13MAY

Brent holds above $103 for second day

4 min read

20:00UTC

The IEA's largest-ever coordinated reserve release — 400 million barrels — failed to keep Brent below $100 for even 48 hours. The market is pricing in months of closure, not weeks.

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Key takeaway

The IEA's record reserve release failed — markets are pricing structural route failure, not a temporary spike.

Brent Crude closed Friday at $103.14 — up 2.67% on the day and the second consecutive close above the $100 threshold first breached on Thursday . Since the war began on 28 February: Brent has risen 41.5%, WTI 47%. US petrol reached $3.63 per gallon nationally.

On Wednesday, the IEA released 400 million barrels from strategic reserves — the largest coordinated action in the agency's 50-year history . The market absorbed it in two trading sessions. The mechanism of failure is structural: strategic petroleum reserves are designed for temporary disruptions — a hurricane shutting Gulf of Mexico platforms, a pipeline rupture. They deliver oil over months at fixed discharge rates. The US contribution of 172 million barrels will take 120 days to reach market at planned discharge rates. The Hormuz supply gap is immediate — 8 million barrels per day removed from global supply, according to the IEA's own March report — and, based on the Navy's assessment that escorts cannot begin until Iranian fire is "substantially reduced," could persist for the duration of the war. The reserves are addressing an open-ended problem with a finite tool.

Friday's price also absorbed a false report that an Indian-flagged tanker had transited Hormuz, which briefly pulled Brent below $100 . The correction — the tanker was east of Hormuz, carrying gasoline bound for Africa — demonstrated how sensitive the market is to any signal of resumed transit. A misidentified cargo ship moved prices $3–4 in minutes; the structural reality reasserted itself within hours. The market has priced in a minimum two-week closure and is beginning to price in months.

The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo removed approximately 5 million barrels per day from global supply and doubled prices over two months. This war has removed 60% more supply and achieved a comparable price increase in under three weeks. The comparison understates the current problem: in 1973, alternative supply routes existed and the Persian Gulf itself remained open. With Hormuz at single-digit daily transits, approximately 20% of the world's traded oil has no route to market. The IEA's reserves bought time. They did not buy a solution.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Oil above $100 per barrel matters because it raises the cost of nearly everything: transport, manufacturing, heating, food production. Most countries import oil, and their import bills are climbing rapidly. The US tried to counter this by releasing its largest-ever emergency oil reserve — 400 million barrels — but prices crossed $100 anyway. That failure is a signal. In a normal supply disruption, releasing stockpiles helps because the oil can reach buyers. When the problem is that the shipping route is blocked, adding oil to the system does not help if the oil cannot be physically delivered. Markets are pricing the route failure, not just the scarcity.

Deep Analysis

Synthesis

The market's rejection of a 400-million-barrel release signals a qualitative transition in what is being priced. Reserve releases are the correct instrument for a temporary supply disruption — they worked in 2022 and during the 1991 Gulf War. They are structurally inadequate for a closed maritime chokepoint, because the oil exists but cannot be moved. This distinction has direct policy implications: the administration's primary economic response tool has been publicly demonstrated as insufficient, and no replacement instrument has been announced.

Root Causes

The SPR release's failure to hold prices below $100 reflects a structural instrument mismatch: strategic reserves add to physical supply but do not resolve the forward curve pricing or war-risk insurance costs that make Gulf supply physically inaccessible. Traders are pricing inaccessibility, not scarcity — and those are different problems requiring different policy instruments.

What could happen next?

2 consequence2 risk1 meaning

Consequence
Emerging market economies with USD-denominated oil import bills — including India, Pakistan, Egypt, and Bangladesh — face acute balance-of-payments pressure and currency depreciation risk at sustained $100+ Brent.
Short term · Assessed
Risk
If Brent sustains above $110–120, Federal Reserve rate-cut expectations will be further delayed or reversed, tightening global financial conditions at a moment of elevated geopolitical risk.
Short term · Suggested
Consequence
The 400 million barrel SPR release depletes the primary Western emergency policy buffer, reducing available response capacity for any subsequent supply shock in the next 12 months.
Medium term · Assessed
Meaning
The market's non-response to the IEA release publicly demonstrates that the current Western policy toolkit is inadequate for a Hormuz-scale chokepoint closure — a signal adversaries and allies have both now observed.
Immediate · Assessed
Risk
Extreme oil price backwardation and war-risk insurance cost increases may render Gulf maritime trade economically non-viable even if physical access were restored, delaying commercial normalisation beyond any military resolution.
Medium term · Suggested

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-leaning sources from United States

United States×3

LeftRight

Primary parallel: The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo drove prices from approximately $3 to $12 per barrel in three months — a 300% increase — producing rationing, recession, and permanent energy policy restructuring across OECD economies. The current trajectory of +41.5% in 17 days, if sustained for 30 days, would begin to approach comparable supply shock velocity.

Counter-parallel: The 1990–91 Gulf War price spike — from approximately $17 to $46/barrel — reversed sharply within weeks once coalition military victory became legible to markets. That reversal depended on a rapid, visible path to conflict resolution that current indicators do not support.

Why it’s relevant now

The 1973 parallel is cautionary: once disruption persists beyond 30 days, demand destruction and economic contraction begin feeding back into price, creating a ceiling but at enormous structural economic cost. The 1991 counter-case is relevant only if a rapid military resolution emerges — which three incompatible administration statements and an acknowledged inability to open Hormuz make unlikely in the near term.

The oil forward curve is likely in extreme backwardation — near-term delivery contracts commanding steep premiums over forward months — as physical delivery uncertainty dominates market structure. Extreme backwardation makes hedging prohibitively expensive for airlines, shipping companies, and manufacturers, translating paper price increases into real operating cost increases faster than in normal contango markets.

Lloyd's of London war-risk premiums for Gulf-region transits have historically increased tenfold or more during active conflict periods; the effective delivered cost of Gulf crude is already materially higher than spot price alone. The IEA's 400 million barrel release represents approximately 4.4 days of global consumption at 90 million bpd — structurally inadequate for a disruption measured in months. Additionally, the US SPR is already at historically depleted levels following 2022 releases, constraining the volume available for any subsequent emergency release in the next 12 months.

Consensus view: Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan had pre-war Brent forecasts of approximately $70–75/barrel for 2025; both institutions are expected to revise toward $130–150 if Hormuz remains restricted beyond 30 days, based on historical crack-spread and demand-elasticity modelling.

Counter-view: The China National Petroleum Corporation's Economics and Technology Research Institute has assessed that Beijing's long-term contracts with Gulf producers include price-cap provisions and alternative routing arrangements — including pipeline access to Oman — that partially insulate Chinese refiners from spot market spikes and reduce China's urgency to pressure Iran.

Key tension: Whether demand destruction in price-sensitive emerging market economies caps the price ceiling before Western recession signals force central bank responses that tighten global financial conditions.

Sources:CNBC·Fortune·Yahoo Finance

Mentions:Persian Gulf →China →Oman →Brent Crude →National Security Council (Iran) →Time →Ukraine weapons export ban (2022) →Iran →Naim Qassem →1973 Arab Oil Embargo →Strait of Hormuz →Goldman Sachs →

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Causes and effects

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This Event

Brent holds above $103 for second day

The failure of the largest strategic reserve intervention in IEA history to contain oil prices signals that markets have concluded the Hormuz disruption is structural, not transient. Strategic reserves are a finite tool designed for temporary shocks; the current supply gap may outlast the reserves themselves.

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Different Perspectives

NATO eastern flank (B9 + Nordics)

The B9+Nordic Bucharest joint statement on 13 May reaffirmed Ukraine's sovereignty within internationally recognised borders and backed NATO eastern flank reinforcement; the summit accepted Zelenskyy's bilateral drone deal proposal as a structural alternative to the stalled US export approval pathway, treating it as a European defence architecture question rather than aid delivery.

IAEA / Rafael Grossi

Grossi is still negotiating a sixth ZNPP repair ceasefire with no agreement after 50 days of 750 kV line disconnection; the 3 May ERCL drone strike that destroyed environmental monitoring equipment represents a qualitative escalation in infrastructure degradation that the IAEA has documented but cannot compel either party to halt.

Péter Magyar / Hungary

Magyar's incoming foreign minister pledged on 12 May that Hungary will stop abusing EU veto rights; the pledge is a statement of intent rather than a binding legal commitment, and Magyar's MEPs voted against the €90 billion loan as recently as April, while a planned referendum on Ukraine's EU accession preserves a downstream blocking lever.

EU Council and European Commission

The Magyar cabinet formation on 12 May removes the Hungary veto that had blocked the €9.1 billion first tranche since February; the Commission is now coordinating the three-document disbursement package for an early-June vote. The structural blocker is gone; the disbursement question is now scheduling, not politics.

Donald Trump / White House

Trump announced a 9-11 May three-day ceasefire with a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner exchange attached, then called peace 'getting very close' on 11-13 May while Russia's 800-drone barrage was under way; his public framing adopted Russian diplomatic language without securing any Russian operational concession or verifying the exchange was agreed.

Vladimir Putin / Kremlin

Putin told reporters on 9 May the war is 'coming to an end' while Peskov confirmed on 13 May that territorial demands are unchanged and Russia requires full Ukrainian withdrawal from all four annexed regions; the verbal accommodation costs Moscow nothing and conditions any summit on a pre-finalised treaty Kyiv cannot accept.