Skip to content
You can now search across every topic, entity and event.What's new
AI: Jobs, Power & Money
22MAR

AI threatens 75% of US tax revenue

4 min read
12:34UTC

Three-quarters of US federal revenue comes from taxing labour. Two economists have mapped what happens to the fiscal base when the labour shrinks.

EconomicAssessed
Key takeaway

Three-quarters of US federal revenue rests on a labour base AI is actively eroding.

A working paper by economists Anton Korinek and Benjamin Lockwood, published through The Brookings Institution, finds that approximately three-quarters of US federal tax revenue derives from labour taxation — income tax and payroll contributions combined 1. The paper argues that sufficient AI-driven displacement of labour income would force a structural shift in how the federal government funds itself, likely toward consumption-based taxation.

The finding sharpens a vulnerability that earlier research had sketched in broader terms. A RAND working paper had already warned that AI priced at cost could induce deflation, making federal debt repayment harder, while Brookings' own prior analysis noted that payroll taxes as a fraction of GDP would decline as displacement accelerated . Korinek and Lockwood put a concrete ratio on that exposure: not a marginal risk, but the foundation of federal fiscal capacity. The Dallas Fed's finding that employment has already fallen roughly 1% in the most AI-exposed industries — concentrated among workers under 25 whose compressed job-finding rates reduce their lifetime tax contributions — suggests the erosion has started at the entry point of the labour pipeline.

The paper lands in a policy environment where competing responses are already forming. Senator Sanders' proposed robot tax would attempt to recoup lost payroll revenue directly from firms that replace workers with AI. The Warner-Rounds Economy of the Future Commission Act tasks its expert body with delivering recommendations on taxation and unemployment insurance within 13 months. Andrew Yang has renewed his call to shift taxation from labour to AI-generated wealth, citing Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei's support . Each proposal implicitly accepts Korinek and Lockwood's premise — that the current tax base cannot survive large-scale labour displacement intact — but offers a different mechanism for adaptation.

The fiscal pressure compounds from both sides simultaneously. The IRS has lost 31% of its revenue agents and 27% of its IT staff, with the Yale Budget Lab projecting $159 billion in foregone collections over the coming decade . A tax system built on labour income is losing both the income it taxes and the enforcement capacity to collect what remains. The AEI's rebuttal to the Sanders report — that current AI tools function as skill equalisers rather than job eliminators — does not address this structural dependency. Even if AI raises productivity without net job losses, a shift from wages to capital returns concentrates income in forms that the current tax code captures less efficiently. The question Korinek and Lockwood pose is not whether AI destroys jobs, but whether the fiscal architecture built for a wage-earning economy can fund a government serving one where wages constitute a shrinking share of national income 2.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Nearly all federal government funding — Social Security, Medicare, defence, roads, everything — ultimately derives from taxes on wages and employment. If AI reduces the number of people earning wages, or compresses what those wages are, the government collects substantially less money. The Brookings paper argues this is not a marginal risk but a structural one, and that the US would eventually have to shift to taxing what people spend rather than what they earn — a politically and economically disruptive transition.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

Events 17 and 18 form a compounding feedback loop the body does not explicitly draw: the Brookings labour-tax vulnerability is being realised simultaneously through two channels — AI displacement eroding the tax base from below, and IRS capacity cuts weakening collection from above. Both effects are silent until a future budget crisis makes them visible together.

Root Causes

The US fiscal architecture's labour-tax dependence reflects a deliberate post-New Deal political design: FICA payroll taxes were structured to feel like earned entitlements, building public support for Social Security by tying benefits to contributions. That political genius is now a structural liability — the architecture that made social insurance durable is the same one that makes it vulnerable to labour displacement.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    Payroll tax base erosion from AI displacement accelerates Social Security and Medicare trust fund insolvency beyond the current 2033–2035 projection window.

    Long term · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Political pressure for consumption tax introduction will intensify as labour displacement data becomes undeniable, reopening distributional battles that have blocked VAT introduction in the US since the 1980s.

    Medium term · Suggested
  • Meaning

    The US fiscal architecture is structurally misaligned with an AI-intensive economy — not facing a cyclical revenue dip but a foundational design mismatch.

    Long term · Assessed
  • Risk

    Robot tax proposals and similar levies become more politically attractive as stopgap measures precisely because consumption tax transition is too slow and politically toxic for short-term fiscal gaps.

    Short term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #2 · 45,000 tech layoffs, half may be reversed

Brookings· 22 Mar 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
European Commission
European Commission
The European Commission's draft Annex III guidelines, closed for comment on 23 July, treat algorithmic scoring in recruitment, pay and termination as high-risk regardless of whether a human signs off, echoing Spain's Audiencia Nacional ruling 101/2026 on concealed scheduling algorithms. Brussels is shifting the fight from counting AI job losses to assigning legal liability for the tools themselves.
Office for National Statistics
Office for National Statistics
The Office for National Statistics recorded UK vacancies rising to 712,000 on 21 July, the first quarterly increase this beat has tracked, with payrolled employment down 85,000 on the year against May's 210,000 fall. The bulletin names no AI cause anywhere, and that is the point: nothing in the release confirms the displacement story it gets cited to support.
Christian Klein, SAP
Christian Klein, SAP
Christian Klein told investors on 23 July that SAP's research headcount will not grow for twelve months because AI agents and their token costs are absorbing the work, not because SAP is cutting jobs. He frames it as commercial arithmetic: the cost of AI-assisted coding tokens plus the salaries specialist AI hires command, not people being replaced by machines.
Betsey Stevenson, University of Michigan
Betsey Stevenson, University of Michigan
Betsey Stevenson argued that the 187,000 jobless-claims reading describes a market that hires little and fires little, not one AI is emptying. She said the real damage hides in eligibility rules and suppressed job postings, not in the headline layoff counts employers keep denying.
Comisiones Obreras, UGT and Concentrix's A Coruña works committee
Comisiones Obreras, UGT and Concentrix's A Coruña works committee
Comisiones Obreras, UGT and Concentrix's A Coruña works committee blamed Microsoft's push toward AI self-service for the 80 redundancies unions signed off on 22 July, not unavoidable business cause. A second Coruña procedure covering 80 more jobs runs to a 31 August deadline, and the unions want the state, not the employer, setting the pace of AI-driven cuts.
Stanford's 'We Must Act Now' signatories
Stanford's 'We Must Act Now' signatories
More than 200 academics, including 16 Nobel laureates, published a 13 July letter warning of AI-driven labour disruption, citing Daron Acemoglu's NBER estimate that AI's total factor productivity gain stays under 0.66% over ten years. The letter's own cited economics sit well below Goldman Sachs Research's 1.5-percentage-point estimate published the same week.