A third projectile struck within the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant perimeter on approximately 28 March, destroying a structure 350 metres from the operating reactor. 1 The IAEA confirmed all three strikes in ten days. No radiation was released. The plant continues to operate. 2
That last detail is the problem. Three projectiles inside the perimeter of an operating nuclear reactor in ten days, and no consequence each time: the risk calculus shifts. Whatever force is responsible, whether Israeli, American, or unattributed, is learning that Bushehr can absorb hits without triggering the radiological event that would change the war's character.
Rosatom broke its public silence with a warning of 'growing nuclear risk.' IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warned of crossing the 'reddest line' of nuclear safety. The IAEA's incident and emergency centre remains activated; regional safety monitoring networks are on alert. Rosatom's intervention matters precisely because Russia is simultaneously alleged to be delivering upgraded drones to Iran . Moscow has interests on both sides of the Bushehr equation: it benefits from Iran's military resilience, but faces contractual and reputational catastrophe if the reactor leaks.
The Zaporizhzhia precedent from the Ukraine war (2022 to 2024) demonstrated that proximity strikes on nuclear plants become normalised over time. Bushehr is following the same trajectory at a faster pace. If the NPT withdrawal bill advances, the IAEA's monitoring mandate evaporates entirely, leaving a reactor under active bombardment without the international body designed to prevent radiological disaster.
