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Pandemics and Biosecurity
24MAY

Africa CDC and EU launch ARILAC for AMR

4 min read
16:06UTC

Africa CDC, ASLM and the EU launched ARILAC in Addis Ababa on 6 May, a four-year laboratory-capacity programme spanning eight African Union states on a One Health basis.

ScienceDeveloping
Key takeaway

ARILAC is Africa's first continental-scale response to a 1.3% routine-AMR-testing baseline.

Africa CDC (Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, the African Union's public health agency), ASLM (African Society for Laboratory Medicine) and the European Union launched ARILAC (Advancing Regional Integrated Laboratory Capacity for AMR Control) in Addis Ababa on 6 May 2026 . The four-year programme is funded through the Team Europe Initiative on Sustainable Health Security and will operate across eight AU states: Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zimbabwe. It works on a One Health basis, integrating human and veterinary microbiology surveillance.

The baseline figure does the editorial work. Of more than 50,000 medical laboratories assessed across 14 African countries in Africa CDC's continental review, only 1.3% conduct routine AMR (antimicrobial resistance) testing, leaving roughly 261 million people without access to AMR diagnostics. Without diagnostic capacity, prescribers cannot distinguish between sensitive and resistant pathogens, antibiotic stewardship cannot be enforced, and surveillance cannot feed back into treatment guidelines. Resistance accumulates as a silent baseline that only surfaces when a clinician runs out of working antibiotics for a patient WHO would have been treatable a year earlier.

One Health framing matters structurally rather than rhetorically here. Resistance genes circulate through livestock, wastewater and clinical settings on a single ecology; an antibiotic deployed in poultry feed in one country can drive resistance in a human pathogen in another within years. ARILAC's design routes diagnostic capacity through veterinary as well as human laboratories, on the logic that the surveillance feed has to match the actual pathway resistance travels. The eight participating states span West, Central, East and Southern Africa, which gives the programme a continental footprint without requiring all 55 AU members to commit at the launch stage.

Team Europe Initiatives pool development-cooperation budgets across EU member states, the European Commission and European development finance institutions, which produces a larger and more stable funding pipeline than bilateral aid arrangements typically achieve. ARILAC's four-year horizon and continental scope both rest on that pooled EU commitment. Whether the programme moves the 1.3% baseline materially over four years depends on three things visible from launch: how fast laboratory accreditation can be brought to WHO GLASS (Global antimicrobial resistance and Use Surveillance System) reporting standards, whether ministries of health absorb operating costs after the EU funding window closes, and whether the One Health surveillance feed actually reaches treatment guidelines rather than sitting in dashboard form.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Antimicrobial resistance happens when bacteria evolve to survive the antibiotics we use to kill them. It is already causing millions of deaths every year and is projected to become far worse. Stopping it requires knowing which bacteria are resistant to which drugs in different places, which requires laboratory testing. In most of Africa, that testing does not happen. A doctor who suspects a patient has a bacterial infection must guess which antibiotic to prescribe rather than running a test. That guessing leads to overuse of broad-spectrum antibiotics, which in turn makes resistance worse. ARILAC funds the lab equipment, the training, and the data systems to start fixing that across eight African countries.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Post-colonial health system architecture in most ARILAC participant states directed infrastructure investment towards infectious diseases with available vertical-programme funding, specifically HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis. These conditions attract both bilateral and multilateral funding with dedicated diagnostic platforms.

AMR, which is a cross-cutting resistance phenomenon affecting all antibiotic-treatable conditions, has no comparable vertical funder. The 1.3% testing figure is the output of decades of investment flowing to HIV rapid tests and malaria rapid diagnostic tests rather than bacterial culture equipment.

Veterinary laboratory capacity, the animal-health side of the One Health framework, is typically weaker still. Antimicrobial use in livestock in most ARILAC participant states goes largely unmonitored because no systematic veterinary surveillance infrastructure exists at farm level. Animal and human AMR surveillance operating independently produces an incomplete picture of where resistance is emerging; ARILAC's integrated approach is technically correct but operationally ambitious.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Over the four-year programme period, participating countries will generate AMR surveillance data for the first time at scale, improving the WHO GLASS dataset's African coverage from its current thin baseline and enabling the first reliable continental AMR resistance maps.

    Medium term · 0.75
  • Opportunity

    ARILAC's One Health framing, which integrates human and veterinary AMR surveillance, creates the institutional precedent for combined livestock and clinical testing programmes in Cameroon, Uganda, Zimbabwe and other participant states with significant agricultural sectors.

    Medium term · 0.65
  • Risk

    Without parallel investment in clinical stewardship programmes, prescriber training, and antibiotic procurement reform, improved laboratory capacity will document resistance patterns that clinicians lack the prescribing alternatives or drug access to address.

    Medium term · 0.7
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Causes and effects
This Event
Africa CDC and EU launch ARILAC for AMR
Only 1.3% of more than 50,000 medical laboratories assessed across 14 African countries conduct routine antimicrobial-resistance testing; ARILAC is the first concrete continental-scale response to a structural surveillance gap that affects 261 million people.
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European Union / ECDC
European Union / ECDC
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Ituri and South Kivu communities / DRC
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Uganda / Diana Atwine
Uganda / Diana Atwine
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Africa CDC / Jean Kaseya
Africa CDC / Jean Kaseya
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United States / HHS
United States / HHS
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Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus / WHO
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus / WHO
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