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Iran Conflict 2026
13JUN

Shadow fleet: 80% of Hormuz traffic

1 min read
10:52UTC

Eighty per cent of March Hormuz transits were shadow fleet vessels. Legitimate commercial shipping has effectively stopped: three transits per day against a pre-war baseline of 138.

ConflictAssessed
Key takeaway

Legitimate Hormuz shipping has fallen 98% from pre-war levels.

AIS tracking data for March shows shadow fleet vessels accounting for 80% of Hormuz transits, up from 15% in February. 1 Legitimate commercial traffic has fallen to approximately three transits per 24 hours against a pre-war baseline of 138. Of all transits: 24% Iranian-affiliated, 15% Greek, 10% Chinese.

Trump claimed '20 big boats of oil going through Hormuz starting tomorrow morning.' Independent AIS tracking does not corroborate this. The transit composition tells its own story: a reorganisation of maritime traffic to benefit non-US-aligned operators, denominated in Chinese yuan, under IRGC naval supervision. The Hormuz toll system is operational, charging up to $2 million per vessel .

The pre-war baseline of 138 daily transits carried roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude and product exports. Three transits per day represents a 98% reduction in legitimate commercial shipping. The IEA confirmed a 20 million barrel per day disruption through Hormuz in its March report, substantially higher than the 8 million barrel per day production disruption commonly cited.

The diplomatic narrative of ships 'getting through' collapses against this primary data. Pakistan's bilateral deal for 20 additional vessels at two per day and Japan's earlier transit grant do not constitute reopening. They constitute selective passage granted by the IRGC to non-belligerents on Iran's terms. The Majlis Hormuz toll bill, expected to be finalised this week , would embed that control in Iranian domestic law.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Before the war, about 138 ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz every day, carrying oil and other goods. Now it is down to about three ships per day. The other ships using the strait are mostly 'shadow fleet' vessels, ships that operate outside normal tracking and regulatory systems and are linked to Iran, Russia, and other sanctioned states. Trump said on 30 March that '20 big boats of oil' were going through Hormuz 'tomorrow morning.' Independent ship tracking data shows this is not accurate. The strait is not freely open. Iran is running a system where it decides which ships can pass, and charges them up to $2 million per voyage. The payments are made in Chinese yuan, not dollars. The people benefiting from what little traffic still moves are Iran and its aligned partners, not the Western countries the US is fighting to protect.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    The Hormuz 'reopening' narrative Washington promotes is contradicted by AIS data showing a 98% collapse in legitimate commercial transits. The strait is open to Iran's allies on Iran's terms.

  • Risk

    The Majlis Hormuz toll bill, expected to be finalised this week, would embed IRGC transit control in Iranian domestic law, making any future negotiated reopening constitutionally more complex.

First Reported In

Update #52 · Trump wants Iran's oil; 3,500 Marines land

USNI News / CNBC· 30 Mar 2026
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Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's of London
Oil markets / Lloyd's of London
Brent fell to near $87.33 on 80 per cent deal-probability pricing, but Lloyd's has not de-listed Hormuz from its war-risk register and shipping diversions continue at 139 vessels. Insurance markets are lagging futures: physical risk remains while financial markets have spent the good news before the paper exists.
India
India
Modi is expected to raise the deaths of three Indian sailors in the 11 June CENTCOM strike on the MT Settebello with Trump at G7 sidelines, the first non-party leader to put the blockade's human cost into a formal bilateral. New Delhi is also a major Iranian oil buyer whose import volumes the sanctions-relief terms will govern.
Israel (Netanyahu)
Israel (Netanyahu)
Netanyahu stated Israel is not party to the deal on 12 June; Defence Minister Katz ruled out the Lebanon withdrawal Iran's draft demands, inserting a third blocker the US-Iran negotiating channel cannot resolve. Israel's position tethers Hormuz reopening to a Lebanon settlement Washington has not brokered.
Pakistan (mediator, Sharif/Naqvi)
Pakistan (mediator, Sharif/Naqvi)
Sharif declared a final agreed text on 12 June before either principal confirmed it, running two Tehran visits in under a week without securing a written IRGC or Khamenei response. Islamabad's incentive to claim a diplomatic win outpaces its standing to deliver either capital's signature.
Iran foreign ministry (Araghchi)
Iran foreign ministry (Araghchi)
Araghchi declared digital signing within days while setting dilute-in-Iran as a non-negotiable red line on the 440.9 kg HEU stockpile, a standing Tehran position he cannot override without authorisation from Khamenei, reachable only by courier. The FM track is sprinting to close before the IRGC reasserts control.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Vance called the deal still TBD on 12 June while CENTCOM downed Iranian drones over Hormuz for a second consecutive night and the White House register stayed blank. Washington holds the ship-out position on HEU and has not signed an Iran instrument in over 100 days of conflict.