Skip to content
You can now search across every topic, entity and event.What's new
European Oil Markets
15JUN

India silent after Modi's Tel Aviv visit

4 min read
11:33UTC

India's prime minister was in Israel 48 hours before the strikes began. His government has said nothing since.

EconomicDeveloping
Key takeaway

India's silence is a calculated exercise of strategic autonomy that protects its Israel defence relationship, its Iranian energy and infrastructure interests, and its US partnership simultaneously — at the cost of any principled stance.

India has not issued a statement on the US-Israeli strikes on Iran. Prime Minister Modi visited Israel on 25–26 February — 48 hours before the campaign began. There is no suggestion the visit was connected to operational planning. The Indian government has offered no comment on the timing or on the strikes themselves.

The opposition Indian National Congress broke the silence to condemn the assassination of a head of state — a formulation that invokes the principle rather than the specific target. The INC's framing echoes India's traditional non-alignment posture, rooted in the Nehruvian doctrine that the killing of a sovereign leader sets a precedent threatening all states regardless of their internal politics. India abstained on previous UN votes related to the conflict , and silence is the continuation of abstention by other means.

India's position is a structural bind with no clean exit. India was, until the reimposition of US sanctions, one of Iran's largest oil customers. The Chabahar Port agreement — signed in 2016 and expanded in 2024 — gives India its only trade corridor to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan. On the other axis, India has become one of Israel's largest defence customers, with cumulative arms procurement exceeding an estimated $10 billion over two decades. Israel is India's third-largest weapons supplier. Modi and Netanyahu have built one of the closest bilateral relationships between any two heads of government. Any statement Delhi makes damages one of these relationships irreparably.

Domestic politics tighten the constraint further. India's approximately 200 million Muslim citizens — the world's third-largest Muslim population — are a constituency the BJP cannot entirely disregard, and the INC's condemnation is designed to mobilise exactly that. Delhi's calculation is that the cost of speaking exceeds the cost of silence on every axis. The question is how long silence holds if the war expands or if evidence emerges that the 25 February visit involved any foreknowledge.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

India is the world's most populous country and a significant economic power, so its silence on a major Middle East conflict is itself a statement. The government of Prime Minister Modi said nothing officially about the strikes. This is uncomfortable partly because Modi visited Israel just two days before the strikes began — though there is no public evidence he was told what was coming. India's main opposition party did condemn the killing of Iran's leader. India is in a genuinely difficult position: it buys significant weapons from Israel, it has strategic port investments in Iran, it needs good relations with the United States, and it has around 8–9 million workers living in Gulf states affected by the conflict. Staying silent is the diplomatic equivalent of keeping all your options open at once.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

India's silence is the most diplomatically significant non-Western non-response to the strikes, precisely because of the scale of Indian interests at stake and the timing of Modi's Israel visit. Whatever the truth of India's foreknowledge — and the narrative explicitly states there is no suggestion of a connection — the optics will sustain speculation and constrain India's ability to subsequently claim neutrality. India's posture confirms that no major non-Western democracy is willing to pay the diplomatic cost of confronting the US-Israeli coalition, even when the target is a formal BRICS partner. The domestic political split — government silence, opposition condemnation — previews a potential foreign policy debate that could shape Indian politics as the conflict's humanitarian consequences accumulate.

Root Causes

India's response is structurally overdetermined by competing interests. Israeli defence exports — drones, missiles, surveillance systems, air defence components — constitute a significant share of Indian military procurement; condemning Israel risks those supply chains. Iran's Chabahar port is India's primary strategic route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan; condemning Iran would jeopardise a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure investment. The US-India strategic partnership (Quad membership, technology transfer agreements, defence co-production) creates strong incentives to avoid friction with Washington. Modi's domestic political positioning — which has historically emphasised Hindu nationalist themes that complicate overt support for a Shia Islamist state — adds a further constraint. The opposition INC's condemnation of the assassination reflects electoral positioning rather than a viable alternative foreign policy trajectory.

Escalation

India's silence is net-neutral to marginally de-escalatory on the conflict itself. India's refusal to condemn the strikes denies Iran a significant non-Western democratic voice that could raise diplomatic costs for Washington. However, India is unlikely to provide material support to Iran, and its continued silence reduces the probability of BRICS or Global South bloc-formation against the US-Israeli coalition. The more consequential escalation variable is whether India continues Iranian oil imports: if it does — following Turkey's explicit model — it provides Tehran a revenue stream that marginally sustains its operational capacity.

What could happen next?
1 consequence2 risk1 meaning1 precedent
  • Consequence

    India's silence removes a significant non-Western democratic voice from potential diplomatic pressure on Washington to pursue a ceasefire, lengthening Iran's diplomatic isolation.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Risk

    The timing of Modi's Israel visit — 48 hours before strikes — will generate sustained domestic and international scrutiny that constrains India's subsequent diplomatic flexibility.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Meaning

    India's multi-alignment posture has survived its most demanding test yet, confirming that New Delhi will not sacrifice any of its major bilateral relationships even during acute crises.

    Medium term · Assessed
  • Risk

    If India maintains Iranian oil imports, it may face US secondary sanctions pressure; if it halts them, it absorbs higher energy costs and jeopardises Chabahar investments.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Precedent

    India's silence establishes a template for major non-Western democracies to abstain from US-led military actions without suffering alliance consequences, potentially emboldening similar postures in future crises.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #6 · Pentagon produced no evidence for Iran war

Globe and Mail· 1 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
India silent after Modi's Tel Aviv visit
India's silence reflects an irreconcilable tension between its deepening defence relationship with Israel and its strategic and energy ties to Iran. The silence also weakens BRICS' collective response, since India's voice — as the bloc's largest democracy — would carry outsize weight.
Different Perspectives
Sanctions compliance officer reviewing a Lukoil International GmbH bid
Sanctions compliance officer reviewing a Lukoil International GmbH bid
OFAC's amended FAQ 1224 gives a compliance desk its first published standard: full severance from Lukoil and a US-jurisdiction blocked account for sale proceeds. The conditions name neither ISAB nor Italy, so a Priolo Gargallo-linked bid answers a different question than a Neftochim Burgas or Petrotel Ploiesti one.
Managed-money funds on Brent Last Day
Managed-money funds on Brent Last Day
CFTC data for the week to 21 July showed managed money flipping 74,400 contracts to a net long of 15,665 against 1,410 short on the Brent Last Day contract, code 06765T. A fund that held that short through July has now covered it, and the spent short base raises the bar for the next leg higher.
Saudi crude exporters
Saudi crude exporters
Saudi-linked tanker transits through Bab el-Mandeb fell to about 7.5 a day after the 24 July underwriting withdrawal, pushing more barrels onto the longer route round the Cape or through the Yanbu terminal. Every diverted barrel ties up a ship for longer, and a fleet that turns slower charges more.
Tanker owners on the Bab el-Mandeb route
Tanker owners on the Bab el-Mandeb route
Lloyd's-market syndicates withdrew war-risk cover from Saudi-linked hulls on 24 July, leaving owners of that class of vessel to sail Bab el-Mandeb uninsured or not at all. Tanker transits on the route fell to roughly 7.5 a day, and cover, once withdrawn, does not return on a shipowner's timetable.
Eni
Eni
Eni's board approved second-quarter results on 29 July, swinging refining EBIT to a EUR0.08bn profit from a year-earlier loss even as group profit doubled, and named Red Sea freight cost as a cap on that improvement. A refiner absorbing higher shipping costs on Saudi-linked crude while its numbers improve treats the freight line as a drag, not a crisis.
Asian buyers (India, Japan, China, South Korea)
Asian buyers (India, Japan, China, South Korea)
Asian refiners are absorbing 62% of Yanbu's 3.75m b/d flow, the bulk of Saudi Arabia's rerouted crude now clearing east rather than into the Atlantic basin. That destination split leaves Asian buyers more exposed to any single Yanbu-specific disruption than under the kingdom's normal multi-terminal export pattern.