The EU's 20th sanctions package, adopted 23 April, left the full maritime-services ban on Russian shadow-fleet shipping out for lack of unanimity among the 27 member states, with any future adoption conditional on G7 and price-cap-coalition coordination1. So 632 listed vessels now carry port bans, yet the P&I withdrawal that would actually reprice the dark-fleet cost curve is still pending. The shadow-fleet economics the KSE Institute tracked, with the Russian-flagged share leaping to 21%, have not moved on this package.
What the package did do was designate Karimun Oil Terminal, an Indonesian VLCC-to-smaller-vessel transfer point used to launder Russian crude origin, closing one transshipment route2. That is a single-node closure, not a systemic squeeze. A port ban removes specific ships from specific berths; an insurance withdrawal removes the cover that lets the whole fleet sail, and only the second one changes the cost of moving a sanctioned barrel.
The G7 summit at Évian-les-Bains on 15-17 June is the next place that unanimity could be forced. Until it is, the systematic insurance squeeze stays a threat rather than a cost, and the dark fleet keeps absorbing barrels at the freight premium it has already priced. The summit sits five days after OPEC+ meets and five days before the 134C expiry, so mid-June stacks three policy hinges in a single window.
