Skip to content
Briefings are running a touch slower this week while we rebuild the foundations.See roadmap
Iran Conflict 2026
25MAY

Iraq: force majeure; oil goes nowhere

4 min read
13:55UTC

With the Strait of Hormuz blocked and onshore storage full, OPEC's second-largest producer has told every foreign operator it can no longer honour export contracts — turning Iraq's oilfields into stranded assets.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Iraq's force majeure is structurally irresolvable until Hormuz reopens — diplomacy cannot fix it.

Iraq's oil ministry declared Force majeure on all oilfields operated by foreign companies, in a letter dated 17 March 1. Onshore storage has reached capacity. Production cuts have been ordered. Iraq produces roughly 4.5 million barrels per day — second only to Saudi Arabia within OPEC — and exports the vast majority from its southern Basra terminals through tanker routes that transit the strait of Hormuz. Gulf oil exports had already fallen at least 60% compared with February .

Force majeure suspends Iraq's contractual obligations to the international companies — BP, TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil, Lukoil, CNOOC — that operate its largest fields under technical service contracts. Those companies cannot lift the crude they are owed. Iraq cannot store crude it continues to extract. The result is mandatory well shut-ins — a process that risks long-term reservoir damage, particularly in Iraq's pressurised southern fields, and carries restart costs running into hundreds of millions of dollars per field.

Iraq is more exposed than its Gulf neighbours to a prolonged shutdown. Oil accounts for more than 90% of government revenue and virtually all export earnings. The Central Bank of Iraq held roughly $100 billion in foreign reserves before the war — a fraction of Saudi Arabia's $430 billion or the UAE's estimated $1.4 trillion in sovereign wealth. Iraq cannot sustain months of near-zero oil income without defaulting on salaries for its 4.5 million public-sector employees or cutting funding for security forces still deployed against Islamic State remnants in the west.

Iraq is not a party to this conflict. Its oilfields have not been struck. But its geography — entirely dependent on the strait for southern exports — has made it one of the war's largest economic casualties. The Force majeure formalises what Brent at $112.19 and a record $14.20-per-barrel backwardation 2 had already priced in: for Iraq, the physical link between oil in the ground and the global refining system has been broken.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iraq earns nearly all of its government income from selling oil. That oil reaches export markets almost entirely through the Strait of Hormuz. With Hormuz now effectively closed by the war, Iraq physically cannot export its oil — not because of any political decision Baghdad made, but because of the geography of its pipeline and port infrastructure. The force majeure declaration is Iraq formally telling its foreign oil company partners — BP, ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, PetroChina — that it legally cannot fulfil its contractual obligations. Those companies in turn cannot fulfil their supply commitments to refineries. Those refineries cannot process the volumes they planned for. This cascade moves through global energy supply chains, compounding the direct Hormuz disruption with a contractual and logistical second wave that takes longer to unwind.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

The force majeure signals that the war's economic blast radius has expanded to encompass a non-belligerent state's fiscal survival — a development with no precedent in the post-Cold War Gulf. Iraq's crisis creates a second-order pressure point: if Baghdad cannot pay its security forces, the operational distinction between Iraqi government forces and Iranian-aligned PMF becomes irrelevant, potentially destabilising the one state both belligerents have nominally sought to keep outside direct hostilities.

Root Causes

Iraq's catastrophic export-route concentration is a structural vulnerability created by two compounding factors: decades of underinvestment in alternative pipeline infrastructure following the 1991 Gulf War, and documented Iranian influence operations that blocked proposed Gulf pipeline projects connecting Iraq to Saudi Arabian or Kuwaiti terminals — preserving Hormuz dependency as a lever of Iranian influence over Baghdad that now cuts both ways.

Escalation

Iraq's force majeure transforms it from passive geographic casualty to active economic casualty with political consequences. Baghdad funds approximately 90% of government expenditure from oil revenues; a multi-week interruption creates a fiscal crisis measurable in weeks, not months. The Popular Mobilisation Forces — Iranian-aligned militias on the Iraqi government payroll — are among the creditors most sensitive to payment delay. PMF funding disruption is a transmission mechanism through which Iraq's fiscal crisis could directly degrade Iranian proxy capacity across the region.

What could happen next?
1 consequence2 risk1 meaning1 precedent
  • Consequence

    Iraq's Development Fund provides approximately 3–4 months of fiscal buffer before Baghdad faces a government payroll crisis, including for Iranian-aligned PMF forces.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Risk

    International oil company activation of force majeure clauses would suspend Iraqi field maintenance, risking permanent reservoir pressure damage that outlasts the war by years.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Meaning

    Iraq's involuntary alignment as economic casualty creates pressure on Baghdad to choose a side — pressing for Hormuz reopening it cannot achieve alone, or seeking emergency financing from Iran or the Gulf states.

    Medium term · Suggested
  • Risk

    PMF funding disruption caused by Iraq's fiscal crisis could inadvertently reduce Iranian proxy capacity — an unplanned consequence of neither belligerent's strategy.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Precedent

    This is the first use of force majeure by a major oil producer for logistical rather than political reasons since the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq war disruptions.

    Long term · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #43 · Trump floats wind-down, deploys 2,200 more

Bloomberg· 21 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
Iraq: force majeure; oil goes nowhere
Iraq's force majeure converts the Hormuz blockage from a logistics disruption into a legal contractual default, suspending obligations to every international oil company in the country. Production must now be cut, risking long-term reservoir damage and fiscal crisis for a government that depends on oil for over 90% of its revenue.
Different Perspectives
Lloyd's of London
Lloyd's of London
The Joint War Committee left Hormuz war-risk premiums at $10-14 million per voyage on 25 May, declining to move on Brent's 5% fall. The JWC's protocol requires a UN Security Council resolution or bilateral government certification letter before de-listing, and neither has arrived: a verbal understanding does not satisfy the formal condition the reinsurance market's treaty terms require.
Gulf Arab producers
Gulf Arab producers
Saudi Arabia and UAE depend on Hormuz for their own crude exports; Aramco CEO Nasser has warned no oil market recovery arrives until 2027 if the blockade continues past mid-June. Monday's $98.96 Brent settlement shortens nothing for Gulf producers without a signed instrument and a Pentagon mine-clearance timeline that runs up to six months post-ceasefire.
Qatar
Qatar
Qatar holds $12bn of frozen Iranian assets at the centre of the sequencing dispute but cannot release them without explicit US Treasury authorisation, given the original freeze was a US instrument. As the asset-holding state, Qatar's leverage is real but passive: it is the escrow holder, not the decision-maker, and any resolution requires US Treasury sign-off that Trump has withheld.
Pakistan
Pakistan
With both Prime Minister Sharif and army chief Munir simultaneously in Beijing on 25 May, Pakistan has for the first time consolidated its civilian and military mediation tracks under China's roof. Munir's direct Tehran-to-Beijing flight signals that the security and financial threads of the sequencing problem are now being worked in parallel rather than sequentially.
China
China
Beijing hosted Pakistan's principal mediators and Iran's China envoy Ghalibaf simultaneously on 25 May while its banking regulator capped new state-bank lending to five sanctioned refiners. China is simultaneously the most credible third-party underwriter of the $12bn sequencing and the state whose institutions face live OFAC secondary-sanctions exposure if the deadlock persists through GL V's expiry.
United States
United States
Trump posted on 24 May that the blockade holds until a deal is certified and signed, ruling out the informal MOU structure both sides had been building. The 'certified, and signed' condition is the first operational bar Trump has attached in 87 days, but it arrived without an executive instrument, maintaining the gap between posted ultimatum and signed US policy.