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Iran Conflict 2026
11JUN

Haaretz: strikes left Iran nuclear capacity intact

3 min read
09:17UTC

Amos Harel cited a former senior Israeli military intelligence official saying US-Israeli strikes did not destroy Iran's underground enrichment infrastructure or its missile production lines.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

A former Israeli intelligence official told Haaretz strikes failed; Iran may now read the bomb as durable deterrent.

Haaretz published analysis by senior military correspondent Amos Harel on the morning of Monday 18 May citing a former senior Israeli military intelligence official: US-Israeli strikes did not destroy Iran's underground enrichment infrastructure or its missile production lines, both of which remain largely operational. The assessment goes further. Tehran may now read the war's lesson as the opposite of its stated objective, namely 'only nuclear weapons can deter future wars with Israel and the United States.' The Harel piece runs on a single on-record former official, and the editorial weight comes from the seat the source has vacated rather than from institutional cover. Haaretz is the centre-left Tel Aviv daily whose military desk has the longest track record of breaking unwelcome assessments from inside Israel's defence establishment; placing the story there, rather than in Yedioth or Israel Hayom, signals the source wanted the unfiltered version on the record. The corroborating institutional evidence is the eight-month IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) blackout itself. Read against the Carnegie Endowment finding by Jane Darby Menton that the IAEA's eight-month lockout makes any moratorium unverifiable in either direction , and against Iran's 15-year enrichment-freeze offer that produced no counter-text , the Harel assessment names what the action paper trail already shows. The instrument that would lock a moratorium in place does not exist. The verification regime that would catch a covert breakout was suspended by a 221-0 Majlis vote on 11 April. Iran's parliament has separately codified the security shift, with Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf's 17 May 'new order' speech carrying the political register that travels alongside a domestic deterrence consensus. The campaign's stated aim, eliminating Iran's nuclear option, has now been displaced inside Iran by the conclusion that the bomb is the only durable deterrent against a war that no signed instrument has ended.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

After the US and Israeli militaries struck Iran's nuclear sites, the official line was that the strikes had set back Iran's nuclear programme. Now, a former senior Israeli military intelligence official has told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz that the most important parts of Iran's nuclear infrastructure, the underground enrichment facilities and missile factories, survived largely intact. The official also warned about something more serious: Iran might now conclude that the only way to stop future attacks is to build an actual nuclear weapon. That is the opposite of what the strikes were supposed to achieve. The international nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, cannot check this independently because Iran has restricted inspector access for over eight months.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The Haaretz assessment surfaces a structural intelligence problem: the IAEA verification system that would normally resolve the 'intact or degraded' question has been suspended since Iran restricted inspector access following the strikes. Without third-party verification, the debate between Israeli Air Force optimists and intelligence community sceptics cannot be resolved publicly.

**Israel**'s **Netanyahu** coalition has staked its political survival on a defined military success against Iran, which sits structurally upstream of every strike decision. The coalition requires a legible 'win' from the strikes; an assessment that Iran's nuclear capability survived intact undermines that narrative and the political justification for the military campaign.

The Haaretz source, identified as a 'former senior military intelligence official', represents the faction inside Israel's security establishment that believes the public narrative has diverged from the classified assessment.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    If the Haaretz assessment is correct, Iran's enrichment programme could resume at near-pre-strike capacity within weeks, eliminating the operational justification for any negotiated pause.

    Short term · 0.65
  • Risk

    A political reassessment inside Israel, if the Haaretz source reflects broader intelligence community doubt, could trigger pressure for a second strike cycle before Iran reconstitutes further.

    Medium term · 0.52
  • Precedent

    Strikes that leave enrichment infrastructure intact while motivating weaponisation may become the defining failure mode of preventive military action against proliferators in the post-Osirak era.

    Long term · 0.7
First Reported In

Update #101 · Barakah hit, Trump posts, Italy sends minesweepers

Haaretz· 18 May 2026
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Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Futures markets priced CENTCOM's strikes-complete statement as a de-escalation signal and pushed Brent down 1.7 per cent to $94.71, even as the IRGC declared Hormuz closed. Lloyd's war-risk premiums held elevated because institutional de-listing requires a UN Security Council resolution that Russia and China have just shown they will block.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on 6-7 June with no public response. The IRGC's Hormuz closure on 11 June shows the corps is acting independently of the channel Pakistan is using, making the mediation structurally unable to produce a binding commitment without direct IRGC access.
Russia and China
Russia and China
Russia and China voted against GOV/2026/40 at the IAEA Board, following through on the blocking position coordinated with Grossi in Geneva on 5 June; both states continue to oppose Western institutional pressure on Iran at every multilateral venue.
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
The E3 co-sponsored IAEA resolution GOV/2026/40, adopted 21-3-10 on 10 June, demanding Iran disclose 440.9 kg of unaccounted HEU and admit inspectors to four denied facilities. The 10 abstentions and Russia-China noes leave any Security Council referral without a viable enforcement path.
IRGC / Iran military command
IRGC / Iran military command
The corps declared Hormuz closed to all traffic on 11 June and claimed two vessels struck, overriding the MoU its own civilian negotiators were pursuing through Pakistan. The closure order used the Persian Gulf Strait Authority apparatus to convert a toll mechanism into a military prohibition.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
CENTCOM completed a second day of strikes on Tehran, Sirik and Minab, rejected the IRGC Hormuz closure as inconsistent with observed transit, and said strikes were complete. Hegseth framed the bombing explicitly as the negotiation: the method is coercive deal-making with no stated pause threshold.