24MAY

Pakistan Hormuz deal: 40 ships of 2,000

2 min read

14:49UTC

Islamabad secured passage for 20 more vessels, but the deal covers a fraction of the queue and preserves Iran's legal claim over the strait.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Pakistan's Hormuz deal reinforces Iran's sovereignty claim while covering under 2% of stranded vessels.

Pakistan secured a second bilateral deal with Iran: 20 more vessels at two per day, bringing the total to approximately 40 Pakistani-flagged ships ¹. Iran's state media framed it as a bilateral arrangement, not a concession on Hormuz sovereignty. Against approximately 2,000 stranded ships , 40 vessels represents less than 2% of the queue.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif held what Pakistani officials described as "extensive discussions" with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Finance Minister Ishaq Dar called the deal a "harbinger of peace." It is not. Every bilateral deal reinforces Tehran's leverage by demonstrating that Hormuz passage now flows from Iranian permission, not international law. Each agreement concedes the premise that Iran controls the strait .

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The Strait of Hormuz has about 2,000 ships stuck waiting to pass through. Pakistan negotiated a deal to get 40 of its own ships through, two per day. That is less than 2% of the queue. The deal is significant not for the ships it moves but for what it implies: Pakistan accepted that Iran's permission is required to transit an international waterway. International law says Iran has no right to charge that toll or require that permission. Every bilateral deal like this one makes it slightly harder to argue that Iran is violating international law, because sovereign states are effectively recognising Iran's authority by asking for its approval.

Source Landscape

This story draws predominantly on Iran state media, with sources from Iran

Iran

Against roughly 2,000 stranded vessels carrying an estimated 20,000 seafarers and cargo valued in the billions, 40 Pakistani-flagged vessels represents a negligible proportion. The deal's economic significance for global markets is near zero; its political and legal significance is substantial.

Consensus view: The Atlantic Council and the International Institute for Strategic Studies assess Pakistan's bilateral Hormuz deal as reinforcing Iranian sovereignty leverage: each agreement treats passage as a gift from Tehran rather than a legal right, gradually establishing the precedent Iran needs.

Counter-view: Pakistani Foreign Ministry officials and Islamabad-based Strategic Vision Institute argue the deals are a pragmatic trade necessity for a nuclear-armed state that cannot afford an economic blockade, and that bilateral arrangements are a lesser concession than outright acceptance of tolls by flag-of-convenience ships.

Key tension: Whether bilateral deals increase diplomatic pressure on Iran by demonstrating that non-Western states can negotiate independently of the US framework, or whether they undermine international legal principles by normalising sovereign control of an international strait.

Sources:PressTV

Mentions:Strait of Hormuz →Iran →Pakistan →

First Reported In

Update #51 · Iran hits aluminium plants; Hormuz emptying

PressTV· 29 Mar 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Pakistan bids to host US-Iran talks

Pakistan's second bilateral Hormuz deal follows its prior facilitation role and confirms its positioning as Iran's preferred bilateral intermediary.

Occurred 24 Mar 2026

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This Event

Pakistan Hormuz deal: 40 ships of 2,000

The bilateral deal demonstrates Iran's ability to grant selective passage while maintaining its sovereignty position, turning Hormuz access into a diplomatic currency rather than a legal right.

Led to

COSCO ships pay IRGC toll at Hormuz

Pakistan's deal for 20 additional ships through Hormuz created the precedent that state-backed vessels can transit under negotiated terms.

Occurred 30 Mar 2026

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Different Perspectives

Civilians and prisoners inside Iran

Mojtaba Kian was hanged in under 50 days from arrest, the fastest wartime espionage case in Hengaw's record, as Trump announced a peace deal. Amnesty places Iran's 2026 execution count above 200 at its fastest pace in 44 years; the diplomatic track has not altered the internal enforcement tempo.

China

Beijing accepted a Pakistani civilian briefing mission on the same day OFAC's GL V expired, keeping itself inside the deal architecture without being a named signatory. How Chinese banks respond to Monday's Hengli dollar-clearing decision is the first real-world test of whether the verbal MOU carries any institutional weight.

Pakistan

Islamabad split its highest-level delegation: army chief Munir to Tehran on the security track, Prime Minister Sharif and Foreign Minister Dar to Beijing before Monday's GL V-driven bank compliance decision. The architecture routes the deal's hardest problem, IRGC buy-in, through the general-officer channel that has extracted every wartime concession.

Israeli government

An unnamed Israeli official told the Times of Israel that Trump privately told Netanyahu the deal will dismantle Iran's nuclear programme and remove all its uranium, terms incompatible with what Tehran and a Reuters source describe. If Netanyahu believes he was promised full dismantlement and the deal delivers less, Israel holds a sabotage veto before any signature.

Iranian Foreign Ministry

Spokesman Esmail Baghaei told state agency IRNA that nuclear issues are 'not in the current negotiations text' and the sequencing is: end the war first, then negotiate nuclear over two months. Baghaei's formulation preserves Khamenei's 21 May uranium-stay directive while letting the civilian diplomacy track continue.

Donald Trump / White House

Trump declared the Iran deal 'largely negotiated' on 23 May via Truth Social and signed nothing; the White House's only paper was a Memorial Day proclamation. The verbal-track method converts maximum political signalling into minimum legal exposure: no congressional notification, no Senate treaty ratification, no instrument for Iran to formally reject.