts this: it demands a White House credible plan before the AUMF is even filed, rather than after it passes, using the threat of legislation as the forcing mechanism. That distinction matters because it puts the burden of producing a signed document on the executive before any congressional vote, which is more direct than 2002's pre-vote certification requirement.

Counter-parallel: The 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR), enacted over Nixon's veto, established a 60-day clock for undeclared hostilities, with the President required to notify Congress within 48 hours of deploying forces. Every President since 1973 has contested the WPR's constitutionality without openly defying it to the point of a Supreme Court test.

The 2026 Senate has voted down WPR motions six times without forcing a test. Murkowski's AUMF route sidesteps the WPR's enforceability problem: rather than using the clock mechanism that Presidents have evaded for 53 years, she would create an affirmative congressional authorisation with conditions, which is constitutionally harder to ignore than a withdrawal deadline.

Sources:The War Zone

Mentions:Lisa Murkowski →White House →United States →Iran →Murkowski's AUMF →Truth Social →AUMF →Iraq →Susan Collins →General Licence W →Rand Paul →OFAC →Trump-Xi summit →War Powers Resolution →Nixon →Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) →Donald Trump →US Senate →

First Reported In

Update #92 · An MOU asking Iran to surrender what nobody can count

The War Zone· 9 May 2026

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Causes and effects

This Event

Murkowski's Iran AUMF still unfiled before recess

An Article I authorisation effort hardens precisely as the executive branch's verbal-only Iran posture extends into a third month, with the Senate returning before the 14 May Trump-Xi summit.

Led to

Murkowski's Iran AUMF still unfiled as Senate returns

ID:3165 confirmed Murkowski had not filed as of 8-9 May; this event records the expiry of her 30 April conditional window and the Senate's return on 11 May without an AUMF filed.

Occurred 11 May 2026

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Murkowski holds AUMF for a paper plan

Murkowski's 9 May AUMF non-filing established the pattern continued when the Senate returned on 11 May

Occurred 11 May 2026

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Different Perspectives

Rafael Grossi, IAEA Director General

Grossi's Update 349 of 7 May recorded a drone strike on ZNPP's radiation monitoring laboratory on 3 May. Rosatom's 17 May public attack on the Secretariat's neutrality degrades the diplomatic ground Grossi needs for the sixth repair ceasefire at day 60 on the single backup line.

Indian Government / Embassy Moscow

The Indian Embassy in Moscow confirmed on 18 May that an Indian national was killed and three hospitalised at a refinery construction site in the 17 May barrage. India is among the largest buyers of discounted Russian crude; the fatality forces a diplomatic protest without changing the purchasing posture.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish President

Erdogan met Zelenskyy in Ankara for nearly three hours on 15 May before the Istanbul session, recovering Turkey's 2022 mediator role and reducing Trump's leverage by hosting bilateral talks without Washington in the room. Turkey hosts the NATO Ankara summit on 7-8 July; the Istanbul format gives Erdogan standing at both tables simultaneously.

Viktor Orban / Hungarian Government

Budapest's new cabinet, formed 12 May, holds the institutional veto point on the EU tranche disbursement ahead of the first-half June window. Hungary has previously leveraged EU loan tranches to extract bilateral concessions; the combination of a fresh cabinet and a tight disbursement timeline makes Budapest the single highest-leverage actor in the EU track this fortnight.

European Council / Commission

The Commission is preparing a three-document disbursement package for the 9.1-billion euro first tranche of the EU loan to Ukraine, targeting first-half June, but delivery depends on the Magyar cabinet, which formed on 12 May, not blocking the mechanism. The 20th sanctions package remains in force against Russia.

Donald Trump / US Treasury

Treasury issued GL 134C with a 48-hour gap after GL 134B expired, confirming the waiver series functions as permanent monthly management rather than a wind-down instrument. Washington was absent from the Istanbul room; Treasury Secretary Bessent framed the Cuba carve-out as protecting 'most vulnerable nations', maintaining the fiction that the 30-day bridge has a humanitarian rationale.