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European Oil Markets
20JUL

Ghalibaf overrules Pezeshkian on strikes

3 min read
10:00UTC

Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf publicly contradicts Pezeshkian's ceasefire order, invoking the late Khamenei's directives — splitting the body meant to exercise supreme authority on whether Iran keeps fighting its neighbours.

EconomicDeveloping
Key takeaway

By attributing the Gulf strikes to Khamenei's pre-death standing directives rather than new decisions, Ghalibaf has constitutionally immunised them from being halted — no Iranian political figure can publicly countermand orders issued by the deceased Supreme Leader.

Mohammad Bagher GhalibafIran's Parliament speaker, third-ranking political figure, and member of the Interim Leadership Council — publicly contradicted President Pezeshkian's halt order on Saturday evening. The Gulf strikes were not "miscommunication within the ranks," the explanation Pezeshkian offered after the IRGC ignored his ceasefire directive within hours . They followed directives from the late Supreme Leader Khamenei himself. As long as Gulf nations host US bases, Ghalibaf wrote, "the countries will not enjoy peace."

Hardliner lawmakers had already denounced Pezeshkian's apology to Gulf neighbours as "humiliating" and "treason" . But Ghalibaf is not a backbencher venting on state media. He sits on the Interim Leadership Council that theoretically inherited The Supreme Leader's military authority after Khamenei's death. Iran has not operated without a functioning Supreme Leader since the Islamic Republic's founding in 1979 — when Khomeini died in June 1989, the Assembly of Experts selected Khamenei within hours. This time, the funeral remains postponed , the Assembly of Experts was struck in the war's early days, and Ghalibaf has invoked the dead leader's standing orders to override the living president. He has reframed the IRGC's defiance not as insubordination but as fidelity to supreme authority — authority that outranks the presidency in Iran's constitutional hierarchy.

The consequence is operational, not theoretical. Egypt, Turkey, and Oman have launched mediation . Iran's foreign minister closed the door on negotiations days ago . The interim council that commands Iran's military is now publicly split on whether to keep fighting. A ceasefire would require agreement from a body that cannot agree, delivered to forces that have already demonstrated they answer to the dead leader's directives rather than the living president's orders. The conflict has shifted from a war between states with identifiable decision-makers to a campaign against a military apparatus whose political command structure has fractured — and no constitutional mechanism exists to repair it before Khamenei is buried.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran's government is in a succession crisis: the Supreme Leader, who had ultimate command authority over the military, has died. A temporary council is supposed to share his powers. The elected President told forces to stop attacking Gulf neighbours; they ignored him. Now the Parliament Speaker — a hardliner on that council — is saying the attacks are legitimate because the old Supreme Leader ordered them before he died. This leaves the President with no political ground to stand on: stopping the strikes means overriding a dead Supreme Leader's wishes, which no Iranian official can politically afford. The military is effectively operating outside civilian control.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

Ghalibaf's invocation of Khamenei's pre-death directives is not merely a political endorsement — it is a constitutional manoeuvre. If the strikes are execution of existing orders rather than new decisions, they fall outside the council's decision-making scope; they can only be stopped by the authority that issued the original orders, which no longer exists. This effectively removes the strikes from the domain of civilian political authority entirely, and it does so using the constitutional framework rather than against it.

Root Causes

The IRGC's chain of command runs directly to the Supreme Leader under Article 110 of the Iranian Constitution, bypassing the presidency entirely. With no successor designated, the IRGC's institutional loyalty is genuinely contested between council members. The IRGC has historically maintained stronger affinity with the hardline clerical establishment than with reformist presidents — Pezeshkian was elected on domestic economic promises and lacks the ideological alignment that generates IRGC institutional loyalty. The structural problem is constitutional design, not individual disobedience.

Escalation

The IRGC's demonstrated willingness to ignore Pezeshkian's direct orders, combined with Ghalibaf's public endorsement of continued strikes, indicates the hardliner faction holds effective operational control of military decision-making — not merely rhetorical dominance. De-escalation is structurally unavailable through the civilian channel regardless of international pressure on Pezeshkian, because he does not control the operational levers.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

    Iran's interim leadership council is now publicly split on the central wartime operational decision, meaning the body theoretically holding supreme authority cannot exercise it coherently — a condition that will persist until a new Supreme Leader is confirmed.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Risk

    Pezeshkian's diplomatic outreach to Gulf states — including his apology and halt order — is operationally nullified while the IRGC continues strikes, making Iran an unreliable negotiating partner in Gulf eyes regardless of presidential intent or sincerity.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Consequence

    The IRGC's operational independence from civilian constitutional authority, already structurally high, is moving towards de-facto autonomy during the succession vacuum — the institutional precedent set now will outlast this specific conflict.

    Long term · Suggested
  • Risk

    External actors seeking a negotiated de-escalation have no reliable Iranian civilian interlocutor: the President cannot commit the IRGC, and the hardliner council members who can influence the IRGC have no incentive to de-escalate while military operations continue to serve their succession-contest interests.

    Short term · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #28 · Iran and Israel swap refinery strikes

Al Jazeera· 8 Mar 2026
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Causes and effects
This Event
Ghalibaf overrules Pezeshkian on strikes
The public fracture between Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf means the interim body that inherited the Supreme Leader's military authority cannot issue coherent orders. Any ceasefire negotiation requires a counterpart who controls the forces with launch authority — and that counterpart does not exist.
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