27JUL

$1.9bn a day, no bill to Congress

4 min read

09:24UTC

The Pentagon told senators behind closed doors that Operation Epic Fury burns $1.9 billion per day — a figure that excludes the missiles being fired and that no one has asked Congress to fund.

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Key takeaway

The US is fighting an unfunded war on existing accounts, consuming defence readiness that Congress has not authorised replacing.

Defence Department officials told the Senate Appropriations subcommittee in closed session on Tuesday that Operation Epic Fury's first six days cost an estimated $11.3 billion — approximately $1.9 billion per day. The figure, disclosed after the briefing by Senator Chris Coons, substantially exceeds the $3.7 billion that CSIS had independently estimated for the first 100 hours. Coons stated the true cost exceeds even the Pentagon's number: $11.3 billion excludes munitions replacement — the Tomahawk cruise missiles, JDAMs, and other precision-guided weapons expended in strikes across Iran, which carry per-unit costs of $1.5 million to $2.4 million.

At the disclosed daily rate, the war's 13-day running total exceeds $24 billion — roughly equivalent to Iceland's annual GDP. Neither The White House nor the Pentagon has requested supplemental funding from Congress. The same Congress rejected the Massie-Khanna war powers resolution by seven votes, leaving no legislative mechanism in motion to either fund or constrain the campaign.

The cost disclosure arrived in a closed session — not a public hearing, not a White House budget request. Supplemental war funding historically requires congressional debate: the 2003 Iraq War's first supplemental was $78.5 billion, submitted weeks after the invasion began. The 2011 Libya intervention cost approximately $1.1 billion over seven months. Operation Epic Fury has spent more in two weeks than the US spent in the entire Libya campaign. Without a supplemental request, costs are being absorbed within existing defence budgets — meaning either other programmes are being deferred or the Pentagon intends to seek retroactive funding once the political dynamics of an active war make denial difficult.

The $1.9 billion per day does not account for economic costs outside the defence budget: the IEA's 400-million-barrel strategic reserve release, the impact on domestic fuel prices as WTI approaches $95, or downstream effects on allied economies. South Korea's KOSPI triggered circuit breakers twice in four sessions . European markets fell 2–3% in a single day . The fiscal cost to the US Treasury is one line in a broader ledger that no single institution is yet consolidating.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

When the US military fights a war, it pays through one of two routes. It can draw from existing defence budget accounts — money set aside for training, maintenance, and equipment. Or it can ask Congress for extra funds, called a supplemental appropriation, which requires a formal vote and public debate. The Trump administration has done neither of the latter. It is spending approximately $1.9 billion per day from existing accounts without requesting congressional approval or additional money. This matters for two reasons. First, Congress is being bypassed on the largest US military operation in over a decade — raising constitutional questions about executive war-making authority. Second, the military is consuming reserves it needs for readiness: training schedules, spare parts, and weapons stockpiles that take years to replace. The true cost is not just the dollars spent — it is the reduced military capacity that will persist long after this conflict ends.

Deep Analysis

Synthesis

The munitions consumption rate creates a cross-theatre readiness problem the $24 billion headline figure conceals. Every long-range precision weapon expended against Iran is unavailable for the Taiwan scenario that US Indo-Pacific strategy is built around. The fiscal cost is theoretically recoverable through future supplementals; readiness depletion on a two-to-five-year munitions replacement timeline is not. The real long-term cost of this operation will be measured in deterrence capacity, not dollars.

Root Causes

Requesting supplemental funding would trigger a mandatory War Powers Resolution debate and force a formal congressional authorisation vote. The administration avoided this by drawing on broad AUMF interpretations and existing appropriations authority. The seven-vote margin on the Massie-Khanna resolution demonstrated the political risk of forcing a formal vote. Fiscal avoidance and legal avoidance are a single strategic decision executed through the appropriations process.

What could happen next?

Meaning
Congress has been effectively bypassed on the largest US military operation in over a decade, with no formal funding authorisation and no war powers vote.
Immediate · Assessed
Risk
O&M account depletion within the fiscal year may force an emergency supplemental request, triggering the congressional authorisation debate the administration sought to avoid.
Short term · Suggested
Risk
Precision munitions stockpile depletion reduces US deterrence capacity in the Indo-Pacific on a two-to-five-year replacement timeline, creating a window of reduced cross-theatre readiness.
Medium term · Assessed
Precedent
Funding a large-scale active war from existing appropriations without supplemental or formal authorisation establishes a template for bypassing congressional war finance oversight.
Long term · Assessed

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-left-leaning sources from United States

United States×4

Primary parallel: The 1990–91 Gulf War cost the US approximately $61 billion total, but $54 billion was reimbursed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Germany, and Japan through burden-sharing agreements — a net US cost of roughly $7 billion over seven months. The current operation has no burden-sharing framework and has already exceeded that net figure in 13 days.

Counter-parallel: The 2003 Iraq War was initially financed through existing appropriations without formal authorisation before Congress passed 13 emergency supplementals totalling over $800 billion across 20 years. The current administration is replicating the opening fiscal pattern of that approach.

Why it’s relevant now

The Gulf War comparison highlights the absence of any burden-sharing mechanism this time — no coalition partners are offsetting costs at any level. The Iraq War precedent suggests supplemental funding requests are eventually unavoidable, but the political cost of requesting them grows with every week of unauthorised spending.

The $11.3 billion draws primarily from Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts — the DoD budget line covering day-to-day readiness, training, and maintenance. Depleting O&M accounts mid-fiscal year forces cancelled exercises, deferred maintenance cycles, and reduced training tempo that are not recoverable within the same year through later supplementals.

The munitions exclusion is the larger fiscal concern. A JASSM-ER costs approximately $1.5 million per unit; a Tomahawk approximately $2 million; a JDAM approximately $35,000. An intensive air campaign expending hundreds of precision weapons daily accumulates replacement costs in the tens of billions across a full replacement cycle — constrained by industrial production rates, not funding alone. Senator Coons' statement that the true cost substantially exceeds $11.3 billion is almost certainly correct by a significant margin.

Consensus view: The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) has documented that modern precision air campaigns consume munitions at rates exceeding current US industrial production capacity, creating readiness gaps that cannot be closed quickly regardless of funding availability.

Counter-view: The Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) frames the $1.9 billion daily burn rate as evidence of US strategic over-extension, arguing that simultaneous Indo-Pacific deterrence and a sustained Middle East air campaign is not fiscally sustainable beyond 60–90 days without triggering domestic political crisis.

Key tension: The Stimson Center's security spending programme has noted that munitions replacement lead times of two to five years mean the readiness cost of this campaign outlasts the conflict itself by years — a deferred liability that no supplemental can fully address.

Sources:NBC News·The Hill·ABC News

Mentions:Senate Appropriations subcommittee →Iceland →Thomas Massie →GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator →White House →Libya →United States →H.Con.Res.38 →National Security Council (Iran) →Pentagon →Center for Strategic and International Studies →KOSPI →Iran →Operation Roaring Lion / Epic Fury →

First Reported In

Update #32 · UN condemns Iran 13-0; ceasefire blocked

NBC News· 12 Mar 2026

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Causes and effects

This Event

$1.9bn a day, no bill to Congress

The Pentagon's disclosed cost of $1.9 billion per day — which excludes munitions replacement — means the war has already cost more than the entire 2011 Libya intervention. At 13 days the running total exceeds $24 billion, with no supplemental funding request submitted and no legislative mechanism to constrain spending after Congress rejected the only war powers challenge by seven votes.

Led to

2,200 Marines pulled from Pacific

31st MEU redeployment adds to war costs already exceeding $24 billion (ID:968) with no supplemental funding requested

Occurred 13 Mar 2026

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Navy calls Hormuz an Iranian kill box

At $1.9 billion per day war cost, the conflict will have exceeded $30 billion by the time the 5,000-person force arrives around 27 March

Occurred 14 Mar 2026

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$16.5bn and 8,700 strikes in two weeks

Pentagon's initial $11.3B/6-day estimate updated by CSIS to $16.5B/12 days, tracking broadly consistent daily burn rate

Occurred 14 Mar 2026

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Different Perspectives

Slovakia

Slovakia says it dropped its hold-out on the 21st sanctions package only after Ursula von der Leyen personally signed written gas-price and supply guarantees. The Council of the European Union's own 17,238-character release on the package names neither Slovakia nor any guarantee, leaving Bratislava's account unconfirmed by the institutional record.

EU regulator on capacity mechanisms

Brussels is watching Germany's StromVKG first 4.5 GW capacity auction move toward its 8 September bid deadline without a resolved state-aid clearance for the 9 GW 2026 programme's gas-plant subsidies. A negative spark spread this deep on cheap gas strengthens the case for subsidised dispatchable capacity, the same case still awaiting a state-aid ruling.

French power exporters

French day-ahead cleared EUR 41.13/MWh on Sunday 26 July, EUR 43.09 below Germany, on wind more than doubling and a demand trough, not on any nuclear recovery. The desk expects the discount to hold only as long as French wind and weekend demand repeat, not as a durable nuclear-cost advantage.

European gas storage operator

A storage operator stopped bidding for prompt TTF cargoes on 21 July, reading the strike-halt unwind as the start of a fuel-side correction rather than a floor. It expects the gap between prompt and forward gas to keep narrowing as the war premium continues leaving the curve.

German gas-fired power fleet

German gas-fired plants cut output from 4.37 GW to 2.85 GW between 24 and 27 July, even as TTF fell 8 per cent, because below roughly minus EUR 40/MWh the fuel price stopped deciding dispatch. The fleet expects no relief until wind eases or StromVKG's first 4.5 GW auction adds capacity.

French industrial power consumers

France's day-ahead discount to Germany has nearly closed as TTF and EUA rise together on both sides of the border, eroding the arbitrage French industry relied on through the summer. A standing negative spark removes the German demand buffer that kept that spread wide.