Pakistan Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed on 26 March that Pakistan is facilitating indirect talks between the US and Iran, relaying a 15-point American proposal that Tehran is reviewing.1 Dar stated publicly that 'the United States has shared 15 points, being deliberated upon by Iran.' The White House would not confirm any scheduled meeting, stating 'nothing official until announced by White House.' Vice President JD Vance has been proposed as the US interlocutor; Parliamentary Speaker Ghalibaf as the Iranian counterpart.
The Pakistan confirmation is the first time a third-party intermediary has publicly confirmed the existence of a channel, distinct from Iran's prior denial of any negotiations. India, Pakistan, Iraq, Malaysia, and China had previously negotiated directly with Tehran on bilateral transit arrangements, establishing Pakistan's credibility as an interlocutor with access to the Iranian government.
The contradiction at the centre of this development is Ghalibaf himself. On the same day Pakistan confirmed the talks and secured his removal from the joint targeting list, Ghalibaf called Trump's claim of Iranian peace overtures an attempt to 'escape the quagmire.'2 He also threatened an unnamed regional neighbour, widely understood to be the UAE, with 'continuous and relentless attacks' on vital infrastructure if it assists in a Kharg Island operation.3
Iran's proposed peace envoy is publicly threatening to destroy Gulf infrastructure on the day his protective status is confirmed. This is either sophisticated negotiating posture (arrive at the table having demonstrated willingness to burn it) or evidence that the talks have no Iranian institutional backing and Ghalibaf is performing for a domestic audience rather than engaging with the diplomatic framework Pakistan has built.
