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Iran Conflict 2026
28MAR

UAE and Saudi Arabia weigh Iran strikes

3 min read
17:06UTC

Axios reports the UAE and Saudi Arabia are considering direct attacks on Iranian missile sites — a step no Gulf Arab state has taken in the modern era, and one that would cost Riyadh a Chinese-brokered peace deal barely two years old.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

The report's sourcing — Israeli officials rather than Emirati or Saudi ones — suggests this may serve Israeli information interests in widening the coalition as much as it reflects genuine Gulf deliberation.

Axios reported Wednesday, citing Israeli officials, that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are considering direct strikes on Iranian missile launch sites, driven by the volume of fire both countries have absorbed. Neither government has confirmed. The UAE has intercepted 165 ballistic missiles, 2 cruise missiles, and 541 drones since operations began . Saudi air defences downed eight drones near Riyadh during the same attack wave that struck the US Embassy compound .

The source warrants scrutiny. Israeli officials have a direct interest in Gulf States joining the campaign — broader participation distributes both the military burden and the political exposure. A report sourced to Israeli officials, published without confirmation from Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, may reflect an Israeli aspiration as much as a Gulf intention. The incentive to leak such a report is obvious: it pressures Gulf capitals publicly and creates a diplomatic expectation they must either meet or visibly refuse.

For Saudi Arabia, the calculus runs through Beijing. The 2023 China-brokered normalisation agreement with Iran ended seven years of severed relations, reopened embassies, and gave China a diplomatic stake in Gulf stability it had never previously held. Saudi strikes on Iranian territory would collapse that architecture entirely. Beijing has already moved beyond general calls for restraint to direct negotiations with Tehran pressing Iran to spare specific Gulf infrastructure . Chinese diplomatic credibility is invested in a framework that Saudi bombs would destroy.

No Gulf Arab state has struck Iranian territory in the modern era. During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Gulf monarchies funded Baghdad's war effort and allowed Iraqi aircraft to operate from their bases, but never launched their own attacks on Iran. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have framed every action in this conflict as purely defensive — intercepting incoming fire, protecting their own populations. Strikes on launch sites inside Iran would end that framing permanently, converting two non-belligerents into active combatants in a war neither chose to start.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

According to a single report citing Israeli sources, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are reportedly considering launching their own airstrikes against Iranian missile sites. Neither country has confirmed this. Both have so far absorbed Iranian missile attacks without striking Iran directly. Joining the fight would be a major escalation — particularly for Saudi Arabia, which signed a peace deal with Iran just three years ago brokered by China. If they do strike, Iran could respond by targeting Saudi oil facilities, which would affect global energy prices significantly.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

China faces a direct test of its regional diplomatic credibility that the body does not surface: the 2023 deal was Beijing's most significant Middle East diplomatic achievement. Saudi strikes on Iran would demonstrate that Chinese soft power in the Gulf is insufficient to prevent an agreement signatory from attacking the other party — revealing whether Chinese regional influence is structural or merely transactional, with consequences for Beijing's global mediator positioning.

Root Causes

The 2023 Saudi-Iran normalisation was always a strategic hedge rather than genuine rapprochement — Riyadh was simultaneously balancing US pressure for Gulf-Israel normalisation and Chinese incentives for Iran engagement. Iran's sustained ballistic missile campaign against Saudi territory has now collapsed that balance, forcing a choice the 2023 agreement was specifically designed to defer indefinitely.

Escalation

UAE's structural position differs from Saudi Arabia's in ways the body does not address: no China-brokered normalisation agreement at risk, an existing intelligence-sharing architecture with Israel via post-Abraham Accords security cooperation, and a smaller domestic political exposure to Sunni-Shia framing. UAE acting before or independently of Saudi Arabia is structurally more plausible than joint simultaneous action.

What could happen next?
2 risk1 consequence1 meaning1 precedent
  • Risk

    Iranian retaliation against Saudi oil infrastructure following Gulf state strikes could remove 6-10% of global crude supply, driving oil prices to levels not seen since 2008 and compounding existing shipping insurance paralysis.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Consequence

    Saudi participation would dissolve the distinction between the US-Israeli coalition and the broader Gulf, transforming a bilateral conflict into a regional war with no neutral Gulf mediators remaining.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Risk

    China's credibility as a regional mediator is directly at stake — Saudi strikes on Iran would represent the most significant failure of Chinese Middle East diplomacy since Beijing's regional engagement began in earnest.

    Medium term · Suggested
  • Meaning

    Israeli sourcing of the report suggests a deliberate signal to Tehran that Gulf participation is possible — functioning as a deterrence escalation tool whether or not Gulf action is genuinely imminent.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Precedent

    Gulf state strikes on Iran would establish that the Abraham Accords framework has produced effective military coalition behaviour even without formal Saudi-Israel normalisation.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #19 · First US torpedo kill since 1945

Axios· 4 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
UAE and Saudi Arabia weigh Iran strikes
Direct Gulf Arab military strikes on Iranian territory would dissolve the distinction both states have maintained between defending their own airspace and joining the US-Israeli offensive campaign. For Saudi Arabia, it would also jeopardise the 2023 China-brokered normalisation with Iran — Beijing's most consequential Middle Eastern diplomatic achievement — at the moment China has shifted from general restraint calls to direct pressure on Tehran.
Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Futures markets priced CENTCOM's strikes-complete statement as a de-escalation signal and pushed Brent down 1.7 per cent to $94.71, even as the IRGC declared Hormuz closed. Lloyd's war-risk premiums held elevated because institutional de-listing requires a UN Security Council resolution that Russia and China have just shown they will block.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on 6-7 June with no public response. The IRGC's Hormuz closure on 11 June shows the corps is acting independently of the channel Pakistan is using, making the mediation structurally unable to produce a binding commitment without direct IRGC access.
Russia and China
Russia and China
Russia and China voted against GOV/2026/40 at the IAEA Board, following through on the blocking position coordinated with Grossi in Geneva on 5 June; both states continue to oppose Western institutional pressure on Iran at every multilateral venue.
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
The E3 co-sponsored IAEA resolution GOV/2026/40, adopted 21-3-10 on 10 June, demanding Iran disclose 440.9 kg of unaccounted HEU and admit inspectors to four denied facilities. The 10 abstentions and Russia-China noes leave any Security Council referral without a viable enforcement path.
IRGC / Iran military command
IRGC / Iran military command
The corps declared Hormuz closed to all traffic on 11 June and claimed two vessels struck, overriding the MoU its own civilian negotiators were pursuing through Pakistan. The closure order used the Persian Gulf Strait Authority apparatus to convert a toll mechanism into a military prohibition.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
CENTCOM completed a second day of strikes on Tehran, Sirik and Minab, rejected the IRGC Hormuz closure as inconsistent with observed transit, and said strikes were complete. Hegseth framed the bombing explicitly as the negotiation: the method is coercive deal-making with no stated pause threshold.