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Iran Conflict 2026
31JUL

OIES puts refill on track for 70%

4 min read
09:24UTC

The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies put EU storage on track for 70% by November, not the mandated 80%, against a forward curve at $14.72/MMBtu that prices a fuller supply recovery than the physical balance supports.

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Key takeaway

OIES puts the November refill on track for 70%, not 80%, against a forward curve pricing a faster supply recovery.

The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) published its June Comment putting EU storage on track to reach 70% by 1 November, not the mandated 80%, on a net European LNG shortfall of 2.1 bcm a month through October 1. OIES is the Oxford-based research body whose gas reviews are reference material for European trading desks. Its balance nets an 8.6 bcm Qatar-UAE loss against only 4.3 bcm replaced from other suppliers and 2.2 bcm shaved from non-EU and UK demand.

The Comment opens a wedge against the forward curve. TTF forwards average $14.72/MMBtu for 2026, below even the $13.50 OIES modelled in March for a rapid Qatari reopening, while OIES warns that above $20/MMBtu may be needed to choke enough demand to refill if Hormuz stays shut. The curve is pricing the optimistic leg of a distribution whose central case is materially worse, a roughly 40% gap below the level OIES says a closed strait requires.

Storage stood at 45.3% on 18 June, filling about 10% below the pace required for the 80% floor and continuing the under-pace trajectory that projected 67% in early June from a 40% reading 2. The mandates remain the only structural injector , with commercial arbitrage absent while the summer-winter strip holds inverted on the 58 mtpa of new global LNG capacity due in H2 . This is a relative-value asymmetry rather than a directional call: the prompt has priced relief that the back of the curve, carrying the risk the supply recovery cannot arrive before the window closes, has not.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies is a respected research group that publishes detailed analyses of gas supply and demand. In June 2026 they calculated that Europe will end up with underground storage only 70% full by the start of November, not the 80% the EU requires as a minimum safety buffer before winter heating season begins. The reason is a shortfall in deliveries of liquefied natural gas, gas chilled to liquid for shipping by sea. Because the Strait of Hormuz, the main exit route for Qatar's massive gas export terminal, was closed since March, about 2.1 billion cubic metres less LNG arrives in Europe each month than normal. Qatar, which produces roughly a fifth of the world's gas, had two of its production facilities destroyed during the conflict. Even now that the strait is reopening, those two facilities cannot be repaired for years. To attract enough extra gas from elsewhere, OIES estimate European gas prices may need to rise about 40% above where they are today. That would make energy significantly more expensive for households and businesses over winter.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The OIES 70% central case rests on three independent structural constraints that compound each other. First, Qatar's Ras Laffan export complex, which supplied close to a fifth of global LNG before the conflict, cannot return to pre-conflict volumes at any opening date because two production trains were destroyed in March. OIES models only the trains that can physically restart, capping Qatari contribution in any reopening scenario.

Second, the JKM-TTF spread at USD 4.35/MMBtu remains above OIES's USD 2.50-3.00 diversion breakeven , meaning Atlantic LNG cargoes face stronger commercial incentives to route east than west. The Disha, the first post-conflict Hormuz transit, cleared India not Europe, this pattern establishes the commercial routing priority that OIES's non-EU demand reduction assumption has to overcome.

Third, EU storage fill at 45.3% on 18 June is already running at 3,257 GWh/day , 10% below the 3,615 GWh/day floor needed for 80% by November, and the only injectors are the EBN, CRE and ARERA mandate programmes . Commercial injection economics at EUR 41 TTF with an inverted or flat strip offer no arbitrage incentive.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    If OIES's 70% central case materialises and cold weather arrives before mid-November, the European Commission would face pressure to invoke emergency supply-sharing measures under Regulation (EU) 2022/1369, the crisis regulation previously activated in summer 2022.

    Medium term · Assessed
  • Consequence

    The 10 bcm gap between 70% and 80% storage implies a TTF price recovery toward USD 20/MMBtu through August-September if Qatari LNG normalisation is slower than Goldman's end-July timeline.

    Medium term · Assessed
  • Opportunity

    Desks long winter TTF or long H1 2027 TTF carry a structural upside tail if OIES's 70% case proves accurate; the spread between EUR 41 current spot and the USD 20 demand-choke level is the pricing range for that optionality.

    Medium term · Assessed
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EnergyRiskIQ· 18 Jun 2026
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