14JUN

US Oil Sanctions Waiver Expires 11 April Amid Confusion

2 min read

11:42UTC

OFAC's GL 134A expires 11 April; at $121 per barrel, any extension would hand Russia far more revenue than when the waiver was issued at $73, while simultaneous vessel desanctioning created contradictory signals.

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Key takeaway

GL 134A expiry on 11 April is the binary choice: extension at $121/barrel or lapse compounding Russia's crisis.

OFAC issued General License 134 on 12 March, covering the roughly 124 million barrels of Russian crude at sea , amended it to GL 134A on 19 March, and faces a binary decision on its 11 April expiry. At $73 per barrel when issued, the waiver was defensible as market stabilisation. At $121, the same licence authorises far greater per-barrel income than its design contemplated.

OFAC added Iran, North Korea, and Cuba exclusions to GL 134A one week after the original licence, a rapid amendment suggesting Treasury received evidence that cargoes were being redirected toward sanctioned parties. On 31 March, OFAC separately removed sanctions on three Russian cargo vessels: Fesco Magadan, Fesco Moneron, and SV Nikolay.

The contradictory pattern, tightening the licence's terms while reducing pressure on named Russian vessels, is consistent with an administration managing competing objectives across the Iran war and Ukraine simultaneously. The Atlantic Council warned that extension at current prices "risks sustaining Russia's war effort."

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US government gave Russia a special oil sales exemption that expires on 11 April. When it was issued, oil prices were around $73 per barrel. Now that the Iran war has pushed prices to $121, extending the same exemption would hand Russia much more money than originally intended. At the same time, the US removed sanctions on three Russian ships while tightening the exemption's rules — sending confusing signals about American policy toward Russia.

What could happen next?

Risk
GL 134A extension at $121/barrel would constitute the largest single US-authorised revenue transfer to Russia since sanctions began.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources

At $73/barrel (waiver issuance price), each barrel of Russian crude under GL 134A generated approximately $29 above the $44.10 cap. At $121/barrel, the same barrel generates $76.90 above cap — a 2.6x increase in per-barrel sanction circumvention value.

Consensus view: Atlantic Council and external sanctions analysts assess extension at current Urals prices would directly fund Russian war prosecution at levels the waiver was never designed to permit.

Counter-view: Treasury may extend on Iran war market stabilisation grounds — the same justification that applied at $73/barrel, though far less defensible at $121.

Key tension: Whether Treasury's Iran war stabilisation objective outweighs the revenue-to-Russia impact of extension at current oil prices.

Sources:Mayer Brown

Mentions:Moscow →Ukraine →Iran →Urals →North Korea →Russia →OFAC →Atlantic Council →

First Reported In

Update #11 · Russia Sells Less Oil but Earns More

Mayer Brown· 5 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

This Event

US Oil Sanctions Waiver Expires 11 April Amid Confusion

The GL 134A expiry is a binary US policy signal: extension at $121 per barrel directly subsidises Moscow's war revenue; lapse combined with Baltic terminal damage would compound Russia's export crisis.

Led to

Treasury kills $150M-a-day Russian oil waiver

At $121 Urals the waiver was running 2.6x above the $73 barrel design price, making non-renewal a structural inevitability.

Occurred 16 Apr 2026

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GL 134A lapses toward quiet extension

GL 134A event is the direct resolution of ID:2027's binary-choice framing: extension at $121/bbl or lapse on the 11 April expiry date.

Occurred 11 Apr 2026

Read story →

Different Perspectives

Qatar (mediator)

Qatari negotiators flew to Tehran on Sunday morning to close remaining gaps between the parties, operating as the primary shuttle channel. Qatar's role is to bridge the civilian-track gap the IRGC veto has left.

IAEA / Rafael Grossi

Grossi replied to Araghchi's 13 June protection-of-materials letter the same day, citing Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement obligation to declare any nuclear material transfer. With 97 days of lost inspector access and approximately 240 kg unaccounted, Grossi has treaty text and no inspectors on the ground to enforce it.

United Arab Emirates

The UAE state oil company assessed full Hormuz flows will not resume until 2027 even with a fast deal, citing demining, inspection, and insurance timelines. The UAE ambassador to Washington said a simple ceasefire is not enough.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The IRGC ran naval exercises in Hormuz during Geneva talks and its political deputy declared Iran was negotiating from a position of strength. The corps has not endorsed the MoU; by amplifying Mashhad protests through Fars, it is framing any deal as conditions it imposed rather than a concession it accepted.

Iran Foreign Ministry / Araghchi

Araghchi's dilute-in-Iran red line was met by the US concession, but his foreign ministry spokesman said Tehran had not taken a final decision and a signing might come in days, not Sunday. Araghchi separately wrote to the IAEA pledging to protect nuclear materials as dilution negotiations advanced.

White House / US negotiating team

Washington accepted dilution inside Iran rather than ship-out, its first substantive material concession in 106 days, the New York Times reported. With the White House register blank and the ceremony slipped a third weekend, the administration has moved its negotiating position without yet producing a document.