27JUL

Two US carriers stay, blockade runs on

3 min read

09:24UTC

The USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS George H.W. Bush remained on station in the Gulf as of 18 June, the blockade still redirecting vessels, despite the memorandum's clause that it be removed immediately.

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Key takeaway

Two carriers on station are the proof the order to lift the blockade never reached the fleet.

Two US carrier strike groups, built around the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS George H.W. Bush, remained on station in the Gulf region as of 17-18 June ¹. CENTCOM (US Central Command), the US military command for the Middle East, has issued no drawdown order, and the naval blockade continues to redirect vessels, despite the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) clause that the blockade be "removed immediately."

The blockade is the apparatus that has throttled Iranian seaborne trade through the war, turning the strait into a corridor ships transit only on US sufferance. Trump signed the MOU and ordered the blockade lifted on 16 June , but CENTCOM kept it running pending a signed instrument it has not received. The carriers on station are the physical evidence that the order has not reached the water.

The shipping industry reads operations, not press releases. Insurers, mine-clearance crews and tanker owners need an on-water change before commercial transits resume; a memorandum does not move a hull. Hormuz logged zero new tanker transits the day after Trump signed . The Geneva signing ceremony was scrapped, and Baghaei confirmed the text was finalised electronically, the presidents' signatures applied digitally rather than at any podium.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Think of the naval blockade as a lock on a gate that is run by one department and the key as a different document held by another department. When the US President signed the Islamabad MOU, he was handing over a promise to unlock the gate. But the military commanders operating the lock need a separate written order from the Defence Department before they can actually turn the key. As of 18 June, that order had not arrived. So both aircraft carriers, the Abraham Lincoln and the George H.W. Bush, stayed in position, redirecting ships just as before. The gate remained locked. Separately, the sea still has live floating mines in it. Even if the lock were opened, no commercial ship would sail through a minefield without a guarantee that the mines had been removed.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The blockade-stays problem has a structural cause independent of politics: the CENTCOM enforcement mechanism runs on a separate chain of command from the diplomatic track that produced the MOU. Trump signed the MOU as the US executive; the blockade is operationalised by CENTCOM via the Secretary of Defense chain. Without a National Security Council decision memo, a SecDef order, and a CENTCOM operational directive, the blockade runs by default.

Mine-clearance progress also blocks the blockade lift. Hormuz was still seeded with active mines on 18 June. BIMCO and the International Chamber of Shipping have stated publicly that commercial vessels will not transit an uncleared minefield regardless of what a ceasefire agreement says. The operational prerequisite for the blockade lift, cleared lanes, does not yet exist.

What could happen next?

Risk
An incident between an on-station carrier and an IRGC vessel, as happened on 15 June with the 'last warning' radio transmission, could escalate to an exchange of fire that voids the MOU before the 19 June ceremony.
Immediate · Reported
Consequence
The carrier stay gives Iran a public talking point: the US blockade continues despite the signed MOU, symmetrically matching Iran's own non-compliance on Lebanon.
Short term · Assessed
Precedent
If the blockade does not begin to lift within seven days of signing, insurers will treat the MOU as a rhetorical instrument rather than an operational change, maintaining war-risk exclusions and keeping effective transit near zero.
Short term · Assessed

Source Landscape

This story draws on mixed-leaning sources from Qatar and United States

Qatar

United States

LeftRight

Primary parallel: After the 1973 Paris Peace Accords ending the Vietnam War, US naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin did not withdraw immediately on signature. CINCPAC kept carrier groups on station for 27 days pending a formal withdrawal schedule issued by the Joint Chiefs. The operational gap between a signed agreement and force drawdown is a documented feature of US military doctrine, not an anomaly. The Islamabad MOU's 'immediately' language conflicts with this doctrine directly.

Counter-parallel: After the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, US naval assets in Korean waters remained unchanged because the agreement was explicitly prospective: it set conditions for a future state, not immediate compliance. The Islamabad MOU's language is more like the Paris Accords (immediate action required) than the Agreed Framework (conditions for future compliance), which makes the operational gap more consequential.

Consensus view: Naval force posture does not change on diplomatic signal; it changes on a signed operational order. CENTCOM cannot legally begin a drawdown without a written instrument from the Secretary of Defense or the Commander in Chief.

Trump's verbal instruction to reopen the strait does not constitute that instrument. The War Zone reported on 15 June that the drawdown details remained 'murky' even after the digital signing, confirming the carriers on station are following standard doctrine, not defying orders.

Counter-view: The carrier stay may also reflect a deliberate Pentagon hedging calculation: keeping force posture in place preserves military leverage during the 60-day nuclear negotiating window, regardless of what the MOU says about immediate blockade removal. Under this reading CENTCOM is not waiting for paperwork but holding position by institutional design, with the administration's tacit approval.

Key tension: Whether the carrier stay represents bureaucratic compliance with normal procedure (waiting for a signed order) or reflects the Pentagon's own assessment that maintaining forward presence during the 60-day nuclear negotiation window serves US interests better than a rapid withdrawal.

Sources:Al Jazeera·The War Zone

Mentions:CENTCOM (US Central Command) →Esmaeil Baqaei →Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding →Vietnam →Islamabad →Geneva →The War Zone →Paris →North Korea →Pentagon →USS Abraham Lincoln →USS George H.W. Bush →

First Reported In

Update #131 · Iran deal's first death tests the text

Al Jazeera· 18 Jun 2026

Read original →

Causes and effects

Caused by

Trump signed Hormuz open; war ran on

Trump signed the MOU and ordered the blockade lifted but CENTCOM received no signed drawdown instrument, leaving the carriers on station.

Occurred 16 Jun 2026

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This Event

Two US carriers stay, blockade runs on

Insurers and shippers need an on-water change, not a memorandum, before tankers move.

Led to

Oil prices a Hormuz reopening that has not happened

Brent pricing a blockade lift that two on-station carrier strike groups and no CENTCOM drawdown order refute.

Occurred 18 Jun 2026

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The carriers that did not leave

The USS Abraham Lincoln and George H.W. Bush holding station on 18 June (event 8) continued the posture already established per ID:4308 with still no drawdown order issued.

Occurred 18 Jun 2026

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Different Perspectives

Slovakia

Slovakia says it dropped its hold-out on the 21st sanctions package only after Ursula von der Leyen personally signed written gas-price and supply guarantees. The Council of the European Union's own 17,238-character release on the package names neither Slovakia nor any guarantee, leaving Bratislava's account unconfirmed by the institutional record.

EU regulator on capacity mechanisms

Brussels is watching Germany's StromVKG first 4.5 GW capacity auction move toward its 8 September bid deadline without a resolved state-aid clearance for the 9 GW 2026 programme's gas-plant subsidies. A negative spark spread this deep on cheap gas strengthens the case for subsidised dispatchable capacity, the same case still awaiting a state-aid ruling.

French power exporters

French day-ahead cleared EUR 41.13/MWh on Sunday 26 July, EUR 43.09 below Germany, on wind more than doubling and a demand trough, not on any nuclear recovery. The desk expects the discount to hold only as long as French wind and weekend demand repeat, not as a durable nuclear-cost advantage.

European gas storage operator

A storage operator stopped bidding for prompt TTF cargoes on 21 July, reading the strike-halt unwind as the start of a fuel-side correction rather than a floor. It expects the gap between prompt and forward gas to keep narrowing as the war premium continues leaving the curve.

German gas-fired power fleet

German gas-fired plants cut output from 4.37 GW to 2.85 GW between 24 and 27 July, even as TTF fell 8 per cent, because below roughly minus EUR 40/MWh the fuel price stopped deciding dispatch. The fleet expects no relief until wind eases or StromVKG's first 4.5 GW auction adds capacity.

French industrial power consumers

France's day-ahead discount to Germany has nearly closed as TTF and EUA rise together on both sides of the border, eroding the arbitrage French industry relied on through the summer. A standing negative spark removes the German demand buffer that kept that spread wide.