6AUG

Gulf jets struck Iran, WSJ reports

2 min read

15:43UTC

The Wall Street Journal says Bahraini and Kuwaiti fighter jets bombed weapons depots inside Iran earlier this month, with Emirati intelligence and air cover behind them. Manama and Kuwait City will not comment.

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Key takeaway

Two Gulf states that had only been targets are now reported to have bombed Iran themselves.

The Wall Street Journal reported on 24 July that Bahrain and Kuwait sent fighter jets against drone and missile storage depots inside Iran earlier this month, citing officials familiar with the operation ¹. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) supplied intelligence and defensive air cover but flew no strikes of its own, the same report said ². Neither Bahraini nor Kuwaiti spokespeople would comment when asked. The sorties themselves are undated beyond that window; only the Journal's account carries the 24 July stamp.

Bahrain is a Gulf island kingdom hosting the US Fifth Fleet; Kuwait sits at the head of the Gulf and holds American air assets at Ali Al Salem. Both have appeared in this war so far on the receiving end. Bahrain said it thwarted Iranian missiles and drones on 19 July , and Kuwait counted a fourth day of attacks on its power and desalination stations by 21 July . Flying into Iranian airspace is a different act from intercepting what comes the other way.

The Journal characterises the depot raids as the first direct retaliation either state has flown against Tehran. That wording belongs to the Journal, and nobody in Manama or Kuwait City has confirmed any part of it ³. Abu Dhabi's contribution, intelligence and defensive cover without ordnance, leaves the UAE able to deny participation while still shaping the operation.

If the account holds, Tehran acquires two new addresses for retaliation, both of them hosting American basing and both within a few minutes' missile flight of the Iranian coast. If it does not hold, three governments have chosen silence over denial, and a denial would cost them nothing.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Bahrain and Kuwait are small Gulf Arab countries that host US military bases and have spent this war on the receiving end of Iranian missile and drone attacks. The Wall Street Journal reported that, for the first time, their fighter jets struck weapons storage sites inside Iran itself earlier in July, with a third Gulf country, the United Arab Emirates, helping with intelligence and air cover but not flying any strikes itself. Neither Bahrain nor Kuwait has confirmed or denied the report. If accurate, it would mean two countries long seen as targets in this war have started fighting back directly, which could change how Iran responds to them.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Bahrain and Kuwait each field air forces built around single squadrons of F-16s, sized for point air defence rather than sustained offensive strike packages into hostile territory, so any deep sortie against Iranian depots would structurally require a third party to supply targeting data and top cover, a gap the UAE's larger, better-equipped air force is positioned to fill.

Both kingdoms also host forward US military infrastructure, Bahrain the Fifth Fleet and Kuwait CENTCOM's logistics hub, which gives Tehran an obvious retaliatory target set immediately offshore; that exposure is the more plausible explanation for continued official silence than any doubt about the WSJ account itself.

Escalation

Direction: upward, if confirmed. Two Gulf states previously limited to defensive interception would have crossed into offensive strikes on Iranian soil, a threshold the war has not seen from these countries before. The evidence for the shift rests entirely on WSJ sourcing that neither government will confirm, so the assessment carries the same uncertainty as the underlying report.

What could happen next?

Meaning
If confirmed, Bahrain and Kuwait would be conducting offensive strikes against Iran for the first time in this war, moving beyond the interception role they have held since March.
Immediate · Reported
Risk
Confirmation of direct Gulf-state strikes could draw a retaliatory Iranian strike specifically targeting Bahraini or Kuwaiti territory rather than shared regional infrastructure.
Short term · Suggested
Precedent
A confirmed UAE intelligence and air-cover role without direct strikes would establish a template for Gulf states to support offensive action against Iran while retaining diplomatic deniability.
Medium term · Suggested

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-right-leaning sources from United States

United States

Primary parallel: During the 1991 Gulf War, Kuwaiti and Qatari squadrons flew combat sorties inside a US-led coalition while relying on American AWACS aircraft for targeting and airspace control, the same mechanical split reportedly at work here: Bahrain and Kuwait supply the airframes, the UAE supplies the intelligence picture and defensive cover.

Counter-parallel: That 1991 arrangement operated under a declared UN mandate and an acknowledged coalition command structure; nothing comparable exists now, so if the strikes happened, the deniability is new even where the operational pattern is not.

Consensus view: The International Institute for Strategic Studies assesses that Gulf states shifting from absorbing Iranian strikes to launching their own, if the Wall Street Journal's account holds, would mark the first instance of GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) members conducting offensive air operations against Iranian territory in this war.

Counter-view: Doha's Gulf International Forum argues the silence from Manama and Kuwait City is itself the more significant data point: a genuine deterrent strike would normally be publicised, so the absence of any claim suggests either a smaller operation than reported or governments calculating that confirmation invites reprisal onto exposed home bases.

Key tension: Whether unclaimed operational secrecy reflects deliberate coalition-style deniability or a story whose battlefield significance outruns its sourcing.

Sources:Wall Street Journal

Mentions:Iran →US Fifth Fleet →Abu Dhabi →Wall Street Journal →Gulf War →Tehran →Doha →Emirates →Manama →Bahrain →Kuwait →United Arab Emirates (UAE) →

First Reported In

Update #161 · Bahrain and Kuwait struck Iran, WSJ reports

Wall Street Journal· 25 Jul 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

IRGC sets Kuwait's Shuaiba complex alight

Kuwait's shift to offensive strikes follows the IRGC's earlier attack on its Shuaiba power complex.

Occurred 17 Jul 2026

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Bahrain says it thwarted a missile wave

Bahrain's reported strikes follow its own account of thwarting Iranian missiles and drones five days earlier.

Occurred 18 Jul 2026

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This Event

Gulf jets struck Iran, WSJ reports

Two Gulf monarchies that have spent this war absorbing Iranian strikes are now reported to have flown offensive sorties into Iranian territory, which changes who Tehran can plausibly retaliate against.

Different Perspectives

Hengaw

The Norway-based monitoring group reported the Urmia executions of Omid Behzad and Pouria Safvat, the only source to do so, consistent with its documented pattern of recording far more executions than the Iranian state acknowledges. Iran's government has not confirmed either execution.

Shipping and insurance underwriters

War-risk premiums price the Houthi campaign because the group announces its targets in advance, but a reopening Trump has promised without a published text gives underwriters no benchmark to reprice Hormuz cover against. Insurers want a text before they move rates, not a promise.

Houthi movement

Spokesman Yahya Saree claimed strikes on two tankers in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden on 5 August, only one of which UKMTO could confirm. The group's campaign against shipping continues on its own schedule, independent of any Hormuz arrangement further north.

Oman

Muscat has brokered the coordinates both Tehran and Washington's wire sources now describe differently, but has published no account of its own. Oman's position depends on treating Hormuz as a shared route, which is not what Iran is currently describing.

United States Central Command

CENTCOM raised its interdiction tally from 35 to 44 redirected vessels and disclosed its first boardings on 3 August, the day before Trump promised a reopening. The command's own enforcement record does not yet reflect the release the President has described.

Iran's Foreign Ministry

Spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei described the agreed Hormuz coordinates as a wholly new corridor under Iranian management, not a split of the existing route, days after his own deputy rejected Oman's lane proposal. Tehran wants the arrangement read as a change of ownership, not a compromise on access.