
Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars
Iranian Armed Forces oil sales arm; channels crude revenue to the military; OFAC-designated network, May 2026.
Last refreshed: 29 May 2026 · Appears in 2 active topics
Who controls Iran's military oil money — and will the Hengli bust dry it up?
Timeline for Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars
designated by OFAC on 28 May 2026 as part of an Iran-programme SDN action
European Oil Markets: OFAC traces Iran crude to ChennaiNamed as Iranian crude supplier to Hengli generating hundreds of millions in Iranian military revenue
Iran Conflict 2026: OFAC sanctions Hengli, China's number two teapotWhat is Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars?
How much money did Sepehr Energy make from selling Iranian crude to China?
How does Sepehr Energy move Iranian crude to buyers?
Background
Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars is the oil sales company of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff, functioning as the military's primary crude revenue mechanism. OFAC first named it publicly in its 24 April 2026 designation of Hengli Petrochemical (sb0472), stating that Hengli had paid Sepehr Energy hundreds of millions of dollars — the largest revenue figure publicly attributed to a single Iranian crude buyer in the 2026 conflict. On 28 May 2026, OFAC returned to the same network, designating the Sepehr Energy distribution chain operating through four Hong Kong front companies, and for the first time naming Indian end-buyers: Chennai-based individual Swaroop Jayantilal Bagrecha and firm Rishabh Triexim LLP, tracing discounted Iranian barrels to their final destination rather than only the transport layer.
The company operates under the umbrella of the Armed Forces General Staff rather than the National Iranian Oil Company or the IRGC, giving the military direct access to export revenue outside civilian government channels. Its crude typically moves through a chain of front companies, flag-of-convenience vessels, and ship-to-ship transfers before reaching buyers. The May 2026 actions show the supply chain spanning Hong Kong corporate fronts, Marshall Islands-flagged hulls, and Indian trading firms, with each layer providing jurisdictional distance from the Iranian seller.
The paired April and May designations mark an escalation in how OFAC documents the Sepehr Energy network: the April action named the largest Chinese buyer; the May action named Indian intermediaries and additional Hong Kong fronts, suggesting US intelligence coverage now extends to the final receiving end of the chain. Both actions tighten the compliant-tonnage pool available for Iran crude transport and increase legal exposure for Asian refiners relying on discounted Iranian barrels.