1JUN

Pakistan Hormuz deal: 40 ships of 2,000

2 min read

08:32UTC

Islamabad secured passage for 20 more vessels, but the deal covers a fraction of the queue and preserves Iran's legal claim over the strait.

← Back to Two parliaments, one war neither can govern Jump to analysis ↓

ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Pakistan's Hormuz deal reinforces Iran's sovereignty claim while covering under 2% of stranded vessels.

Pakistan secured a second bilateral deal with Iran: 20 more vessels at two per day, bringing the total to approximately 40 Pakistani-flagged ships ¹. Iran's state media framed it as a bilateral arrangement, not a concession on Hormuz sovereignty. Against approximately 2,000 stranded ships , 40 vessels represents less than 2% of the queue.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif held what Pakistani officials described as "extensive discussions" with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Finance Minister Ishaq Dar called the deal a "harbinger of peace." It is not. Every bilateral deal reinforces Tehran's leverage by demonstrating that Hormuz passage now flows from Iranian permission, not international law. Each agreement concedes the premise that Iran controls the strait .

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The Strait of Hormuz has about 2,000 ships stuck waiting to pass through. Pakistan negotiated a deal to get 40 of its own ships through, two per day. That is less than 2% of the queue. The deal is significant not for the ships it moves but for what it implies: Pakistan accepted that Iran's permission is required to transit an international waterway. International law says Iran has no right to charge that toll or require that permission. Every bilateral deal like this one makes it slightly harder to argue that Iran is violating international law, because sovereign states are effectively recognising Iran's authority by asking for its approval.

Source Landscape

This story draws predominantly on Iran state media, with sources from Iran

Iran

Against roughly 2,000 stranded vessels carrying an estimated 20,000 seafarers and cargo valued in the billions, 40 Pakistani-flagged vessels represents a negligible proportion. The deal's economic significance for global markets is near zero; its political and legal significance is substantial.

Consensus view: The Atlantic Council and the International Institute for Strategic Studies assess Pakistan's bilateral Hormuz deal as reinforcing Iranian sovereignty leverage: each agreement treats passage as a gift from Tehran rather than a legal right, gradually establishing the precedent Iran needs.

Counter-view: Pakistani Foreign Ministry officials and Islamabad-based Strategic Vision Institute argue the deals are a pragmatic trade necessity for a nuclear-armed state that cannot afford an economic blockade, and that bilateral arrangements are a lesser concession than outright acceptance of tolls by flag-of-convenience ships.

Key tension: Whether bilateral deals increase diplomatic pressure on Iran by demonstrating that non-Western states can negotiate independently of the US framework, or whether they undermine international legal principles by normalising sovereign control of an international strait.

Sources:PressTV

Mentions:Strait of Hormuz →Iran →Pakistan →

First Reported In

Update #51 · Iran hits aluminium plants; Hormuz emptying

PressTV· 29 Mar 2026

Read original →

Causes and effects

Caused by

Pakistan bids to host US-Iran talks

Pakistan's second bilateral Hormuz deal follows its prior facilitation role and confirms its positioning as Iran's preferred bilateral intermediary.

Occurred 24 Mar 2026

Read story →

This Event

Pakistan Hormuz deal: 40 ships of 2,000

The bilateral deal demonstrates Iran's ability to grant selective passage while maintaining its sovereignty position, turning Hormuz access into a diplomatic currency rather than a legal right.

Led to

COSCO ships pay IRGC toll at Hormuz

Pakistan's deal for 20 additional ships through Hormuz created the precedent that state-backed vessels can transit under negotiated terms.

Occurred 30 Mar 2026

Read story →

Different Perspectives

Human rights monitors (Hengaw, Amnesty International, Iran HRM)

Monitors documented a second death sentence for Zahra Tabari, 68, reported cemetery record deletions at Behesht-e Zahra, and a poll showing 81.5% of medical residents want to emigrate, against a background of 200+ confirmed executions since February. Iran's security courts operate at uninterrupted wartime tempo regardless of the diplomatic track.

Pakistan (mediator)

Islamabad carried Trump's revised MOU demanding HEU destruction to Iranian negotiators, formally inheriting the role of sole active mediator after Oman's forced withdrawal. Pakistan lacks Oman's banking infrastructure for frozen-asset routing and carries its own regional stakes, making it a less structurally neutral broker.

Kuwait

Kuwait intercepted Iranian missiles and drones for a second time in days on 1 June, with air-raid sirens sounding nationwide, after invoking Article 51 self-defence on 28 May following the Ali Al Salem ballistic-missile strike. The repeated interceptions test whether Kuwait's domestic politics can sustain hosting US forces as a de facto co-belligerent.

China (PRC)

Beijing sent scholars to Shangri-La rather than its defence minister and addressed Taiwan without mentioning Iran, maintaining bilateral energy corridor protection with Tehran while refusing diplomatic exposure at multilateral forums. Trump barred China as an HEU custodian on 27 May, removing Beijing from the deal architecture while China continues supplying DPI hardware that caps Iran's internet.

Lloyd's of London / war-risk underwriters

Lloyd's held its Hormuz war-risk designation at $10-14 million per voyage while Brent recovered to $93.91, maintaining the structural divergence from futures pricing that has persisted since late May. Underwriters require a UN Security Council resolution or government certification letter, not diplomatic optimism.

Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar)

Five Gulf states wrote to the IMO on 21 May rejecting Iran's PGSA transit authority over international waters; Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not confirmed participation in the European Hormuz mission. The GCC is navigating between US security guarantees and exposure to Iranian fire, with no Gulf state formally co-belligerent except Kuwait.