
Mohammad Sarafraz
Member of Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace and former head of state broadcaster IRIB, who disclosed in May 2026 that Chinese DPI hardware had arrived in Iran.
Last refreshed: 26 May 2026 · Appears in 1 active topic
Why did an Iranian state official publicly confirm China's censorship hardware is already in place?
Timeline for Mohammad Sarafraz
Confirmed Chinese-built hardware for a permanent switchable internet blackout had been imported and installed
Iran Conflict 2026: Iran's internet returns at 40%, by designDisclosed in a 23 May interview that Chinese DPI hardware had already arrived in Iran
Iran Conflict 2026: Iran buys China's internet control dial- Who is Mohammad Sarafraz and what did he reveal about Iran's internet?
- Mohammad Sarafraz is a member of Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace and a former head of state broadcaster IRIB. In May 2026 he confirmed that Chinese Deep Packet Inspection hardware had already arrived in Iran, intended to build a tiered censorship system modelled on the 2009 Xinjiang internet isolation.Source: Lowdown reporting
- What is the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and who sits on it?
- The Supreme Council of Cyberspace is Iran's highest internet policy authority, reporting to the Supreme Leader. Members include senior state media officials such as Mohammad Sarafraz, who also served as IRIB director-general from 2014 to 2019.
- How does Iran's planned internet censorship system work?
- Iran is building a tiered, switchable system using Chinese Deep Packet Inspection hardware. It would allow the state to throttle dissent at the network layer without a total shutdown, following the model China used in Xinjiang in 2009.Source: Lowdown reporting
- What did Iran's IRIB head do after leaving state television?
- After leaving IRIB in 2019, Mohammad Sarafraz moved into cyber-policy through membership of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, where he has been involved in decisions about Iran's internet architecture and the procurement of Chinese filtering technology.
Background
Mohammad Sarafraz disclosed on 23 May 2026 that Chinese Deep Packet Inspection hardware had already arrived in Iran, making the first authoritative public confirmation of the technology's deployment. Speaking as a member of Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace, he described a planned tiered censorship architecture modelled on China's ten-month sealing of Xinjiang in 2009, designed to let the state throttle dissent without paralysing commerce.
Sarafraz served as director-general of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) from 2014 to 2019, placing him at the apex of state media during one of its most consequential periods. Under his tenure IRIB consolidated its reach across more than thirty television channels and expanded Press TV's international operations. His subsequent seat on the Supreme Council of Cyberspace positioned him at the intersection of broadcast propaganda and internet governance, two instruments the Islamic Republic deploys in parallel during moments of internal crisis. Iran's wartime internet shutdown surpassed 1,700 cumulative hours by mid-May 2026, the longest sustained national restriction NetBlocks has recorded.
As a public official operating within the Supreme Leader's orbit, Sarafraz represents the institutional layer that bridges hardware procurement and political authority. His willingness to confirm the Chinese equipment publicly, rather than deny or deflect, signals that Tehran's leadership now regards the surveillance infrastructure as a legitimising achievement rather than an embarrassment. His statements carry weight precisely because the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, not the elected government, sets Iran's internet architecture.