UNC6780 exploited CVE-2026-42208, an SQL injection vulnerability in the open-source LiteLLM proxy library, within 36 hours of CISA adding the flaw to the KEV catalogue on Friday 8 May 2026, per Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG)12. LiteLLM is an open-source proxy that sits between enterprise applications and frontier Large Language Models; its commercial parent, BerriAI, was named as a victim of the same intrusion. UNC6780 used SANDCLOCK-stolen AWS keys and GitHub tokens to operate inside both estates.
The 36-hour figure matters because the typical enterprise patch cycle for KEV-flagged vulnerabilities runs five to ten days. GTIG's assessment is that this window has been compressed by roughly 85 percent for the LiteLLM case, leaving most defenders without a credible response interval between detection and active intrusion. The 36-hour figure runs alongside the deadline-before-patch tension established by Palo Alto's PAN-OS captive-portal flaw two days earlier, where the first federal deadline preceded the vendor's first available fix.
UNC6780 is the same cluster GTIG named in the Cisco AI Defense source-code theft. The AI-security M&A market repriced by the $32 billion Google-Wiz close in March 2026 now has named breach incidents on both sides of its supply chain: the defender (Cisco AI Defense) and the proxy layer most often deployed in front of it (LiteLLM and BerriAI). Cloudflare AI Gateway sits in the same architectural slot as LiteLLM and has not been named as a victim. For chief information security officers buying AI-security tooling, the procurement question shifts from feature comparison to supply-chain hygiene of the LLM proxy itself.
