Skip to content
Briefings are running a touch slower this week while we rebuild the foundations.See roadmap
Russia-Ukraine War 2026
13MAY

Tehran's 14 million: no sirens, shelter

4 min read
20:00UTC

AP's first detailed dispatch from inside Tehran describes 14 million people absorbing sustained bombardment without warnings, shelters, or internet — conditions worse than anything the city faced during the Iran-Iraq War.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Iran built one of the world's largest missile arsenals but made no investment in shelters or sirens for the 14 million people those missiles were meant to protect.

The Associated Press published the most detailed dispatch from inside Tehran since the war began on 28 February. Fourteen million people in Tehran province are living under sustained aerial bombardment with no air raid sirens, no warning systems, no bomb shelters, and no functioning internet. Bombs arrive without notice. Families rely on phone calls where mobile networks still function, word of mouth otherwise. An athlete in northern Tehran told The AP: "The psychological pressure is real." Streets built for 9 million daily occupants are empty.

The physical toll on the city is visible in its monuments. The Azadi Square archway — the 45-metre tower built in 1971 to mark 2,500 years of the Persian Empire, renamed after the 1979 revolution, and Tehran's most internationally recognised structure — was photographed enveloped in smoke after nearby strikes. The Golestan Palace, a Qajar-era royal complex and UNESCO World Heritage Site since 2013, had its windows blasted out from a strike on adjacent Arag Square. Residents report persistent sore throats and burning eyes — symptoms consistent with Iranian Red Crescent warnings last week that acidic black rain from 30 Israeli-struck fuel depots carried toxic hydrocarbon compounds, sulphur, and nitrogen oxides, posing risks of chemical burns and lung damage across the metropolitan area. The strikes that created those fires produced an environmental health emergency layered on top of the kinetic one.

The last time Tehran endured sustained aerial bombardment was during the Iran-Iraq War's "War of the Cities" between 1985 and 1988, when Iraqi Al-Hussein missiles — modified Scuds with extended range — struck the capital in intermittent barrages. A generation of Tehranis learned to sleep in basements when sirens sounded. Today there are no sirens. Iraq's missile capacity in the 1980s was limited to dozens of launches per campaign phase; the ordnance now falling on Tehran includes precision-guided munitions from fifth-generation aircraft striking around the clock.

UNHCR reported this week that up to 3.2 million Iranians have been internally displaced since 28 February — but for the millions who remain in Tehran, leaving requires transport, fuel, money, and a destination. The city sits at the base of the Alborz Mountains with limited northward road capacity; primary exit routes run south and west, toward the areas under heaviest strike activity. During the War of the Cities, Baghdad and Tehran exchanged barrages with pauses of days or weeks between them. Residents had time to adapt, stockpile, relocate. Fourteen days into this campaign, no such rhythm has formed. The bombardment has been continuous, and the population has fewer means to endure it than their parents did forty years ago.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

When bombs fall on a city, governments normally have systems to protect civilians: sirens that give people time to find cover, designated shelters to run to, and emergency broadcasts telling people where it's safe. Tehran has none of these. There are no public sirens — bombs arrive without any warning. There are no public shelters. The government has shut down the internet, so families cannot even track news or warn each other via social media. Fourteen million people are living in what military planners call an 'open city' — entirely unprotected from air attack. What makes this additionally striking is that this is not the result of war destroying those systems. Iran simply never built them. For four decades, the government spent enormous resources developing ballistic missiles and proxy forces across the region, operating on the assumption that Iran would never be the one being bombed. That assumption has now failed, and there is no civil defence infrastructure to fall back on. On top of the bombing itself, the government's own decision to shut down the internet — apparently to prevent anti-government organising — has eliminated the one communication network Tehranis were using to share information and warn each other.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

The internet shutdown is analytically distinct from the bombing and should be tracked as a separate indicator of regime stability calculations. A government genuinely focused on protecting its population would maintain emergency communications infrastructure at all costs during active bombardment. Iran's decision to shut it down reveals that the regime ranks information control above civilian safety — it is protecting its own political position at a quantifiable cost in civilian lives. This is not an emergency measure; it is a choice about whose survival the government is optimising for.

Root Causes

The Islamic Republic's strategic doctrine was built entirely around deterrence-by-projection and power extension — Hezbollah, proxy networks, ballistic missiles — with zero investment in homeland civil defence. This was a conscious doctrinal choice, not an oversight: the government assumed deterrence would prevent attacks, and that if deterrence failed, the war would be fought on others' soil. The internet shutdown compounds this failure: the regime is suppressing the one tool Tehranis could use for mutual aid and early warning because it also transmits information the government cannot control. Civilian safety is being sacrificed to information control — a priority inversion with measurable mortality consequences.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    Without sirens or shelters, Tehran's casualty rate per strike is structurally higher than in comparable historical campaigns — the death toll trajectory will worsen non-linearly as bombardment continues.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Daily sore throats and burning eyes from refinery smoke signal chronic benzene and hydrogen sulphide exposure — a public health crisis that will generate elevated cancer and respiratory disease rates for years after the campaign ends.

    Long term · Assessed
  • Meaning

    Golestan Palace's window destruction from a nearby strike implicates Hague Convention 1954 obligations on cultural property — a war crimes vector independent of civilian targeting allegations.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Risk

    The internet shutdown prevents accurate casualty reporting, emergency coordination, and organised evacuation — it will prolong the humanitarian consequences of every individual strike beyond what the strike itself would otherwise cause.

    Immediate · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #34 · Tehran march bombed; first deaths in Oman

AP· 13 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
Tehran's 14 million: no sirens, shelter
Tehran's civilian population of 14 million has no functioning warning or shelter infrastructure, compounded by toxic fallout from destroyed refineries, creating conditions where sustained bombardment proceeds without any civilian mitigation — worse in terms of protection than the 1980s War of the Cities.
Different Perspectives
NATO eastern flank (B9 + Nordics)
NATO eastern flank (B9 + Nordics)
The B9+Nordic Bucharest joint statement on 13 May reaffirmed Ukraine's sovereignty within internationally recognised borders and backed NATO eastern flank reinforcement; the summit accepted Zelenskyy's bilateral drone deal proposal as a structural alternative to the stalled US export approval pathway, treating it as a European defence architecture question rather than aid delivery.
IAEA / Rafael Grossi
IAEA / Rafael Grossi
Grossi is still negotiating a sixth ZNPP repair ceasefire with no agreement after 50 days of 750 kV line disconnection; the 3 May ERCL drone strike that destroyed environmental monitoring equipment represents a qualitative escalation in infrastructure degradation that the IAEA has documented but cannot compel either party to halt.
Péter Magyar / Hungary
Péter Magyar / Hungary
Magyar's incoming foreign minister pledged on 12 May that Hungary will stop abusing EU veto rights; the pledge is a statement of intent rather than a binding legal commitment, and Magyar's MEPs voted against the €90 billion loan as recently as April, while a planned referendum on Ukraine's EU accession preserves a downstream blocking lever.
EU Council and European Commission
EU Council and European Commission
The Magyar cabinet formation on 12 May removes the Hungary veto that had blocked the €9.1 billion first tranche since February; the Commission is now coordinating the three-document disbursement package for an early-June vote. The structural blocker is gone; the disbursement question is now scheduling, not politics.
Donald Trump / White House
Donald Trump / White House
Trump announced a 9-11 May three-day ceasefire with a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner exchange attached, then called peace 'getting very close' on 11-13 May while Russia's 800-drone barrage was under way; his public framing adopted Russian diplomatic language without securing any Russian operational concession or verifying the exchange was agreed.
Vladimir Putin / Kremlin
Vladimir Putin / Kremlin
Putin told reporters on 9 May the war is 'coming to an end' while Peskov confirmed on 13 May that territorial demands are unchanged and Russia requires full Ukrainian withdrawal from all four annexed regions; the verbal accommodation costs Moscow nothing and conditions any summit on a pre-finalised treaty Kyiv cannot accept.