Skip to content
You can now search across every topic, entity and event.What's new
European Oil Markets
18JUN

UAE and Saudi Arabia weigh Iran strikes

3 min read
12:45UTC

Axios reports the UAE and Saudi Arabia are considering direct attacks on Iranian missile sites — a step no Gulf Arab state has taken in the modern era, and one that would cost Riyadh a Chinese-brokered peace deal barely two years old.

EconomicDeveloping
Key takeaway

The report's sourcing — Israeli officials rather than Emirati or Saudi ones — suggests this may serve Israeli information interests in widening the coalition as much as it reflects genuine Gulf deliberation.

Axios reported Wednesday, citing Israeli officials, that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are considering direct strikes on Iranian missile launch sites, driven by the volume of fire both countries have absorbed. Neither government has confirmed. The UAE has intercepted 165 ballistic missiles, 2 cruise missiles, and 541 drones since operations began . Saudi air defences downed eight drones near Riyadh during the same attack wave that struck the US Embassy compound .

The source warrants scrutiny. Israeli officials have a direct interest in Gulf States joining the campaign — broader participation distributes both the military burden and the political exposure. A report sourced to Israeli officials, published without confirmation from Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, may reflect an Israeli aspiration as much as a Gulf intention. The incentive to leak such a report is obvious: it pressures Gulf capitals publicly and creates a diplomatic expectation they must either meet or visibly refuse.

For Saudi Arabia, the calculus runs through Beijing. The 2023 China-brokered normalisation agreement with Iran ended seven years of severed relations, reopened embassies, and gave China a diplomatic stake in Gulf stability it had never previously held. Saudi strikes on Iranian territory would collapse that architecture entirely. Beijing has already moved beyond general calls for restraint to direct negotiations with Tehran pressing Iran to spare specific Gulf infrastructure . Chinese diplomatic credibility is invested in a framework that Saudi bombs would destroy.

No Gulf Arab state has struck Iranian territory in the modern era. During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Gulf monarchies funded Baghdad's war effort and allowed Iraqi aircraft to operate from their bases, but never launched their own attacks on Iran. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have framed every action in this conflict as purely defensive — intercepting incoming fire, protecting their own populations. Strikes on launch sites inside Iran would end that framing permanently, converting two non-belligerents into active combatants in a war neither chose to start.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

According to a single report citing Israeli sources, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are reportedly considering launching their own airstrikes against Iranian missile sites. Neither country has confirmed this. Both have so far absorbed Iranian missile attacks without striking Iran directly. Joining the fight would be a major escalation — particularly for Saudi Arabia, which signed a peace deal with Iran just three years ago brokered by China. If they do strike, Iran could respond by targeting Saudi oil facilities, which would affect global energy prices significantly.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

China faces a direct test of its regional diplomatic credibility that the body does not surface: the 2023 deal was Beijing's most significant Middle East diplomatic achievement. Saudi strikes on Iran would demonstrate that Chinese soft power in the Gulf is insufficient to prevent an agreement signatory from attacking the other party — revealing whether Chinese regional influence is structural or merely transactional, with consequences for Beijing's global mediator positioning.

Root Causes

The 2023 Saudi-Iran normalisation was always a strategic hedge rather than genuine rapprochement — Riyadh was simultaneously balancing US pressure for Gulf-Israel normalisation and Chinese incentives for Iran engagement. Iran's sustained ballistic missile campaign against Saudi territory has now collapsed that balance, forcing a choice the 2023 agreement was specifically designed to defer indefinitely.

Escalation

UAE's structural position differs from Saudi Arabia's in ways the body does not address: no China-brokered normalisation agreement at risk, an existing intelligence-sharing architecture with Israel via post-Abraham Accords security cooperation, and a smaller domestic political exposure to Sunni-Shia framing. UAE acting before or independently of Saudi Arabia is structurally more plausible than joint simultaneous action.

What could happen next?
2 risk1 consequence1 meaning1 precedent
  • Risk

    Iranian retaliation against Saudi oil infrastructure following Gulf state strikes could remove 6-10% of global crude supply, driving oil prices to levels not seen since 2008 and compounding existing shipping insurance paralysis.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Consequence

    Saudi participation would dissolve the distinction between the US-Israeli coalition and the broader Gulf, transforming a bilateral conflict into a regional war with no neutral Gulf mediators remaining.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Risk

    China's credibility as a regional mediator is directly at stake — Saudi strikes on Iran would represent the most significant failure of Chinese Middle East diplomacy since Beijing's regional engagement began in earnest.

    Medium term · Suggested
  • Meaning

    Israeli sourcing of the report suggests a deliberate signal to Tehran that Gulf participation is possible — functioning as a deterrence escalation tool whether or not Gulf action is genuinely imminent.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Precedent

    Gulf state strikes on Iran would establish that the Abraham Accords framework has produced effective military coalition behaviour even without formal Saudi-Israel normalisation.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #19 · First US torpedo kill since 1945

Axios· 4 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
UAE and Saudi Arabia weigh Iran strikes
Direct Gulf Arab military strikes on Iranian territory would dissolve the distinction both states have maintained between defending their own airspace and joining the US-Israeli offensive campaign. For Saudi Arabia, it would also jeopardise the 2023 China-brokered normalisation with Iran — Beijing's most consequential Middle Eastern diplomatic achievement — at the moment China has shifted from general restraint calls to direct pressure on Tehran.
Different Perspectives
Gulf oil producer
Gulf oil producer
Secured OPEC's confirmed 188,000 b/d September increment with the next meeting set for 6 September, but the Secretariat's own 2 August release says nothing about the fourth quarter. Output guidance beyond September remains undisclosed even as delegate sourcing keeps filling that gap.
Money manager positioned in WTI
Money manager positioned in WTI
Added 21,402 lots to a 108,307 net long in NYMEX WTI in the week to 28 July, against just 1,485 added to Brent's 15,740, a roughly fourteen-to-one split. Conviction sits in the American benchmark even as the European diesel story sets the record.
Indian refiner buying Urals
Indian refiner buying Urals
Bought Russian crude at a discount that narrowed to $1-2 a barrel in the week to 29 July from over $10, as Hormuz risk pushed it toward Urals. If that risk eases with the strike now called off, the discount it is currently enjoying could re-widen just as fast.
Russian diesel exporter
Russian diesel exporter
Novak tied any lifting of the diesel export ban, due to lapse 31 July, to an unspecified market recovery with no date, and pushed the gasoline ban to end-2026. An open-ended constraint suits an exporter benefiting from the record European crack it feeds.
War-risk underwriter
War-risk underwriter
Withdrew war-risk cover for Saudi-linked hulls on 24 July and has not reinstated it, holding Bab el-Mandeb tanker transits near 7.5 a day. A cancelled strike does not by itself trigger the committee review needed to re-accept the class.
Northwest European refiner
Northwest European refiner
Sources only 17% of diesel imports from Saudi Red Sea ports against the Mediterranean's 24%, so the ARA crack at $85.86 trails the Med print by $5.81. Lower Red Sea exposure is cushioning it against the rerouting cost, not eliminating it.