
Russian LNG short-term contract ban
EU law banning new short-term Russian LNG import contracts, entering force 25 April 2026; removes 17 bcm/yr.
Last refreshed: 15 April 2026
Where does Europe find 17 bcm of replacement LNG when no country has named a source?
Timeline for Russian LNG short-term contract ban
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European Energy Markets- When does the EU ban on Russian LNG take effect?
- The ban on new short-term Russian LNG contracts enters force on 25 April 2026. Long-term contracts follow on 1 January 2027.Source: EU Council
- How much Russian LNG does the EU import?
- Russia supplied roughly 17 bcm under short-term contracts in the first eleven months of 2025, about 13% of EU LNG imports.Source: EU Council
- What replaces Russian LNG after the EU ban?
- No member state has named a committed replacement. Record March imports were front-loading; US flexible supply requires winning cargoes on price against Asian buyers.Source: Bruegel
- Does the EU LNG ban affect long-term contracts?
- No, not until 1 January 2027. The 25 April ban covers short-term and spot contracts only.Source: EU Council
- Why did Europe import record Russian LNG in March 2026?
- Bruegel data shows March imports were front-loading ahead of the 25 April ban; Russian volumes were high alongside record US deliveries.Source: Bruegel
Background
The EU Council short-term contract ban on Russian LNG enters force on 25 April 2026, removing roughly 17 billion cubic metres per year (about 13% of EU LNG imports in the first eleven months of 2025). From that date, importers must operate under a prior-authorisation system proving non-Russian origin on every cargo, and member states have one month to notify the Commission of any remaining Russian gas contracts. Long-term contracts follow on 1 January 2027. No member state has publicly named a committed replacement supply, and March 2026 saw record EU LNG imports driven by high Russian and US volumes, consistent with front-loading ahead of the deadline rather than a durable supply bridge.
The measure is the first EU instrument that actually blocks Russian LNG at the European border. The earlier transshipment ban of 27 March 2026 covered re-export to non-EU destinations; it did not reduce inbound Russian volumes at EU terminals. Bruegel data confirms March imports as a record high, including record US and elevated Russian deliveries, evidence that the commercial incentive to front-load was stronger than any signal from the 27 March measure. The ban passed through a qualified majority mechanism; Hungary could not veto it despite opposing further energy-sanctions tightening.
At March 2026 import levels, the ban displaces roughly 1.3-1.6 bcm per month of LNG. Replacing that volume from US flexible supply requires winning cargoes on the JKM-TTF spread, which had compressed to near parity for weeks before 15 April. QatarEnergy's Ras Laffan Force majeure remains in place and close to a dozen Atlantic cargoes diverted to Asia in the same period. The combined effect is a supply gap landing on day one of the ban rather than gradually, against an EU storage level of only 29.55% on 13 April.