15JUN

India silent after Modi's Tel Aviv visit

4 min read

12:23UTC

India's prime minister was in Israel 48 hours before the strikes began. His government has said nothing since.

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Key takeaway

India's silence is a calculated exercise of strategic autonomy that protects its Israel defence relationship, its Iranian energy and infrastructure interests, and its US partnership simultaneously — at the cost of any principled stance.

India has not issued a statement on the US-Israeli strikes on Iran. Prime Minister Modi visited Israel on 25–26 February — 48 hours before the campaign began. There is no suggestion the visit was connected to operational planning. The Indian government has offered no comment on the timing or on the strikes themselves.

The opposition Indian National Congress broke the silence to condemn the assassination of a head of state — a formulation that invokes the principle rather than the specific target. The INC's framing echoes India's traditional non-alignment posture, rooted in the Nehruvian doctrine that the killing of a sovereign leader sets a precedent threatening all states regardless of their internal politics. India abstained on previous UN votes related to the conflict , and silence is the continuation of abstention by other means.

India's position is a structural bind with no clean exit. India was, until the reimposition of US sanctions, one of Iran's largest oil customers. The Chabahar Port agreement — signed in 2016 and expanded in 2024 — gives India its only trade corridor to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan. On the other axis, India has become one of Israel's largest defence customers, with cumulative arms procurement exceeding an estimated $10 billion over two decades. Israel is India's third-largest weapons supplier. Modi and Netanyahu have built one of the closest bilateral relationships between any two heads of government. Any statement Delhi makes damages one of these relationships irreparably.

Domestic politics tighten the constraint further. India's approximately 200 million Muslim citizens — the world's third-largest Muslim population — are a constituency the BJP cannot entirely disregard, and the INC's condemnation is designed to mobilise exactly that. Delhi's calculation is that the cost of speaking exceeds the cost of silence on every axis. The question is how long silence holds if the war expands or if evidence emerges that the 25 February visit involved any foreknowledge.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

India is the world's most populous country and a significant economic power, so its silence on a major Middle East conflict is itself a statement. The government of Prime Minister Modi said nothing officially about the strikes. This is uncomfortable partly because Modi visited Israel just two days before the strikes began — though there is no public evidence he was told what was coming. India's main opposition party did condemn the killing of Iran's leader. India is in a genuinely difficult position: it buys significant weapons from Israel, it has strategic port investments in Iran, it needs good relations with the United States, and it has around 8–9 million workers living in Gulf states affected by the conflict. Staying silent is the diplomatic equivalent of keeping all your options open at once.

Deep Analysis

Synthesis

India's silence is the most diplomatically significant non-Western non-response to the strikes, precisely because of the scale of Indian interests at stake and the timing of Modi's Israel visit. Whatever the truth of India's foreknowledge — and the narrative explicitly states there is no suggestion of a connection — the optics will sustain speculation and constrain India's ability to subsequently claim neutrality. India's posture confirms that no major non-Western democracy is willing to pay the diplomatic cost of confronting the US-Israeli coalition, even when the target is a formal BRICS partner. The domestic political split — government silence, opposition condemnation — previews a potential foreign policy debate that could shape Indian politics as the conflict's humanitarian consequences accumulate.

Root Causes

India's response is structurally overdetermined by competing interests. Israeli defence exports — drones, missiles, surveillance systems, air defence components — constitute a significant share of Indian military procurement; condemning Israel risks those supply chains. Iran's Chabahar port is India's primary strategic route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan; condemning Iran would jeopardise a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure investment. The US-India strategic partnership (Quad membership, technology transfer agreements, defence co-production) creates strong incentives to avoid friction with Washington. Modi's domestic political positioning — which has historically emphasised Hindu nationalist themes that complicate overt support for a Shia Islamist state — adds a further constraint. The opposition INC's condemnation of the assassination reflects electoral positioning rather than a viable alternative foreign policy trajectory.

Escalation

India's silence is net-neutral to marginally de-escalatory on the conflict itself. India's refusal to condemn the strikes denies Iran a significant non-Western democratic voice that could raise diplomatic costs for Washington. However, India is unlikely to provide material support to Iran, and its continued silence reduces the probability of BRICS or Global South bloc-formation against the US-Israeli coalition. The more consequential escalation variable is whether India continues Iranian oil imports: if it does — following Turkey's explicit model — it provides Tehran a revenue stream that marginally sustains its operational capacity.

What could happen next?

1 consequence2 risk1 meaning1 precedent

Consequence
India's silence removes a significant non-Western democratic voice from potential diplomatic pressure on Washington to pursue a ceasefire, lengthening Iran's diplomatic isolation.
Immediate · Assessed
Risk
The timing of Modi's Israel visit — 48 hours before strikes — will generate sustained domestic and international scrutiny that constrains India's subsequent diplomatic flexibility.
Short term · Assessed
Meaning
India's multi-alignment posture has survived its most demanding test yet, confirming that New Delhi will not sacrifice any of its major bilateral relationships even during acute crises.
Medium term · Assessed
Risk
If India maintains Iranian oil imports, it may face US secondary sanctions pressure; if it halts them, it absorbs higher energy costs and jeopardises Chabahar investments.
Short term · Suggested
Precedent
India's silence establishes a template for major non-Western democracies to abstain from US-led military actions without suffering alliance consequences, potentially emboldening similar postures in future crises.
Long term · Suggested

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-leaning sources from Canada

Canada

LeftRight

India's abstention on UN resolutions condemning Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine established the modern template for its multi-alignment posture: formal neutrality, continued economic ties with the aggressor, and diplomatic silence designed to protect relationships on all sides. Nehru's Non-Aligned Movement leadership (1955–1964) provides the longer historical frame, though post-2014 India has moved from non-alignment toward active multi-alignment — maintaining positive relationships with competing powers rather than equidistance.

The timing parallel — Modi's Israel visit 48 hours before strikes — has no direct historical precedent, though India's defence import relationship with Israel (approximately $2.4bn annually) is a structural constraint on any condemnatory posture.

Why it’s relevant now

The Ukraine abstention precedent matters because it shows India's silence is a deliberate, repeatable foreign policy instrument rather than a one-off response — Washington and Tel Aviv will have anticipated it, and are unlikely to apply serious pressure to change it.

India imports approximately 4.5 million barrels per day; at $82.37/bbl, a sustained 15% price increase relative to pre-strike levels adds roughly $7–10bn annually to the import bill, with direct pressure on the current account and the rupee. India previously imported Iranian oil at discounts of 10–20% below market during the 2018–2020 sanctions period, before US pressure reduced those flows.

If India quietly resumes or maintains Iranian imports — following Turkey's explicit model — it could partially offset the price shock through discounted barrels.

The rupee, which depreciated sharply during the 2022 energy price spike, faces renewed pressure; Indian inflation, already sensitive to fuel prices, could tick upward if Brent sustains above $90.

C. Raja Mohan (Asia Society Policy Institute) and Harsh Pant (Observer Research Foundation) have both characterised post-2014 Indian foreign policy as 'multi-alignment' — the active maintenance of functional relationships with competing powers rather than bloc membership.

The Stimson Centre has noted that India's Iran-Israel-US triangle is the most structurally complex instance of this tension, involving defence supply chains, energy security, and regional infrastructure simultaneously.

Tanvi Madan (Brookings) has argued that India's Ukraine abstention established a replicable template that Washington has effectively accepted, suggesting New Delhi calculates the US will again tolerate silence rather than demand alignment.

Sources:Globe and Mail

Mentions:New Delhi →National Security Council (Iran) →Narendra Modi →United States →Benjamin Netanyahu →Israel →Iran →Chabahar →

First Reported In

Update #6 · Pentagon produced no evidence for Iran war

Globe and Mail· 1 Mar 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Five Iranian cities hit on opening night

India's silence on strikes is diplomatic positioning in response to the conflict

Occurred 28 Feb 2026

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This Event

India silent after Modi's Tel Aviv visit

India's silence reflects an irreconcilable tension between its deepening defence relationship with Israel and its strategic and energy ties to Iran. The silence also weakens BRICS' collective response, since India's voice — as the bloc's largest democracy — would carry outsize weight.

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