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Cuba Dispatch
12JUN

Florida Republicans push for Cuba licence purge

3 min read
09:35UTC

Three Miami-area Republicans wrote to OFAC on 11 February demanding review of every active licence authorising US business with Cuban state entities.

PoliticsDeveloping
Key takeaway

Three Miami members are pulling the Trump administration's Cuba policy back toward its most restrictive reading.

On 11 February 2026 Florida Representatives Carlos Giménez (FL-26), Mario Díaz-Balart (FL-25) and María Elvira Salazar (FL-27) sent a joint letter to OFAC and the Bureau of Industry and Security demanding a comprehensive review and revocation of every active licence authorising US business with Cuban state-controlled entities 1. The letter invokes the 1996 LIBERTAD Act and Cuba's State Sponsor of Terrorism designation.

The three signatories are not random. FL-25, FL-26 and FL-27 cover the majority of the Cuban-American diaspora in south Florida, and their offices function as the permanent congressional constituency for hardline Cuba policy. The demand is tactical: general licences and specific licences issued under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations are the legal instruments that carve exceptions into an otherwise comprehensive embargo, and revoking them removes the daylight through which ordinary US-Cuba commerce passes.

The effect is already partly visible in Treasury practice. The 25 March Venezuela licence permitting private-sector Cuban buyers only, while keeping GAESA and the Cuban state blocked, maps closely to the letter's logic of private-over-state differentiation. Lowdown has not found a public Treasury written response to the 11 February letter through 15 April, but absence is not the same as inaction: licence revocations under OFAC practice do not require correspondence announcements. Whether a broader revocation programme materialises, particularly against the telecommunications and travel authorisations that remain in place, is the open policy question. Silence past a further 30 days would itself be a signal about the weight Treasury is giving to the delegation's pressure.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Three Republican members of Congress from South Florida; all representing districts with large Cuban-American populations; wrote a letter demanding the US government cancel every business licence that allows American companies to deal with Cuba's government-controlled companies. These three have enormous influence over US Cuba policy because they represent the community most directly affected, and their support matters to the Republican Party in a key electoral state. The letter is asking for maximum sanctions; essentially closing every remaining commercial loophole. Whether Treasury complies is a test of how much the administration wants to give the Miami delegation.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    If OFAC reads the letter's 'regime-controlled entities' language broadly, telecommunications licences enabling internet access and journalism inside Cuba could be revoked; cutting the independent information channel that produces Yoani Sánchez and 14ymedio reporting.

  • Consequence

    The absence of a public Treasury response through 15 April does not confirm inaction; OFAC licence revocations are typically implemented without announcement, meaning compliance could already be occurring.

First Reported In

Update #1 · Cuba carve-out survives Venezuela oil easing

Office of Rep. Carlos Giménez· 15 Apr 2026
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Different Perspectives
WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America)
WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America)
WOLA argues that sanctioning peso-paid Cuban officials has limited coercive bite because their personal holdings are not US-proximate, citing the Maduro Venezuela precedent: the head-of-state listing functions as a signal rather than a seizure, and the real operational weight of the 4 June package sits entirely in FAQ 1258's ownership-tree multiplier.
OCDH / Prisoners Defenders
OCDH / Prisoners Defenders
OCDH (Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos, Madrid-based) documented 332 repressive actions in May and formally demanded an EU reparations fund for Cuban political prisoners. Prisoners Defenders' May census placed the count at a record 1,281 with one death in custody; both organisations argue the EU restrictive-measures track is the remaining lever after the US programme has exhausted institutional designations.
EU / Netherlands Foreign Affairs (Ollongren track)
EU / Netherlands Foreign Affairs (Ollongren track)
EU Special Representative Kajsa Ollongren received the OCDH Acuerdo de Liberacion in Brussels on 13 May demanding asset freezes and a victims' compensation fund for political prisoners. Madrid's hotel-sector stake and the Spanish chains' own exit decisions create a structural tension within EU policy between restrictive-measures pressure and commercial-engagement continuity.
China
China
China joined Russia in birthday solidarity to Raul Castro but has not moved a tanker to Cuba since the CUPET designation. Beijing's calculus resembles the post-PDVSA Venezuela calculation: barter or renminbi-denominated crude outside the US legal perimeter is technically available but requires absorbing secondary-sanctions risk Washington is deliberately signalling.
Russia
Russia
Moscow sent birthday solidarity to the indicted Raul Castro on 3 June but despatched no replacement cargo after the Sovcomflot Universal turned back on 26 May. Russia's practical support for Cuba is constrained by its own war economy and secondary-sanctions exposure under the same OFAC architecture it benefits from in the Ukraine context.
Cuban government / MINREX
Cuban government / MINREX
Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla condemned the CUPET designation as 'further tightening the economic and energy blockade'; Diaz-Canel's standing public line is willingness for dialogue 'on equal terms' but political prisoners are explicitly off the table. Havana offers no new concessions after the personal listing.