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Iran Conflict 2026
1MAR

Trump waives Russia sanctions; G7 balks

4 min read
15:00UTC

A 30-day reprieve on Russian oil sanctions aims to cool crude prices past $100 — but six G7 members called it the wrong signal, and Zelenskyy warned the waiver hands Moscow $10 billion.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

The US is subsidising Russian war revenues to offset oil prices its own war created.

President Trump issued a 30-day waiver on Russian oil sanctions, seeking to ease crude prices that have risen more than 40% since the war began on 28 February 1. Six of seven G7 members — Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, and Canada — told the administration the waiver sends "not the right signal" 2. Zelenskyy estimated the reprieve could deliver $10 billion to Moscow 3.

The waiver is a response to market conditions the administration's own campaign created. Brent Crude breached $100 on a closing basis on 11 March after the International Energy Agency declared the Iran war "the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market" — Gulf production down at least 10 million barrels per day, Hormuz transits reduced to single digits against a pre-war average of 138 . The IEA's record 400-million-barrel strategic reserve release failed to hold prices below $100. Brent closed Friday at $103.14 , with Monday futures pointing to $104.89–106.44 — the war's highest sustained range. The administration needs crude on the market. Russia has crude to sell.

The policy contradiction is direct. On the same day the waiver was announced, Zelenskyy told CNN that Russia is manufacturing Shahed drones at the Alabuga factory in Tatarstan and shipping them to Iran for use against American forces 4. If that intelligence is accurate, the waiver eases financial pressure on a state arming Washington's current battlefield adversary. Russian oil revenue flows to the same defence industrial base producing drones that US forces intercept over The Gulf. The United States is, in practical effect, financing both sides of its own war — prosecuting a campaign against Iran while relaxing sanctions on Iran's arms supplier to manage the economic consequences of that campaign.

G7 opposition is broad but without enforcement leverage. The objecting six do not control the sanctions architecture — the United States does. European leaders face their own bind: the continent is still restructuring energy supply away from Russian gas dependency, and a simultaneous Gulf disruption and Russian supply contraction would push import-dependent economies toward the recession that Deutsche Bank and Oxford Economics have already warned of . Their objection is genuine. Their capacity to offer an alternative mechanism that puts barrels on the market within 30 days is not. The waiver will hold because no ally can propose a substitute — and because the administration has decided that $103 oil is a greater immediate political liability than the contradiction of easing sanctions on one adversary to fight another.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the US and allies imposed sanctions to reduce Russia's oil revenues and limit its war capacity. Trump is now temporarily lifting some of those restrictions — not because Russia took any constructive action, but because US military operations against Iran are pushing up global oil prices. Six of the seven major Western economies publicly objected. The circularity identified by Zelenskyy and G7 members is the core problem: US actions raise oil prices, the waiver allows Russia to earn more from oil, and that revenue may fund the arms transfers supplying Iran against US forces — making the policy self-defeating at the strategic level.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

Six-of-seven G7 public dissent is structurally extraordinary. G7 communiqués and public statements almost universally paper over bilateral disputes with consensus language; a six-to-one break — on the record, on a US unilateral economic action toward Russia — signals that European capitals judge this waiver as categorically different from previous US-Russia economic adjustments. The dissent is itself a deterrence signal to Washington: further unilateral carve-outs risk formal G7 fragmentation on Russia policy, weakening the sanctions architecture that European capitals have invested three years constructing.

Root Causes

The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve was drawn down substantially during 2022–2023, materially reducing the administration's non-market tool for oil price management. The IEA coordinated emergency release mechanism requires consensus among member states, which the US has not sought. The waiver is therefore a supply-side fix for a price shock the US itself generated, reflecting a structural absence of short-term alternatives rather than a considered strategic choice.

Escalation

The waiver signals to Iran that US economic coercion has a domestic price ceiling: once oil rises high enough, sanctions relief follows regardless of adversary behaviour. This reduces Iranian incentive to seek terms and provides a replicable template — sustain the conflict at a cost level that keeps prices elevated without triggering decisive US escalation, and wait for Washington's domestic economics to force concessions.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

    US sanctions credibility is now explicitly conditional on domestic petrol prices, giving adversaries a replicable template: sustain conflict at a price-elevating tempo until sanctions relief follows.

    Medium term · Assessed
  • Risk

    If incremental Russian revenues within the waiver window accelerate Shahed deliveries to Iran, the waiver directly shortens the US-Israel military advantage at a critical phase of the air campaign.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Consequence

    Six-of-seven G7 public dissent normalises allied defection from US-led sanctions coalitions, weakening economic coercion as a collective instrument precisely when it is most needed against Iran.

    Long term · Assessed
  • Precedent

    Granting sanctions relief to offset inflation caused by a US military campaign creates a template adversaries can exploit in future conflicts by operating at a price-escalating rather than militarily decisive tempo.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #37 · Six more weeks of strikes; Hormuz deal dead

ABC News· 16 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
Trump waives Russia sanctions; G7 balks
The waiver exposes a structural policy contradiction: the US is easing financial pressure on Russia to manage oil prices driven up by the US war on Iran, while Russia — per Ukrainian intelligence — is arming Iran against US forces with Shahed drones manufactured at Alabuga.
Different Perspectives
Gulf shipping and insurance markets
Gulf shipping and insurance markets
With Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb both hostile at once, war-risk underwriters face their first dual-chokepoint pricing problem; the rerouting hedge that absorbed one closure is gone for Israeli-linked hulls. Any deal that reopens Hormuz without a Houthi stand-down clause delivers only partial shipping relief.
Russia and China
Russia and China
Russia and China met IAEA chief Grossi jointly in Geneva on 5 June to coordinate an advance blocking position against Washington's censure resolution, the first documented instance of proactive pre-session obstruction rather than reactive post-vote dissent. Beijing's move came four days after OFAC designated Shanghai Qianye Energy under Iran energy sanctions.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia was left out of the emergency $4.01 billion Patriot waiver Qatar received on 2 May as its own PAC-3 stocks ran near-empty from intercepting Iranian salvoes over Aramco facilities. Riyadh is on a standard 18-month FMS queue behind a production line booked through 2030, with no equivalent priority to Qatar's Al Udeid basing role.
Houthis (Ansar Allah)
Houthis (Ansar Allah)
The Houthis declared a complete ban on Israeli Red Sea navigation on 8 June and struck Jaffa, their first attack on Israeli territory since April, seven days after the Tasnim authorisation to activate other fronts including Bab el-Mandeb. The declaration put both chokepoints under hostile authority simultaneously.
Iran
Iran
Iran agreed the 9 June mutual halt after the Mahshahr exchange and coordinated with Russia and China to block Washington's IAEA censure resolution, using the Board as a second front while the bilateral pause held on the military one. Tehran's acceptance of the Lebanon carve-out contradicts the linkage position it stated on 1 June.
Benjamin Netanyahu and the IDF
Benjamin Netanyahu and the IDF
Israel struck the Karun Petrochemical plant at Mahshahr on 8 June over Trump's explicit objection, then agreed a halt with Iran the following day scoped on Israeli terms with Lebanon carved out. Netanyahu's posture is that the IDF will not accept Iranian missile factories as off-limits regardless of US diplomatic timelines.