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Renewables pass fossil fuels, gas bill rises

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22:33UTC

Wind and solar generated more EU electricity than fossil fuels for the first time in 2025, yet the power sector's gas bill still climbed 16%.

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Key takeaway

Wind and solar hit 30% of EU generation in 2025, but the gas bill still rose 16% on hydro shortfalls.

Ember published its European Electricity Review showing wind and solar exceeded fossil fuels in EU electricity generation for the first time in 2025: renewables at thirty percent against fossil fuels' share. The milestone marks a structural shift in the generation mix. But the EU power sector's gas import bill still reached EUR 32 billion in 2025, up 16% year-on-year, because gas generation itself rose 8% to compensate for reduced hydro output.

The transition insulates unevenly. Spain is largely protected from TTF pass-through; Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium are fully exposed. Ember's data confirms that the merit order mechanism, where the most expensive fuel needed to meet demand sets the price for all generation, means gas retains pricing power far beyond its share of actual generation. In markets where gas sets the marginal price most hours (Italy being the clearest case), the rising renewables share delivers environmental benefit but limited consumer price relief.

The structural implication for traders: EU-wide renewables statistics overstate the degree to which the bloc is insulated from gas price shocks. Market-by-market merit order composition, not aggregate generation share, determines price exposure.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

In 2025, for the first time ever, European wind turbines and solar panels produced more electricity than all fossil fuels combined. This sounds like a major milestone for clean energy, and in generation terms it is. But here is the complication: Europe's gas import bill for electricity still went up by 16%, to EUR 32 billion. This is because wind and solar do not blow and shine all the time. When they stop, something else needs to fill in quickly, and right now gas stations are the primary backup. Gas is now used less for routine power but more for emergency top-ups, which happen to be at the most expensive market hours.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The simultaneous achievement of renewable majority and rising gas bills reflects the merit order's structural mechanics: wind and solar push gas out of baseload hours but increase gas's role in marginal hours, where gas must provide rapid ramping to cover renewable generation shortfalls.

Gas-fired plants running fewer hours but at higher marginal prices can generate the same or higher revenue, and their fuel costs per unit of production are higher because they operate less efficiently at low capacity factors.

The hydro shortfall is the second structural factor. European reservoir hydro output fell 8% in 2025 due to below-average Alpine snowpack and drought in Iberia's river basins. Gas compensated for this on an essentially unplanned basis, at spot prices, because the hydro shortfall was not foreseeable six months in advance when storage injection contracts were placed.

What could happen next?

Consequence
The EUR 32 billion gas bill for power generation creates a permanent structural argument for accelerating battery storage and interconnection investment, as each alternative capacity unit reduces the volume of spot gas purchased at peak prices.
Risk
If Alpine hydro output continues below long-run averages due to climate-related snowpack decline, gas compensation demand will remain a structural feature of EU electricity markets regardless of renewable capacity growth.

Source Landscape

This story draws on mixed-leaning sources from Belgium

Belgium

LeftRight

Primary parallel: Germany's Energiewende faced the same paradox in 2013-16: renewable capacity exceeded coal and nuclear in installed capacity, but gas and coal consumption still grew as hydro output fell and solar/wind variability required flexible backup generation. German industrial gas consumption peaked in 2016, not 2013 as originally modelled, because the transition created demand for flexible gas backup that the original planning had not fully accounted for.

Counter-parallel: Denmark reached over 50% wind generation share in 2015 without a corresponding gas demand rise, because Danish interconnectors with Norway and Sweden provided hydro balancing at marginal cost. The EU-wide position lacks this balancing capacity: Norwegian hydro is insufficient to backstop the whole continental grid.

The EUR 32 billion gas bill on top of significant EU wind and solar subsidies (estimated at EUR 50-60 billion annually in feed-in tariff and contract-for-difference obligations) suggests the EU is paying for two energy systems simultaneously. The renewable subsidy cost supports low-carbon capacity; the gas bill pays for the flexibility that makes renewables-heavy grids operational.

The critical policy implication: EUR 32 billion in annual gas purchases is the economic incentive for accelerating battery storage, demand response, and cross-border interconnection. Each percentage point reduction in gas-at-the-margin hours reduces the gas bill by approximately EUR 640 million at current prices, providing a precise investment return metric for flexibility alternatives.

Consensus view: Ember lead analyst Dave Jones assessed that the 2025 result is an efficiency paradox: wind and solar achieved generation majority, yet gas demand rose because the energy transition has not yet replaced gas in its two remaining dominant roles (heating load following and hydro backup). The EUR 32 billion gas bill reflects that these residual uses involve purchasing gas on spot at peak prices, not baseload contract prices.

Counter-view: The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) argued that the EUR 32 billion figure overstates the structural problem: a significant portion reflects strategic storage injection at elevated prices, which is a deliberate choice rather than unavoidable demand. If the EU had maintained pre-crisis storage norms, the actual operational gas bill would be approximately EUR 18 billion, with the premium attributable to forced emergency injection.

Key tension: Whether the rising gas bill despite renewables majority reflects an unavoidable structural transition gap (requiring a decade of further investment in seasonal storage alternatives) or a policy failure in gas demand management (solvable through accelerated heat pump deployment and demand flexibility mechanisms).

Sources:Bruegel·Ember

Mentions:Russia →Ember →European Union →Netherlands →Denmark →Belgium →Prima →Italy →Sweden →Norway →Germany →Dutch TTF →

First Reported In

Update #1 · Europe's thinnest gas cushion since 2018

Bruegel· 13 Apr 2026

Read original →

Different Perspectives

European Commission

Commissioner Jorgensen formally acknowledged the post-Russia energy security framework cannot absorb the LNG shock, cutting the mandatory storage target from 90% to 80% and explicitly warning that normalisation is not foreseeable even with immediate peace. The Commission is now dependent on coordinated member state LNG purchasing and demand flexibility to bridge the remaining gap.

Germany

Germany holds the EU's largest storage estate but entered injection season at 23.32% fill with a 4.3 TWh/day injection ceiling that physically prevents any sprint recovery; the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium has maintained its early warning stage since July 2025. An escalation to Alarmstufe, which would trigger compulsory injection obligations, remains live if storage fails to rise through April.

QatarEnergy

QatarEnergy declared force majeure on European LNG contracts citing Ras Laffan strike damage, while the Gulf Research Centre assessed the declaration may also reflect a commercial decision to reallocate volumes toward higher-priced Asian spot markets without triggering breach penalties. Independent engineering confirmation of damage extent has not been published, leaving legal and commercial uncertainty unresolved.

Equinor / Norway

Norway remains the EU's largest pipeline gas supplier and benefits from sustained elevated TTF; Norwegian pipeline capacity has partially offset the Russian supply loss but cannot close the structural gap. Norway Zone 4 power prices at EUR 2/MWh on 13 April illustrate how hydro-dominated systems are structurally decoupled from the gas price shock affecting continental Europe.

Italy

Italy cleared day-ahead power at EUR 133/MWh on 13 April, four to five times the Iberian equivalent, because gas-fired plants set the marginal price for approximately 90% of generation hours. Italy's circa 40 GW of gas-fired CCGT capacity, built when gas was cheap and nuclear was politically blocked, is now a structural liability at EUR 47/MWh TTF.

Spain

Spain cleared at EUR 29/MWh on the same day Italy paid EUR 133/MWh, the starkest single-day demonstration that its renewable energy investment is translating directly into price shock insulation for industry. Iberian interconnector constraints at the Pyrenees mean Spain cannot export this advantage to northern European markets at scale.