17MAR

Pakistan Hormuz deal: 40 ships of 2,000

2 min read

04:31UTC

Islamabad secured passage for 20 more vessels, but the deal covers a fraction of the queue and preserves Iran's legal claim over the strait.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Pakistan's Hormuz deal reinforces Iran's sovereignty claim while covering under 2% of stranded vessels.

Pakistan secured a second bilateral deal with Iran: 20 more vessels at two per day, bringing the total to approximately 40 Pakistani-flagged ships ¹. Iran's state media framed it as a bilateral arrangement, not a concession on Hormuz sovereignty. Against approximately 2,000 stranded ships , 40 vessels represents less than 2% of the queue.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif held what Pakistani officials described as "extensive discussions" with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Finance Minister Ishaq Dar called the deal a "harbinger of peace." It is not. Every bilateral deal reinforces Tehran's leverage by demonstrating that Hormuz passage now flows from Iranian permission, not international law. Each agreement concedes the premise that Iran controls the strait .

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The Strait of Hormuz has about 2,000 ships stuck waiting to pass through. Pakistan negotiated a deal to get 40 of its own ships through, two per day. That is less than 2% of the queue. The deal is significant not for the ships it moves but for what it implies: Pakistan accepted that Iran's permission is required to transit an international waterway. International law says Iran has no right to charge that toll or require that permission. Every bilateral deal like this one makes it slightly harder to argue that Iran is violating international law, because sovereign states are effectively recognising Iran's authority by asking for its approval.

Source Landscape

This story draws predominantly on Iran state media, with sources from Iran

Iran

Against roughly 2,000 stranded vessels carrying an estimated 20,000 seafarers and cargo valued in the billions, 40 Pakistani-flagged vessels represents a negligible proportion. The deal's economic significance for global markets is near zero; its political and legal significance is substantial.

Consensus view: The Atlantic Council and the International Institute for Strategic Studies assess Pakistan's bilateral Hormuz deal as reinforcing Iranian sovereignty leverage: each agreement treats passage as a gift from Tehran rather than a legal right, gradually establishing the precedent Iran needs.

Counter-view: Pakistani Foreign Ministry officials and Islamabad-based Strategic Vision Institute argue the deals are a pragmatic trade necessity for a nuclear-armed state that cannot afford an economic blockade, and that bilateral arrangements are a lesser concession than outright acceptance of tolls by flag-of-convenience ships.

Key tension: Whether bilateral deals increase diplomatic pressure on Iran by demonstrating that non-Western states can negotiate independently of the US framework, or whether they undermine international legal principles by normalising sovereign control of an international strait.

Sources:PressTV

Mentions:Strait of Hormuz →Iran →Pakistan →

First Reported In

Update #51 · Iran hits aluminium plants; Hormuz emptying

PressTV· 29 Mar 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Pakistan bids to host US-Iran talks

Pakistan's second bilateral Hormuz deal follows its prior facilitation role and confirms its positioning as Iran's preferred bilateral intermediary.

Occurred 24 Mar 2026

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This Event

Pakistan Hormuz deal: 40 ships of 2,000

The bilateral deal demonstrates Iran's ability to grant selective passage while maintaining its sovereignty position, turning Hormuz access into a diplomatic currency rather than a legal right.

Led to

COSCO ships pay IRGC toll at Hormuz

Pakistan's deal for 20 additional ships through Hormuz created the precedent that state-backed vessels can transit under negotiated terms.

Occurred 30 Mar 2026

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Different Perspectives

IAEA

Director General Rafael Grossi appeared in person at the UNSC on 19 May and warned that a direct hit on an operating reactor 'could result in very high release of radioactivity'. The session produced a condemnation record but no resolution, and the Barakah perimeter was already struck on 17 May.

Hengaw (Kurdish rights monitor)

Hengaw documented three judicial executions and the detention of Kurdish writer Majid Karimi in Tehran on 19 May, establishing Khorasan Razavi province as the newest geography in Iran's wartime judicial record. The organisation's Norway-based operation continues to surface a domestic repression track running in parallel with every diplomatic and military development.

India

Six India-flagged vessels conducted a coordinated cluster transit under PGSA bilateral assurances during the 17 May window, paying no yuan tolls. New Delhi's inclusion in Iran's state-to-state passage track insulates Indian energy supply without requiring endorsement of the PGSA's yuan-toll architecture or alignment with the US coalition.

Pakistan

Pakistan is the only functioning diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington. Its role is relay, not mediation in the settlement sense: it conveyed Iran's 10-point counter-MOU in early May, relayed the US rejection, and is now passing 'corrective points' in the third documented exchange of this sub-cycle without either side working from a shared text.

UK and France (Northwood coalition)

Twenty-six coalition members have published no rules of engagement eight days after the Bahrain joint statement; Lloyd's underwriters have conditioned war-risk reopening on written ROE from either Iran or the coalition. Italian and French mine-countermeasures deployments are operating on the in-water clearance task CENTCOM Admiral Brad Cooper's 90% mine-stockpile claim does not address.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh has not publicly commented on the Barakah strike or the 50-47 discharge vote. Saudi output feeds the IEA's $106 base case; the $5 Brent premium above that model reflects institutional uncertainty no Gulf producer can compress through supply adjustment alone.