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Iran Conflict 2026
19AUG

Moscow posts surplus as shares sink

2 min read
18:42UTC

Russia recorded its first monthly budget surplus of 2026 in June, and its sovereign fund's liquid assets rose. Its stock market has now fallen for seventeen straight weeks.

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Key takeaway

Russia's reserves are lasting longer than forecast, and this briefing said otherwise for three months.

Russia recorded its first monthly budget surplus of 2026 in June, RUB 0.28tn, on Finance Ministry data reported on 9 July 1. Liquid assets in the Russia National Wealth Fund, Moscow's rainy-day reserve, rose RUB 200bn month on month to RUB 3.61tn (about $46.4bn) as of 1 July, with the total fund at RUB 13.104tn 2.

That requires a correction to this briefing's own framing. Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov projected in May that liquid fund assets would fall to roughly $12.5bn by year-end, and the Finance Ministry then topped the fund up by RUB 1.3tn to cover the first-half shortfall . Lowdown has run a reserve-depletion narrative on this topic since April on that basis. At about $46bn on 1 July with five months left to run, the projection looks unlikely to be met, and readers who took the depletion timetable from us should discount it.

The wider fiscal picture has not turned, and the surplus should not be read as recovery. The half-year deficit stands at RUB 5.73tn, 2.5% of GDP and RUB 2.35tn worse than the same point last year, with spending running 16.1% above 2025 3. The Finance Ministry attributes June's swing to front-loaded contract advances tapering off rather than to revenue picking up, which loads the heavier bill onto the second half.

The equity market tells a third story again. The Moscow Exchange index has fallen for 17 consecutive weeks, its longest unbroken decline since 1997, back to the level it touched on the day of the February 2022 invasion. Retail investors kept buying through it, putting RUB 910bn into brokerage accounts in the first quarter with equities at 30% of their portfolios. Alexander Kolyandr of the Center for European Policy Analysis, who published the figures on 16 July, argues the slide suits the Kremlin in the short run, since savings shifting into bank deposits help fund state borrowing, while it undercuts Vladimir Putin's target of doubling market capitalisation to two-thirds of GDP by 2030 and starves the domestic technology drive of capital 4.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Russia's public finances sent two very different signals in the same week. On one hand, the government posted its first monthly budget surplus of 2026 in June, a small one at RUB 0.28tn, and the cash reserves it can actually spend (its "liquid" National Wealth Fund assets) grew to RUB 3.61tn (about $46bn). On the other hand, Russia's main stock market index has now fallen for 17 straight weeks in a row, the longest losing streak since 1997, dropping all the way back to where it stood on the day the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. For context: over the first six months of the year, Russia still spent RUB 5.73tn more than it collected, a deficit that is worse than the same period last year even after June's surplus. So the budget picture and the stock market picture are pulling in opposite directions, and it is not yet clear which one better reflects the underlying health of Russia's wartime economy.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Retail investors poured RUB 910bn into brokerage accounts in the first quarter, the most since 2021, pushing equities to 30% of retail portfolios; the 17-week Moscow Exchange slide therefore erodes household savings exposure directly, a channel the budget figures alone do not capture.

Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov's own May forecast put liquid National Wealth Fund assets at roughly $12.5bn by year-end. The actual figure, about $46bn with five months still to run, means either that forecast was too pessimistic or June's inflow will not repeat; the Finance Ministry has not addressed which.

First Reported In

Update #24 · Fedorov sacked as the front stands still

Russian Ministry of Finance· 19 Jul 2026
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