Admiral Brad Cooper confirmed that Iran's Ballistic missile attacks are down 90% from Day 1 levels and drone launches have fallen 83%. Cooper attributed the decline to sustained US strikes on launch infrastructure, including B-2 bomber missions that dropped dozens of 2,000-lb penetrator munitions on deeply buried Ballistic missile launchers. B-1 bombers were also employed. The figures track the trajectory reported earlier in the week: Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dan Caine noted Iran was firing fewer missiles than at the war's start , and IRGC waves 16 and 17 comprised "more than 40 missiles" — sharply below early-conflict salvos that ran to hundreds per wave . A former US official told Middle East Eye that Washington has "shot several years' worth of production in the last few days."
The 90% figure carries a caveat that Cooper's briefing did not address. Israeli analysts and The Jerusalem Post reported that Iran has fully activated its Decentralised Mosaic Defence doctrine , devolving launch authority to 31 autonomous provincial units — one per province — with authorisation to conduct strikes without Central Command approval. The doctrine was designed for precisely this scenario: when centralised command infrastructure is destroyed, provincial units operate independently. The question Cooper's figures do not answer is whether the 90% reduction reflects capacity that has been physically destroyed or capacity that has been dispersed to 31 independent nodes and has not yet fired.
The distinction determines what kind of war this becomes. Iran's missile programme began during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, when Iraqi Scud attacks on Iranian cities killed thousands and Tehran had no means of retaliating. The programme was built over three decades as a strategic deterrent — Iran's answer to the permanent asymmetry in air power, since its air force still flies airframes dating to the Shah's era. If the strikes have genuinely destroyed this infrastructure, then the deterrent Iran spent 30 years constructing has been eliminated in seven days, and Tehran's military posture — for this conflict and any future confrontation — reverts to asymmetric and proxy warfare, the IRGC's founding mandate from the early 1980s before Iran began pursuing conventional capabilities.
If the dispersed provincial units retain significant stockpiles, the arithmetic looks different. Thirty-one autonomous launch nodes are harder to track and suppress than centralised batteries, even if each node commands fewer missiles. The current lull could be a function of degraded coordination rather than degraded capacity — dispersed units recalibrating after the loss of Central Command, not units with nothing left to fire. The next 48 to 72 hours of launch data will begin to distinguish between these two interpretations.
