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Autonomous Systems: Land & Sea
6JUN

Crewless-ship rules duck the hard part

2 min read
11:59UTC

The IMO's MASS Code is set to enter force on 1 July, yet seafarer union Nautilus International says three structural questions, liability, multi-vessel safety and jobs, remain unanswered when it does.

TechnologyDeveloping
Key takeaway

The crewless-ship rulebook takes effect on 1 July with liability for a master ashore still unwritten.

The International Maritime Organization's Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) Code is set to enter force on 1 July 2026, opening its Experience Building Phase 1. The Code is the first global framework for cargo ships that sense, navigate and steer with reduced crews or none aboard, adopted in London in May . It is also a framework that takes effect with the questions it was meant to settle still open.

Nautilus International, the seafarer union, names three gaps that the Code leaves open 2. On liability, "the Code keeps a human master legally responsible but does not say who answers when that master sits ashore and something goes wrong," said David Appleton, the union's head of professional and technical. On safety, nobody has shown that one master can safely supervise several vessels at once, the watchkeeping model the Code permits. On jobs, shore control rooms create new roles while threatening to displace higher-paid sea-going officers with cheaper operators on land.

What takes effect on 1 July is a procedural milestone over an unresolved core question. A code that keeps a master legally responsible without allocating liability for a remote one leaves a defined accountability hole, and that hole gets filled by whoever has to price the risk. Classification societies including DNV and Lloyd's Register are already running parallel assurance frameworks alongside the Code, and the courts will eventually settle the remote-master liability the regulation chose not to define.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The MASS Code (Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships Code) sets rules for ships that can navigate without a full crew, or even without any crew at all, aboard. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency based in London, adopted it in May 2026. On 1 July 2026, the Code is scheduled to enter force. Three structural problems arrive with it, still unresolved: First, liability: if a ship goes wrong and its master is sitting in a control room on shore rather than on the ship, the law is currently unclear about who is legally responsible. Second, safety evidence: no one has yet proved that one shore-based master can safely supervise several ships at once. Third, jobs: shore-based control rooms require fewer staff than crewed ships, so the industry shift could displace well-paid seafaring officers. Classification societies such as DNV (Norwegian) and Lloyd's Register (British) certify that ships meet safety standards. Both are developing their own parallel frameworks to fill the gaps the Code left open.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The three unresolved MASS Code gaps share one structural origin: the IMO consensus process requires broad flag-state agreement, and the states most dependent on crewed seafarer labour (the Philippines, Indonesia, India) negotiated provisions that preserved the master-aboard requirement as a default, leaving the remote-master model as an opt-in that individual flag states must enable domestically.

MASS Code adoption therefore did not create a uniform international framework: a vessel registered in a flag state that has not updated its domestic maritime law to enable remote masters cannot operate without crew under the Code even after 1 July. The liability question remains unresolved at the IMO level and at an uneven stage of domestic implementation across the 175 member states.

First Reported In

Update #4 · Allied robot minehunters reach the Gulf

Nautilus International· 24 Jun 2026
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