13MAY

GBU-57 bunker buster not used at Natanz

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The B-2s that struck Natanz carried 2,000-pound bombs that penetrate a metre of concrete. The enrichment halls sit under eight metres of concrete and twenty-two metres of earth.

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ConflictAssessed

Key takeaway

The gap between the weapon required and the weapon used is itself a strategic signal — whether deliberately communicated as restraint or inadvertently revealed as a constraint.

Defence analysts at The War Zone and Army Recognition assessed that the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator — the 30,000-lb weapon engineered for deeply buried targets — has not been confirmed used against Iranian nuclear facilities. The B-2 Spirit bombers that struck Natanz carried GBU-31 2,000-lb munitions with BLU-109 warheads, which penetrate approximately 1–2 metres of reinforced concrete. Natanz's enrichment halls sit under 8 metres of concrete and 22 metres of earth. Fordow is inside a mountain.

The GBU-57 exists for this target set. Boeing developed it from 2004 under a programme accelerated by successive US administrations specifically to hold Iran's Fordow facility at risk after its existence was revealed. The weapon penetrates over 60 metres of earth or 118 metres of reinforced concrete — the minimum required to reach Natanz's centrifuge halls. The B-2 fleet at Whiteman Air Force Base — the same base the strike aircraft launched from — carries both weapons. The bombers carried the smaller one.

Three explanations exist, each with different strategic implications. The GBU-57 may be held in reserve for a subsequent phase, making the current campaign preparatory — sealing entrances and destroying surface infrastructure before the penetrating weapon is deployed. It may have been withheld because detonating 30,000 pounds of explosive near tonnes of enriched uranium risks exactly the radiological release the IAEA has confirmed did not occur. Or it was never authorised, which would disconnect the nuclear justification Defence Secretary Hegseth offered from the Pentagon podium from the campaign's actual military plan.

Senior Israeli defence figures, including former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, have publicly questioned whether air power alone can destroy Iran's dispersed and hardened nuclear programme. Internal Israeli military assessments reportedly reached the same conclusion as recently as 2024. The distance between what the campaign has deployed and what it needs to penetrate is measurable: 8 metres of concrete and 22 metres of earth.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US built a 30,000-pound bomb specifically to destroy bunkers like Natanz and Fordow — it took seven years and only the B-2 stealth bomber can carry it. That bomb was not used. The bombs that were used can penetrate roughly one to two metres of reinforced concrete — adequate for a hardened surface building, not for a facility buried under eight metres of concrete and 22 metres of earth. The question this raises is deliberate: was the bigger bomb withheld as a future threat, or was there a constraint on using it?

Deep Analysis

Synthesis

Senator Warner's statement that there was no imminent threat from Iran, combined with MOP non-use, suggests a possible coherence in the administration's approach that the body frames as a gap: if the actual objective is coercive pressure and regime behaviour change rather than programme destruction, GBU-31 strikes that damage entrances and demonstrate B-2 overflight may be calibrated to that objective. The munitions gap is either a capability failure or a strategy — and those two interpretations demand opposite policy responses.

Root Causes

Three structural explanations are not mutually exclusive: first, political constraint on striking nuclear facilities with maximum force due to the nuclear adjacency taboo and concern about Russian or Chinese reaction; second, a strategy of progressive pressure reserving maximum capability for a second phase contingent on Iranian behaviour; third, sortie and logistics constraints on MOP deployment given its unique carriage requirements. The body's framing — that stated war aims and demonstrated capability are misaligned — assumes the first explanation; the second would mean alignment exists but is not publicly disclosed.

Escalation

The non-use of the MOP creates a visible and identifiable next rung on the escalation ladder. Iran's leadership can observe that maximum available capability was withheld — this either signals US restraint (reducing Iranian incentive to retaliate massively) or signals a ceiling on current willingness to escalate (potentially emboldening a measured response). The ambiguity appears deliberate and constitutes a form of coercive signalling: the threat of MOP deployment remains available as leverage.

What could happen next?

2 risk1 meaning1 consequence1 precedent

Risk
If Iran concludes the programme survived intact, reconstruction begins underground where further GBU-31 strikes cannot reach — and the window for coercive leverage narrows as reconstruction proceeds.
Short term · Suggested
Meaning
The US retains an unambiguous escalation reserve in MOP deployment — a demonstrated capability step withheld from the current strike package — which functions as both leverage and deterrent simultaneously.
Medium term · Assessed
Consequence
Congressional and allied pressure to clarify whether MOP will be used will intensify as battle damage assessment proceeds and programme survival becomes the central intelligence question.
Short term · Suggested
Risk
Partial disruption of nuclear infrastructure without programme termination may accelerate Iranian decision-making toward weaponisation as the only remaining deterrent against future strikes.
Medium term · Suggested
Precedent
First public assessment of GBU-57 non-use against its designed target set establishes a documented precedent of restraint that constrains future US freedom of action — using MOP in a second wave becomes a visible and politically significant escalation step.
Long term · Suggested

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-leaning sources from United States

United States×2

LeftRight

The GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator was developed between 2004 and 2011 specifically in response to intelligence on Iran's hardened underground facilities — Fordow's existence was confirmed publicly in 2009, and MOP development was accelerated accordingly. The weapon was certified operational in 2011.

This is the first combat scenario in which its designed target set has been present and the weapon's non-use has been publicly assessed.

Why it’s relevant now

The MOP exists because of facilities like Natanz and Fordow; its apparent non-deployment against them is therefore the central anomaly requiring explanation, and each plausible explanation carries distinct strategic implications.

RAND Corporation and Center for Strategic and International Studies open-source assessments of the MOP's capability envelope indicate it can defeat Natanz underground halls but that Fordow — built into solid granite at greater depth — likely requires multiple successive strikes to the same penetration point, a tactic not confirmed as executed in any strike package.

This means even full MOP deployment might not guarantee Fordow's destruction in a single sortie package, making the facility potentially undestroyed by any conventional means currently available.

Sources:War on the Rocks·War on the Rocks

Mentions:Pete Hegseth →B-2 Spirit →GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator →Fordow →Pentagon →United States →The War Zone →National Security Council (Iran) →Iran →Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant →Israel Defense Forces (IDF) →IAEA →

First Reported In

Update #14 · Natanz unverified; Hormuz sealed

War on the Rocks· 3 Mar 2026

Read original →

Causes and effects

Caused by

B-2s sent; Iran buried arsenal survives

Confirmed use of GBU-31 (not GBU-57 MOP) in B-2 strikes revealed gap between munitions capability and deeply buried target requirements

Occurred 2 Mar 2026

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Hegseth: Iran hid nukes behind missiles

Hegseth's stated nuclear mission objective established the policy aim that the identified munitions cannot achieve

Occurred 2 Mar 2026

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This Event

GBU-57 bunker buster not used at Natanz

The only weapon in the US arsenal capable of penetrating Natanz's underground enrichment halls or reaching Fordow's mountain facility has not been confirmed used, creating a measurable gap between the administration's stated nuclear objective and the military capability it has actually deployed.

Different Perspectives

NATO eastern flank (B9 + Nordics)

The B9+Nordic Bucharest joint statement on 13 May reaffirmed Ukraine's sovereignty within internationally recognised borders and backed NATO eastern flank reinforcement; the summit accepted Zelenskyy's bilateral drone deal proposal as a structural alternative to the stalled US export approval pathway, treating it as a European defence architecture question rather than aid delivery.

IAEA / Rafael Grossi

Grossi is still negotiating a sixth ZNPP repair ceasefire with no agreement after 50 days of 750 kV line disconnection; the 3 May ERCL drone strike that destroyed environmental monitoring equipment represents a qualitative escalation in infrastructure degradation that the IAEA has documented but cannot compel either party to halt.

Péter Magyar / Hungary

Magyar's incoming foreign minister pledged on 12 May that Hungary will stop abusing EU veto rights; the pledge is a statement of intent rather than a binding legal commitment, and Magyar's MEPs voted against the €90 billion loan as recently as April, while a planned referendum on Ukraine's EU accession preserves a downstream blocking lever.

EU Council and European Commission

The Magyar cabinet formation on 12 May removes the Hungary veto that had blocked the €9.1 billion first tranche since February; the Commission is now coordinating the three-document disbursement package for an early-June vote. The structural blocker is gone; the disbursement question is now scheduling, not politics.

Donald Trump / White House

Trump announced a 9-11 May three-day ceasefire with a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner exchange attached, then called peace 'getting very close' on 11-13 May while Russia's 800-drone barrage was under way; his public framing adopted Russian diplomatic language without securing any Russian operational concession or verifying the exchange was agreed.

Vladimir Putin / Kremlin

Putin told reporters on 9 May the war is 'coming to an end' while Peskov confirmed on 13 May that territorial demands are unchanged and Russia requires full Ukrainian withdrawal from all four annexed regions; the verbal accommodation costs Moscow nothing and conditions any summit on a pre-finalised treaty Kyiv cannot accept.