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Drones: Industry & Defence
26OCT

The IRGC has not signed the deal text

3 min read
15:07UTC

IRGC-aligned Tasnim said on 13 June the deal text still needs institutional review, the same day Araghchi raced to sign it digitally.

TechnologyDeveloping
Key takeaway

Iran's diplomats want to sign, but IRGC commander Vahidi, who froze talks on 1 June, has not assented.

Tasnim, the news agency aligned with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said on 13 June the deal text "still requires review and finalisation by the relevant institutions in Iran".⁠1 It ran the same day Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was pushing to sign digitally. The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a think tank that publishes daily conflict assessments, said it was unclear whether Mojtaba Khamenei or IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi had accepted the details.⁠2

The IRGC is Iran's parallel armed force, and its budget and command run through The Supreme Leader's office rather than parliament. That structure is why pro-deal Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the faction Araghchi belongs to, cannot bind Vahidi. The corps does not answer to the diplomats trying to sign over its head.

Vahidi proved the mechanism on 1 June, suspending negotiations after Trump amended the draft and freezing the entire track unilaterally while the Foreign Ministry stayed at the table. Nothing since has reversed that authority. Analysts had already placed day-to-day war authority with the IRGC while Khamenei stayed unseen and produced no MoU response. A single faction can halt the deal again, exactly as it did a fortnight ago.

Trump's claim of approval at the highest Iranian level becomes falsifiable the moment Tasnim or Vahidi contradicts it, which on 13 June they effectively did. Whichever faction signs the digital text decides which institution controls Iranian foreign policy this weekend. The diplomats are sprinting; the men who hold the guns have not said yes.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran has two sets of people who can speak for the government: the civilian side, led by Foreign Minister Araghchi, who was racing to sign a digital deal text on 13 June; and the military side, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a powerful Army that reports directly to The Supreme Leader, not to the civilian government. Tasnim is the IRGC's unofficial newspaper. When Tasnim said on 13 June that the deal text "still requires review", it was the IRGC's way of publicly saying it had not yet signed off. The IRGC commander, Ahmad Vahidi, had already frozen talks once before on 1 June after Trump changed the draft. His endorsement, and probably The Supreme Leader's, are required before any deal can actually hold.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The IRGC's institutional budget and command authority runs through The Supreme Leader's office, not through parliament or the presidency. Araghchi's Foreign Ministry cannot bind the corps to an MoU because the corps does not fall under Foreign Ministry command.

Vahidi suspended negotiations on 1 June after Trump amended the draft, which established a precedent: corps commanders can halt the civilian diplomatic track unilaterally. The 13 June Tasnim signal repeats that structural move without requiring Vahidi to use the word "suspended" again.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    A digital signing by Araghchi without explicit IRGC and Supreme Leader endorsement would produce a document one corps commander could void, repeating the April ceasefire collapse pattern.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Meaning

    Tasnim publishing the review-needed signal on the same day as the digital-signing sprint suggests the IRGC chose public contradiction over private veto, escalating the internal visibility of the split.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Speaker Ghalibaf's pro-deal parliamentary faction loses leverage every day the IRGC's review posture holds; any deal text that reaches the Majlis without corps buy-in faces a 221-0 rejection precedent from the 4 June IAEA cooperation vote.

    Short term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #126 · The weekend signing that never reached paper

Tasnim News Agency· 13 Jun 2026
Read original →
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Written with AI from Lowdown's published reporting. Not individually reviewed by an editor. Editorial standards.