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European Energy Markets
18JUN

Russia's first net territorial loss since Kursk

3 min read
09:57UTC

ISW assessed on 3 May that Russia suffered a net territorial loss of 116 km² in April 2026, the first reversal since Ukraine's Kursk incursion in August 2024, with daily advance rates down 70% year-on-year.

EconomicAssessed
Key takeaway

Russia's first net territorial loss since Kursk: 116 km² in April, with advance rates down 70% year-on-year.

ISW (Institute for the Study of War) assessed on 3 May 2026 that Russia suffered a net territorial loss of 116 km² in April, the first net loss since Ukraine's Kursk incursion in August 2024 1. Russia's average daily territorial advance fell to 2.9 km² per day over January-April 2026, against 9.76 km² per day in the same period of 2025: a 70% deceleration 2.

Russia cited an April gain of 28.28 km² when including infiltrations in contested grey zones. ISW's net figure of minus 116 km² results from subtracting Ukrainian counterattacks and contested-zone reversals from that gross 28.28 km². Russian forces advance into grey-zone terrain that is not held at fortification depth; when Ukrainian counterattacks clear the position, it drops from the verified count without a corresponding Russian acknowledgement. The same mechanism produced Gerasimov's 5:1 exaggeration ratio on Luhansk claims documented in early May . TASS publishes the 28.28 km² gross figure; Russian operational planners work with a different number.

Over the November 2025-April 2026 window, Russia seized 1,443 km² against 2,368 km² in the equivalent period the prior year: 38% less 3. The kill rate rose 6.5% while engagements fell in early May , meaning Russia is sustaining higher attrition at lower contact tempo. That pattern has historically indicated manpower pressure rather than an operational choice to reduce tempo. The 800-drone barrage on 13 May runs independently of the ground picture. The diplomatic posture in May frames the war as near-complete at the same moment the battlefield picture is running in the other direction.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Russia has been pushing into Ukraine every month for most of the past two years. In April 2026, for the first time since Ukraine launched a surprise attack into Russian territory in August 2024, Russia actually lost more land than it gained. Research groups track this by comparing satellite images of the frontline at the start and end of each month. The net loss was 116 square kilometres, roughly the size of a medium-sized city. Russia's daily advance rate has also fallen by 70% compared to a year ago. This does not mean Ukraine is winning. The war remains grinding and bloody. But Russia's ability to push forward has slowed significantly, which matters for how long the war might last and on what terms it might eventually end.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The 70% advance-rate deceleration has three structural drivers. First, Russian manpower contracting peaked in late 2024; the recruits from that cycle have been committed to the frontline and their assault attrition is reflected in the rising kill-rate data.

Second, Ukraine's deep-strike campaign has degraded Russian logistics and ammunition supply along key axes, reducing the frequency of combined-arms pushes. Third, Western-supplied mine-clearing equipment and electronic warfare systems have raised the cost per kilometre of Russian advance above the 2024 baseline.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

    Russia's first net territorial loss since August 2024 weakens the Kremlin's internal argument that military pressure will force Ukrainian concessions before Western support exhausts; it shifts the calculus toward protracted stalemate.

  • Consequence

    A sustained advance-rate deceleration removes Russia's incentive to offer genuine ceasefire terms, since time favours a party that believes its relative position will improve through reconstitution rather than continuing to deteriorate.

First Reported In

Update #16 · 800 drones, three ceasefires, one cliff

Euromaidan Press / ISW· 13 May 2026
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