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Iran Conflict 2026
10APR

Collins, Tillis back Murkowski's Iran AUMF draft

3 min read
08:05UTC

Republican senators Susan Collins and Thom Tillis publicly signalled support for Lisa Murkowski's pre-committee Iran AUMF on 25 April. The draft remains pre-referral with six days to the 1 May War Powers deadline.

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Key takeaway

Two Republican signatures bring Murkowski's AUMF closer to markup before the 1 May War Powers deadline.

Senator Lisa Murkowski's Iran AUMF draft has not formally reached committee, but Susan Collins and Thom Tillis publicly signalled support on 25 April 1. Tillis told reporters he has been "in conversations with Murkowski about her proposal" and said it "would put to bed this whole narrative about whether Congress supports ongoing action". John Curtis of Utah signalled similar reservations about war authority. Josh Hawley's earlier AUMF push has gone quiet.

The Authorisation for the Use of Military Force is the formal congressional instrument that licenses the executive branch to keep US forces in hostilities. Without it, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 imposes a 60-day clock from the introduction of US armed forces into hostilities; the Senate rejected the fifth WPR by 51-46 on 22 April and Murkowski drafted the AUMF in the same week . If the vehicle reaches markup before 1 May it creates a bipartisan signed instrument the executive branch does not control, potentially binding operational authorities the President has so far exercised verbally.

Senate Democrats hold a further eight WPR resolutions in procedural reserve, which extends pressure into May regardless of what Murkowski produces by Friday 1 May. The exact start date for the WPR clock is contested, with 28 February (first CENTCOM engagement), 4 March (first confirmed hostile fire exchange), or a later date The Administration may argue. If the trigger date is challenged before the courts, the 1 May deadline could be extended without a Senate vote.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, but since the 1970s, presidents have fought wars using executive authority without a formal declaration. To put limits on this, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973, which says the president must get congressional approval within 60 days of starting military action, or stop. Trump launched strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026. The 60-day clock expires on 1 May 2026. Five Senate votes to end the war have failed. Now Senator Lisa Murkowski is working on a different approach: an AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force), which is a congressional vote to formally authorise the war already in progress, rather than to end it. The difference matters. A WPR vote to end the war is politically difficult (senators are seen as siding with Iran). An AUMF authorising the war is easier to vote for, but gives Congress a formal stake in how the war is conducted, including requiring disclosure and transparency Trump has so far avoided.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Two structural forces are pushing Senate Republicans toward the Murkowski AUMF rather than continued WPR rejection.

The first is the 51-46 WPR margin from 22 April. Five WPR votes have failed, but the margin is narrowing: the fourth vote failed 47-52, the fifth 51-46. John Fetterman crossing to Republicans and Rand Paul crossing to Democrats on the same vote confirms the coalition is unstable. Republicans who cannot hold the WPR line have an incentive to pre-empt further WPR votes by passing an AUMF that formally settles the legal question.

Thom Tillis announced he will not seek a third term, converting his North Carolina seat into an open contest. A senator with no re-election constraint is more willing to publicly support an independent oversight vehicle; Tillis's endorsement of Murkowski signals that the retiring-senator caucus may be the most tractable Republican constituency for any war-constraint measure.

What could happen next?
  • Opportunity

    If Murkowski's AUMF reaches the floor before 1 May and passes, it would produce the first formal signed Iran war instrument of the conflict, creating a legal baseline any subsequent diplomatic settlement would need to address.

    Immediate · 0.52
  • Risk

    An AUMF that passes without meaningful disclosure conditions would entrench the war's legal basis and reduce future congressional leverage, despite its proponents' stated transparency goals.

    Medium term · 0.68
  • Consequence

    Hawley's AUMF push has gone quiet (ID:2676); if Murkowski's vehicle advances, it consolidates the congressional war-authorisation debate around a transparency-focused text rather than Hawley's earlier harder-line version.

    Short term · 0.75
First Reported In

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