27MAR

Leaked data: 62% killed, medevac gone

2 min read

20:48UTC

A 62:38 killed-to-wounded ratio, the inverse of Western military norms, points to a catastrophic failure of battlefield medical care on the Russian side.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Russian troops appear nearly twice as likely to die as to survive their wounds.

Leaked Russian internal assessments revealed a 62:38 killed-to-wounded ratio, the inverse of Western military norms where roughly 30% of casualties are killed and 70% survive ¹. The data, cited by Ukrainian Military Intelligence, suggests Russian field medical care has effectively collapsed.

Western armies invest heavily in the "golden hour": rapid casualty evacuation, forward surgical teams, and helicopter medevac to stabilise wounded soldiers within 60 minutes. The 62:38 ratio implies that the majority of wounded Russian soldiers die before reaching treatment. Contributing factors likely include insufficient armoured ambulances, overextended medical units across a 1,200-kilometre front, and the sheer volume of daily engagements (619 in four days by Syrskyi's count).

The intelligence source introduces uncertainty. Ukrainian military intelligence has operational incentives to emphasise Russian losses. Western military analysts have not independently corroborated the specific ratio. However, the figure is consistent with observable indicators: recruitment that fails to replace losses, Mediazona's confirmed death count accelerating to 207 per day, and Russia's reliance on convict recruits and mobilised reservists with minimal training.

If the ratio holds at scale, Russia's 206,200 confirmed deaths translate to approximately 126,600 surviving wounded, not the 480,000-plus a Western ratio would produce. Each Russian soldier sent to the front faces far worse odds than any peer military would accept.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

In modern Western armies, roughly 30 out of every 100 casualties die; 70 survive their wounds. Leaked Russian internal data suggests the opposite is happening: roughly 62 die, 38 survive. This matters because it means Russian soldiers are nearly twice as likely to die from their wounds as survive them. The likely reason: Russia cannot get injured soldiers to hospital quickly enough. Ukrainian drones attack supply routes in Russian-held areas, and Russia's military medical system was not built for this scale of daily casualties. Treat this with caution: the data comes from Ukrainian military intelligence, which has reasons to emphasise Russian losses.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

A 62:38 killed-to-wounded ratio has identifiable structural causes.

Russia's reliance on convict recruits and poorly trained mobilised reservists means fewer soldiers have basic combat casualty care training. Applying a tourniquet in the first minutes can be the difference between survival and death — a skill drilled into professional soldiers but often absent in hastily mobilised units.

Ukrainian drone saturation of Russian rear areas disrupts medical evacuation routes. Armoured ambulances and casualty collection points are legitimate military targets; Ukraine's FPV drones have been documented striking both.

Russia's 1,200-kilometre front line means medical units must cover enormous distances. Forward surgical teams cannot be pre-positioned everywhere; the 207 confirmed daily deaths suggest many soldiers bleed out before reaching treatment.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-left-leaning sources from Ukraine

Ukraine

Primary parallel: Soviet forces in Afghanistan (1979-89) had a killed-to-wounded ratio of approximately 1:3.4 — meaning roughly 23% of casualties died. Even that figure, considered high by Western standards, is far below Russia's reported 62:38 in Ukraine. The Soviet Afghan campaign is the closest modern precedent for a major power fighting a high-intensity war with an underfunded medical evacuation chain.

Counter-parallel: US forces in Vietnam achieved a killed-to-wounded ratio of roughly 1:5, largely through helicopter medevac. The golden-hour doctrine — evacuate within 60 minutes — saved lives at a rate Russia's current posture evidently cannot match. Ukraine's own drone interdiction of Russian rear areas may be actively preventing armoured ambulance movement.

Sources:Kyiv Independent

Mentions:Russia →Mediazona →

First Reported In

Update #8 · Pentagon diverts funds; 948 drones fired

Kyiv Independent· 27 Mar 2026

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Different Perspectives

Belarus

Minsk announced completion of its own 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade near Gomel, under plans dating to August 2025 rather than a response to any single frontline event this window, keeping its hedge of hosting the war without formally joining Russia's mobilisation drive.

European Union / Operation IRINI states

Italy, Greece and Poland boarded the sanctioned tanker Toa Payoh off Pantelleria under a standing EU mandate rather than a national decision, extending enforcement from the Channel and Baltic and the Black Sea and Azov into the Mediterranean. Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto praised the crew; the captain's refusal to produce documentation left detention unconfirmed.

Poland and the NATO eastern flank

Warsaw's Coordination Team said explicitly its forces tracked the 30 July missile incursion and were ready to shoot it down, then flew air cover for an EU tanker interdiction three days later. Poland is simultaneously the war's nearest spillover victim and a contributor to enforcing sanctions against the state causing that spillover.

Ukraine (government, defence establishment and civilians)

Kyiv runs its manpower crisis through acting Defence Minister Yevhen Khmara, whose formal appointment waits for parliament's 18 August return, and a fortnight-old Commander-in-Chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi. Reported attacks on enlistment officers rose from 5 cases in 2022 to 341 in 2025, reaching Odesa's Territorial Recruitment Centre staff directly on 2 August.

Kremlin and Russian domestic economic voices

Moscow has not addressed July's advance-rate collapse or Sberbank's OFZ warning; Novak's diary ran to OPEC+ quota diplomacy with no diesel item logged since 15 July. Economist Nikolai Korzhenevsky calls the Central Bank's RUB 2.3tn in bank lending effectively deficit monetisation, a framing Sberbank's Skvortsov, with his own institutional interest, has not disputed.

IAEA (Rafael Grossi)

IAEA inspectors logged Zaporizhzhia's 22nd loss of off-site power, ten of them in the last three months, after a thunderstorm knocked out the plant's sole surviving backup line. Grossi reads the accelerating frequency, not any single outage, as the safety signal now that the plant's redundancy is exhausted.