The Ministry of Defence said on 10 August that a routine cyber vulnerability assessment had identified an issue affecting a sub-system on a Kraken uncrewed surface vessel, and that a thorough investigation found no evidence of MoD data or systems being accessed, compromised or transmitted externally1. It stripped the cameras of internet connectivity and declined to say whether it had acted against the third-party component supplier2.
The Telegraph describes what the cameras did; the department describes what its own investigation found afterwards. Neither account displaces the other, and neither states how many vessels were affected or over what period the cameras were connected. The Chinese embassy in London and the Beijing foreign ministry had not addressed the matter publicly by 12 August, and the ministry's English transcripts for 10, 11 and 12 August carry no question on it3.
The Conservative opposition asked the Government to audit its equipment for hidden Chinese components, and The Telegraph's reporting names no individual Member of Parliament4. Six months earlier, on 4 February, the Commons Business and Trade Committee reported on Britain's economic-security policy. Its chair, Liam Byrne, warned that "Allies fear Britain is becoming the weak link. Ministers must prove them wrong and take steps now to strengthen our defences."5 That inquiry covered the whole economy, not uncrewed boats.
Britain sized this industry before it audited the parts going into it. Lloyd's Register, the National Physical Laboratory and the National Shipbuilding Office published the first official measurement of UK maritime autonomy on 4 June, at £600m of annual turnover and about 5,000 jobs including the supply chain. That measurement tells ministers what the sector earns. It counts no components and names no suppliers, and the cameras arrived under a third party's assurance letter.
