The Royal United Services Institute projected in early March that THAAD stocks would exhaust within one month; that window has now closed. The Payne Institute estimates one-third of the THAAD stockpile has been consumed. Annual production capacity: roughly 100 interceptors. No emergency resupply has been announced.
Arrow-3 stocks remain at 81% depletion or worse. Combined with the consumption of more than 1,000 JASSM-ERs drawn from Pacific Command stocks, the US is simultaneously drawing down its primary standoff strike capability and its missile defence inventory. The restock gap for JASSM-ERs runs 18 to 30 months under even surge production. The weapons designed for a Taiwan contingency are being spent in Iran.
The arithmetic runs one direction. Iran does not need to win the air war. It needs to outlast the interceptors. With Russia supplying an estimated 1,000 Geran-2 drones per day, the attritional equation favours the side that can produce munitions at industrial scale against a defence architecture that cannot replenish at any scale.
If THAAD and Arrow-3 stocks cross critical thresholds without resupply, the US and Israel face a binary choice: accept degraded air defence or reduce the operational tempo that is consuming the interceptors. Either path changes the war's trajectory.
