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Iran Conflict 2026
22APR

Houthis threaten second chokepoint

1 min read
10:22UTC

Three days of sustained attacks on Israel establish that Ansar Allah can maintain tempo. The question is whether they close the strait.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

The Houthi front is calibrated escalation, not symbolic gestures.

Ansar Allah struck Israel for a third consecutive day on 30 March . All projectiles were intercepted. Deputy Information Minister Mohammed Mansour described Bab al-Mandeb closure as "among our options" in a staged escalation, contingent on Israeli or US ground movement. 1

No formal blockade has been imposed. All vessels, including US- and Israeli-linked ships, continue to transit. But three days of attacks confirm sustainable operational tempo. Combined with near-total Hormuz closure, a formal Bab al-Mandeb blockade would place simultaneous pressure on the world's two most critical oil transit routes for the first time since the 1973 oil crisis. MARAD and UKMTO have already confirmed deliberate GNSS denial spanning both chokepoints .

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The Houthis control much of northern Yemen and have been attacking ships in the Red Sea since 2024. They are also allied with Iran. For three days running, they have fired missiles and drones toward Israel; all were intercepted. Bab al-Mandeb is a narrow strait between Yemen and Djibouti. About 10% of all world trade and a large share of oil from the Gulf to Europe passes through it. If the Houthis block it, combined with Iran blocking the Strait of Hormuz, two of the world's main oil routes would be shut simultaneously. That last happened in 1973 during the Arab oil embargo. It triggered a global recession. The Houthis have not closed Bab al-Mandeb yet, but their deputy minister said it is an option.

First Reported In

Update #53 · Trump drops Hormuz goal; toll becomes law

Al Jazeera· 31 Mar 2026
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