The Fertilizer Institute projects US farmers will be short 2 million tonnes of urea this spring, with urea prices up 30% since the war began. Some farmers cannot obtain supply at any price.1 Spring planting is underway now. The shortage is not a forecast; it is a current constraint on fields being sowed this week.
The domestic economic pressure from this conflict has been building. US gasoline had already reached $3.98 per gallon, up 36% from pre-war levels. US diesel previously topped $5 per gallon. The fertiliser shortage adds a production-cost dimension to the energy-cost dimension: fuel to run farm equipment costs more, fertiliser to grow crops costs more or is unavailable, and transport costs have increased across the supply chain.
Urea is synthesised from natural gas. Iran and Russia together account for approximately 25% of global urea exports. The war has simultaneously disrupted Iranian production via strikes on petrochemical facilities and Russian supply chains via shipping insurance complications in the Gulf. The shortage is structural, not speculative: the 2 million tonne shortfall represents approximately 15% of annual US nitrogen fertiliser demand.
Corn planted without adequate nitrogen produces thin, pale stalks and reduced yields. The Fertilizer Institute's projection implies yields on affected acres could fall 10-20%, with downstream effects on global grain prices by autumn 2026. No administration response has been announced. The political dimension is acute: rural America, which supported the war at higher rates than urban centres per Pew data, is the constituency absorbing the most direct economic blow from a conflict it disproportionately endorsed.
