Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had not appeared in public for at least 17 days as of 30 March, the longest absence of any Supreme Leader since the 1979 revolution.12 His only communication was a written statement read by a state TV anchor over a still photograph. No video or audio of Khamenei himself has been released.
The absence coincides with the most consequential period of the war: ground forces converging on the Gulf, a third Bushehr strike, the NPT withdrawal bill, and 1,700 wartime arrests. Jerusalem Post sources described the Iranian power arrangement: 'The Revolutionary Guards are controlling him, not the other way around.' A Middle East Institute senior fellow assessed that Mojtaba Khamenei 'owes his position to the Revolutionary Guards.'
Whether the absence reflects security precautions, incapacity, or IRGC-imposed isolation cannot be determined from open sources. The CIA, Mossad, and allied agencies were actively searching for evidence he is alive and functioning as of Day 23. His predecessor missed no Nowruz address in the revolution's entire history; Mojtaba's silence over the Persian New Year on 20 March remains the most striking public absence.
The practical consequence is institutional: the IRGC appears to be the decision-making authority in a wartime state that constitutionally vests supreme authority in a single individual. The 1,700 arrests across Kurdish provinces, the Hormuz toll system, and the university ultimatum all bear IRGC institutional fingerprints. Who authorised them is an open question.
