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Zelenskyy signs Gulf security deals

2 min read

13:56UTC

Ukraine is exchanging three years of battle-tested counter-drone expertise for Gulf security agreements, POW releases, and a diplomatic constituency beyond Europe.

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Key takeaway

Ukraine converted battlefield drone expertise into Gulf security partnerships and a new diplomatic constituency.

Zelenskyy completed a three-state Gulf tour between 27 and 28 March, signing 10-year security agreements with Saudi Arabia and Qatar and securing cooperation terms with the UAE⁠¹. Over 200 Ukrainian counter-drone specialists are now deployed across four Gulf states, with 30 more assigned to Jordan and Kuwait. Six countries have submitted formal cooperation requests.

Iran manufactures the Shahed-136 drone. Russia buys it and launches it at Ukrainian cities nightly. Iran also fires the same design at Gulf targets. Ukraine's three years of defending against Shaheds produced the world's most battle-tested counter-drone expertise. Gulf states that spent $13.5 million per Patriot interception are now buying Ukrainian interceptor drones at under $2,000 each.

Ukraine is exchanging drone expertise for things it needs: Gulf states are facilitating POW releases and the return of Ukrainian children deported by Russia. Qatar is the primary intermediary. Zelenskyy's earlier offer to Trump of counter-drone assistance opened this track; the Gulf tour formalises it into binding agreements that create a diplomatic constituency beyond Europe.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Ukraine's president toured Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE in late March and signed security agreements with two of them. The logic: Iran makes the Shahed drones that Russia fires at Ukrainian cities every night. Iran also fires the same drones at Gulf state targets. Ukraine has three years of battle experience shooting down these drones cheaply. The Gulf states want that expertise. In exchange, Ukraine is getting help with POW releases, the return of children Russia deported, and something more strategic: six countries in the Middle East now have a material interest in Ukraine's survival. That is diplomatic leverage Ukraine did not have a year ago.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The Gulf tour's strategic foundation is Iran's dual role: Iran manufactures the Shahed drones used against both Ukraine and Gulf states, creating a shared threat perception. Ukraine's three-year operational experience against Iranian drones gives it knowledge that Gulf states, despite vastly greater defence budgets, cannot replicate without battlefield exposure.

The timing reflects Ukraine's recognition that European and American support has structural limits, including aid fatigue, election cycles, and the PURL diversion. Building a Gulf constituency diversifies Ukraine's political support base and its economic relationships simultaneously.

What could happen next?

Opportunity
Ukraine's Gulf defence export relationships provide a revenue stream and diplomatic constituency that partially offsets potential reductions in US and European support.
Consequence
Qatar's role as POW intermediary and Zelenskyy's public acknowledgement of it strengthens Qatar's diplomatic position relative to other Gulf mediators.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-leaning sources from France

France

LeftRight

Primary parallel: Israel's post-1967 arms export strategy traded battlefield-tested military technology for diplomatic relationships in Africa and Latin America, creating economic and political dependencies that partially offset Arab League isolation. Ukraine is following a structurally similar playbook, converting wartime capability into diplomatic leverage.

Counter-parallel: Ukraine's 2022 weapons export ban, maintained for three years, prevented it from building the commercial relationships that could now be accelerated. Israel had a 20-year head start on weapons diplomacy. Ukraine is starting that process under wartime conditions.

Ukraine's counter-drone technology represents a nascent export industry. At under $2,000 per interceptor unit versus $13.5 million per Patriot round, the potential market among Gulf states with Iranian drone exposure is large. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan, and Kuwait combined spend over $100 billion annually on defence. Even a 0.5% shift to Ukrainian counter-drone systems represents a $500 million annual market.

The strategic economic implication is longer-term: if Ukraine develops a sustainable defence export sector, its post-war reconstruction may be partly self-funded through arms revenues rather than relying entirely on EU and US grant financing.

Consensus view: Gulf Research Centre analysts assess that Gulf states' interest in Ukrainian counter-drone expertise is genuine and commercially motivated: the Iran war demonstrated that existing Patriot-based defences could not cost-effectively handle mass Shahed saturation attacks without burning through $13.5M missiles at unsustainable rates.

Counter-view: Al Jazeera's diplomatic correspondents note that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have simultaneously maintained economic and diplomatic relations with Russia throughout the war, suggesting the security agreements are hedging instruments rather than alignment shifts. Gulf states backing Ukraine while not sanctioning Russia is a carefully balanced position.

Key tension: Whether Gulf states' drone expertise purchases translate into political support for Ukraine's territorial position in peace negotiations, or remain purely transactional security arrangements.

Sources:Euronews

Mentions:Kuwait →Shahed-136 →Iran →Russia →Saudi Arabia →Volodymyr Zelenskyy →CIA →Ukraine →Ukrainian interceptor drone →CREA →Jordan →POW →Qatar →United Arab Emirates (UAE) →Patriot missile system →Gulf Research Centre →Arab League →Al Jazeera →

First Reported In

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Euronews· 1 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

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This Event

Zelenskyy signs Gulf security deals

The Gulf agreements transform Ukraine from an aid recipient into an arms exporter with commercial ties that give six states a material stake in its survival.

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Different Perspectives

Cross-border power traders

The France-Germany day-ahead spread flipped from a EUR 17.20 German premium on 1 August to a EUR 4.15 French premium on 3 August, the same day French curtailment peaked. They cannot yet attribute the flip to curtailment alone, since a like-for-like overnight comparison shows French nuclear output rising while wind fell and demand returned on the weekday step.

EDF

River-cooling limits took 7.6 GW, 12 per cent of its fleet, offline on 3 August, the highest curtailment since the heatwave began, with an easing forecast to 4.3 GW on 4 August and 3 GW after. It manages the cut as a recurring seasonal constraint, expecting it to lift with river temperature, not repair.

Gasunie

TTF, the Dutch hub it operates, drifted to roughly EUR 55 to 58 per MWh across the window, staying inside its recent range through both the German spark reversal and the French curtailment. It reads a flat hub price as evidence that neither event this window carried enough weight to move the fuel leg on its own.

German gas-fired generators

Record German solar of 18,761 MW on 2 August pushed the clean spark spread to minus 18.48 EUR/MWh, a loss-making day, before it returned to plus 16.20 on 3 August. They now price dispatch against post-solar residual load rather than wind alone, since the sign flipped inside 48 hours on unchanged fuel and carbon costs.

European Commission (DG Energy)

Its implementing-measures register logged transposition notices from only Portugal and Slovakia against Wednesday's Article 94 deadline for Directive (EU) 2024/1788, with 25 states silent. It expects the register to fill only gradually, since filing routinely lags legislating and any infringement track against non-notifying states runs on a slower clock than the deadline itself.

Spain's LNG terminal operators

Spain's 9,145 GWh terminal inventory is the largest single stock in the EU LNG network, an option value that can reroute cargoes wherever the winter strip pays best rather than a cavern gas obligation tied to a fixed date. That flexibility matters more as Germany's cavern shortfall pushes more of the winter security question onto import infrastructure.

Written with AI from Lowdown's published reporting. Not individually reviewed by an editor. Editorial standards.