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Iran Conflict 2026
9MAR

Vance rebuffs Netanyahu on regime change

2 min read
05:12UTC

The US Vice President told Israel's Prime Minister he was overselling regime change, then went on a podcast to declare victory and promise more war in the same breath.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Washington and Jerusalem are fighting different wars on the same battlefield.

Vice President JD Vance told the Benny Show podcast on 28 March that the war would continue "a little while longer" to ensure Iran is "neutered for a very long time." In the same interview, he claimed Iran's conventional military is "effectively destroyed" and a third of its missile arsenal gone 1. The two claims sit uneasily together.

In a tense phone call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Vance knocked the Israeli leader for "overselling the likelihood of Iran regime change." US officials subsequently accused Israel of "smearing Vance" after the exchange leaked. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had told G7 ministers on 27 March that the war needs 2 to 4 more weeks , the first official acknowledgement the timeline has slipped. The 6 April deadline for strikes on Iran's power grid is now eight days away with no movement toward the conditions that would prevent it.

The fracture defines the war's trajectory. Israel wants the Iranian government replaced. The US wants nuclear facilities degraded and Hormuz reopened. These are different wars sharing a kinetic phase. Iran's asymmetric strategy exploits exactly this gap: without a unified strategic objective, every Iranian escalation forces Washington and Jerusalem to negotiate with each other before they can respond. That internal delay is itself a strategic advantage for Tehran.

The contradiction in Vance's own messaging (objectives met, war must continue) mirrors the broader alliance problem. If the mission is accomplished, the war has no mandate to continue. If it must continue, the mission is not accomplished. Both things cannot be true.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The United States and Israel are fighting in the same war but not for the same goal. The US wants to destroy Iran's nuclear programme and reopen the oil shipping lane at Hormuz. Israel wants the Iranian government replaced entirely. US Vice President JD Vance told a podcast the war has nearly achieved its aims, then told Israel's prime minister to stop claiming it would end with regime change. Those two positions contradict each other. This matters because Iran's strategy depends on keeping the two allies arguing with each other. Every time Iran escalates, the US and Israel first have to negotiate what to do about it before they can respond. That delay is exactly what Tehran wants.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The fracture originates in the two countries' different threat assessments. For Israel, Iranian regime survival is an existential threat; nuclear degradation alone leaves the regime intact and able to rebuild. For the US, regime change triggers occupation, reconstruction, and a nation-building commitment that Trump explicitly rejected.

Iran's asymmetric strategy deliberately exploits this gap. Every Iranian escalation (Houthi entry, aluminium strikes, university threats) forces Washington and Jerusalem to negotiate their response with each other before they can act. Internal US-Israeli negotiation is itself Tehran's most effective delaying tactic.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    The US-Israeli strategic divergence gives Iran time to lock in legal and domestic architecture around Hormuz before a unified allied response can be coordinated.

    Immediate · 0.8
  • Consequence

    If Vance's 'effectively destroyed' claim becomes the official US position, it narrows the justification for continued operations and risks Israeli unilateral escalation.

    Short term · 0.7
  • Precedent

    An alliance fracture at this stage normalises divergent war aims within the coalition, making it harder to agree on ceasefire terms.

    Medium term · 0.65
First Reported In

Update #51 · Iran hits aluminium plants; Hormuz emptying

Times of Israel· 29 Mar 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Futures markets priced CENTCOM's strikes-complete statement as a de-escalation signal and pushed Brent down 1.7 per cent to $94.71, even as the IRGC declared Hormuz closed. Lloyd's war-risk premiums held elevated because institutional de-listing requires a UN Security Council resolution that Russia and China have just shown they will block.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on 6-7 June with no public response. The IRGC's Hormuz closure on 11 June shows the corps is acting independently of the channel Pakistan is using, making the mediation structurally unable to produce a binding commitment without direct IRGC access.
Russia and China
Russia and China
Russia and China voted against GOV/2026/40 at the IAEA Board, following through on the blocking position coordinated with Grossi in Geneva on 5 June; both states continue to oppose Western institutional pressure on Iran at every multilateral venue.
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
The E3 co-sponsored IAEA resolution GOV/2026/40, adopted 21-3-10 on 10 June, demanding Iran disclose 440.9 kg of unaccounted HEU and admit inspectors to four denied facilities. The 10 abstentions and Russia-China noes leave any Security Council referral without a viable enforcement path.
IRGC / Iran military command
IRGC / Iran military command
The corps declared Hormuz closed to all traffic on 11 June and claimed two vessels struck, overriding the MoU its own civilian negotiators were pursuing through Pakistan. The closure order used the Persian Gulf Strait Authority apparatus to convert a toll mechanism into a military prohibition.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
CENTCOM completed a second day of strikes on Tehran, Sirik and Minab, rejected the IRGC Hormuz closure as inconsistent with observed transit, and said strikes were complete. Hegseth framed the bombing explicitly as the negotiation: the method is coercive deal-making with no stated pause threshold.