
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS)
Standard shipping lanes through Strait of Hormuz; IRGC published danger zone over TSS on 9 April 2026.
Last refreshed: 9 April 2026 · Appears in 1 active topic
Can Iran legally replace IMO-governed Hormuz lanes with an IRGC-run corridor?
Latest on Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS)
- What is the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Strait of Hormuz?
- The TSS is the internationally recognised shipping lane system through the Strait of Hormuz, administered by the IMO. It separates inbound and outbound tanker traffic and carries roughly 20% of global oil supply.Source: IMO
- What did Iran do to the Hormuz shipping lanes in April 2026?
- On 9 April 2026, the IRGC published mine charts via ISNA and Tasnim overlaying a danger zone over the standard TSS lanes through Hormuz, directing ships to Larak Island IRGC-supervised corridors instead. Zero tankers transited on Day 1 of the Ceasefire.Source: ISNA / Tasnim / Kpler / Lowdown update 63
- Is the Strait of Hormuz still open to tankers?
- Iran announced the strait was open after the April 2026 Ceasefire, but Kpler tracked zero tankers on Day 1. The IRGC published charts directing ships away from standard IMO-governed lanes to IRGC-supervised Larak corridors, deterring tanker operators.Source: Kpler / Lowdown update 63
Background
The Traffic Separation Scheme through the Strait of Hormuz is the internationally recognised maritime corridor, administered under IMO conventions, that separates inbound and outbound tanker traffic through the strait. It carries approximately 20% of global oil supply and is one of the most closely monitored shipping lanes in the world. On 9 April 2026, the IRGC published danger zone charts via ISNA and Tasnim overlaying the TSS with a maritime exclusion area, effectively declaring the standard lanes hazardous and directing ships instead towards Larak Island corridors under IRGC escort.
The TSS was established under the International Maritime Organization's COLREGS framework and is not subject to unilateral modification by any single state. Iran's publication of charts that conflicted with the TSS was therefore not a formal navigational notice but an implicit threat: vessels using the standard lanes were being told, through a semiofficial channel, that those lanes were now mined or otherwise dangerous. No formal NOTAM or NAVAREA warning was issued through standard IMO channels.
The incident tested whether Iran could functionally replace the IMO-governed TSS with an IRGC-managed corridor system without triggering a formal legal or military response. Tanker operators responded by holding vessels outside the strait on Day 1, validating the IRGC's coercive intent without the need to detain or attack a single ship. The zero-tanker count tracked by Kpler on Ceasefire Day 1 was the direct commercial consequence.