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European Tech Sovereignty
22OCT

OFAC publishes the licence it revoked

4 min read
17:24UTC

The Office of Foreign Assets Control put the full texts of General Licence X and its revoking instrument into the Federal Register on 30 September. The June licence had briefly let Iranian crude be produced, sold and shipped by blacklisted tankers.

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Key takeaway

Washington printed a June authorisation for Iranian crude sales six weeks after it stopped mattering.

OFAC put the full text of General Licence X and of General Licence X1, the instrument that revoked it, into the Federal Register on Wednesday 30 September 2026⁠1. The Federal Register is the daily gazette where the American government has to print its rules before they bind anyone, and until that filing neither text was readable in full.

General Licence X was the June authorisation that briefly let Iranian crude be produced, sold and shipped, including by tankers already blacklisted. Issued on 21 June 2026 to run to 21 August, it expressly reached vessels blocked under seven sanctions programmes, the Iranian and the Russian ones among them⁠2. Blocked means frozen out of any dealing with an American person or bank. General Licence X1 withdrew the authorisation in full on 7 July 2026, sixteen days after issue, allowing a wind-down only to 17 July⁠3. The June text shows what Washington was prepared to allow; the July revocation shows what collapsed. Both became readable on 30 September. On 14 September we reported that no Iran-specific presidential document had reached the Federal Register at all.

The same day Treasury filed a rule rather than a licence. An executive order is an instruction from the President; the Code of Federal Regulations is the rulebook that corporate compliance departments and American courts actually read. Executive Order 13902, signed in January 2020, let Washington sanction anyone working in Iran's construction, mining, manufacturing or textile sectors. Treasury wrote it into 31 CFR part 560 on 30 September, six years on, effective the same day with no consultation period, at Federal Register volume 91, page 61759⁠4.

The rule also adds a note at 31 CFR 560.425. Property of the Government of Iran or of an Iranian financial institution is blocked under Executive Order 13599 whether or not the name appears on the Specially Designated Nationals list⁠5, the blacklist that freezes a named party out of the dollar. A bank can no longer treat a missing name as a clean one, which removes a defence built on absence from the list and shifts the screening burden onto ownership research. A lawyer clearing a six-year backlog would file exactly these documents, and nothing in the rule says which it was.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

American sanctions on Iran come in two layers. Presidents sign executive orders, which bite immediately, and the Treasury Department later writes those orders into a permanent rulebook, the Code of Federal Regulations, which is what banks screen against and what courts read. On 30 September 2026 the Treasury finally wrote an order signed in January 2020 into that rulebook. It also added a short note saying something important in plain terms: property belonging to the Iranian government or an Iranian bank is frozen whether or not that name has ever appeared on the published sanctions list. Until now, a foreign bank could point to the list and say the name was not on it. The same day, the Treasury published the full text of a licence it had issued in June 2026 that briefly allowed Iranian oil to be sold, and of the document that cancelled it sixteen days later. Nobody outside the deal could read either until now, so this is the first public sight of how far Washington was prepared to go before the policy reversed.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Executive Order 13902 was signed in January 2020 and bound its targets immediately, but it sat outside 31 CFR part 560 until a drafter wrote it in. The Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations are the text compliance departments screen against and American courts construe, so for six years the rulebook ran behind the instrument it was meant to describe.

General Licence X was issued, used and revoked before its text reached the public record, so for three months the measure of what Washington had been prepared to authorise existed only in the hands of the parties holding the licence. An authority can therefore be created, exercised and withdrawn entirely inside the gap between a decision and its gazetting.

Escalation

Sideways. Neither instrument changes the naval blockade or the designations driving it; both tidy the legal record behind positions already taken. The trigger worth watching is the first enforcement action brought against a foreign bank under the 31 CFR 560.425 note, which would show whether Treasury intends the status test to be used rather than merely stated. A second signal would be the issue of any successor to General Licence X, which would mean the June position had returned.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    A foreign bank can no longer rely on a counterparty's absence from the Specially Designated Nationals list, because the blocking now turns on the definitions at 31 CFR 560.304 and 560.324.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Meaning

    The published General Licence X text shows Washington was briefly prepared to authorise Iranian crude lifted by vessels already blocked under Russian sanctions authorities, which is a wider concession than anything since offered.

    Immediate · Reported
  • Precedent

    Codifying Executive Order 13902 moves the construction, mining, manufacturing and textiles sectors into the text American courts construe, which matters whenever a designation under it is litigated.

    Long term · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #180 · Washington left Iraq as it answered Tehran

Federal Register· 1 Oct 2026
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