
National Security Council (Iran)
Iranian government body that advised residents to leave Tehran during the March 2026 conflict.
Last refreshed: 3 April 2026 · Appears in 2 active topics
Iran's security council told Tehran to evacuate — who is actually in charge?
Latest on National Security Council (Iran)
- What is Iran's Supreme National Security Council?
- The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is Iran's constitutional body that coordinates defence, intelligence, and Foreign Policy. Chaired by the president, it includes military chiefs, IRGC commanders, and the Supreme Leader's personal representatives, with all binding decisions requiring the Leader's final approval.Source: entity
- Who is the secretary of Iran's SNSC?
- In 2026 the secretary was Ali Larijani, who publicly rejected US negotiations during the March 2026 conflict even as President Pezeshkian sought de-escalation. Ali Shamkhani had previously held the role.Source: entity
- Why did the SNSC lose authority in March 2026?
- Khamenei's death on Day 1 of the conflict removed the Supreme Leader whose ratification all binding SNSC decisions require. This immediately paralysed the body, allowing the IRGC to pursue autonomous operations outside central direction.Source: entity
- What is the constitutional basis of Iran's SNSC?
- Article 176 of Iran's 1989 revised constitution established the SNSC to replace the earlier Defence Council, giving it authority to set strategic red lines, authorise force, and negotiate security agreements.Source: entity
Background
Established under the 1989 revised constitution (Article 176), the SNSC replaced the earlier Defence Council. It is chaired by the president, with membership drawn from the heads of all three government branches, military chiefs, IRGC commanders, and the Supreme Leader's personal representatives. Decisions require the Leader's final ratification, which is why Mojtaba Khamenei's contested succession immediately paralysed the body's authority.
Iran's Supreme National Security Council coordinates defence, intelligence, and Foreign Policy at the highest constitutional level. In the March 2026 conflict its coherence collapsed: an IRGC military council has effectively sidelined both the NSC and civilian government, controlling all information flow and access to the Supreme Leader. President Pezeshkian cannot appoint ministers or secure a meeting with Mojtaba Khamenei, and the IRGC controls all channels to him. The SNSC secretary publicly rejected US negotiations while Pezeshkian simultaneously sought de-escalation, exposing the fault-line the Guard exploited to pursue operations outside central direction.
The SNSC's structural weakness extends across all theatres: Lebanon expelled Iran's ambassador-designate without the body mounting a coherent response, a strike landed 350 metres from the Bushehr nuclear reactor, and Iran asked FIFA to relocate its World Cup matches; all three decisions the NSC would ordinarily coordinate, each taken under fragmented authority the IRGC now holds rather than surrenders.